DevOps & Infra

daemon-blockint-tech Bundle

Guides enterprise-scale cloud architecture—multi-BU landing zones and federation, cloud Center of Excellence governance, enterprise agreement and commit strategy, org-wide FinOps and chargeback, regulated-workload patterns (residency, segmentation), hybrid integration with identity and ERP, and architecture review board standards for large organizations. Use when designing cloud at hundreds of accounts, steering CCoE policy, EA/MACC optimization, sovereign or regulated cloud placement, or executive cloud governance—not for single-product cloud designs (cloud-architect), hands-on service config (cloud-engineer), SOC 2 evidence automation (compliance-engineer), general cross-domain ADRs (senior-system-architecture), or enterprise AI copilot architecture (applied-ai-architect-commercial-enterprise), or VP-level cloud program portfolio and board narratives (vp-of-cloud).

daemon-blockint-tech Bundle

Design carrier- and enterprise-scale backbone networks—core/distribution/edge topology, OSPF, IS-IS, BGP and route policy, WAN/MPLS/SD-WAN, DCI, peering, transit, IX, anycast, ECMP, BFD, FRR, addressing, backbone QoS, capacity, maintenance domains, and observability (NetFlow, SNMP, telemetry); EVPN/VXLAN spine-leaf where relevant. This skill should be used when the user asks about network backbone, backbone architect, BGP design, OSPF, IS-IS, WAN architecture, MPLS, SD-WAN, data center interconnect, DCI, internet peering, transit provider, IX, core network design, route policy, ECMP, network redundancy, spine-leaf, or EVPN—not app HTTP/API (enterprise-integration-api-developer), cloud landing zone or VPC only (cloud-architect, enterprise-cloud-architect), host or endpoint security (information-security-engineer), cloud/Linux sysadmin (cloud-system-administrator), cabling without routing (infrastructure-engineer), or OT/ICS (scada-ics-cyber-security-specialist).

daemon-blockint-tech Bundle

Guides authorized offensive security work—engagement scoping and rules of engagement, reconnaissance, vulnerability validation, exploitation proof-of-concept, attack-path chaining, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, and remediation-focused reporting for pentests and red-team exercises. Use when planning or executing authorized penetration tests, validating findings with reproducible PoCs, prioritizing exploitable issues, simulating adversary TTPs within scope, or writing offensive findings for engineering remediation—not for SOC alert triage (defensive-security-analyst), security program or GRC design (cybersecurity), CI/CD hardening (devsecops), or LLM jailbreak and prompt-injection testing (ai-redteam).

daemon-blockint-tech Bundle

Guides senior system and solution architecture—cross-service boundaries, integration patterns, non-functional requirements (scale, reliability, security, cost), ADRs, C4-style modeling, architecture review, build-vs-buy, and phased migration (strangler, dual-write). Use when designing multi-service systems, evaluating platform or vendor choices, writing or reviewing architecture decision records, defining standards and principles, or assessing technical risk across domains—not for single-service RFCs and module design (senior-software-engineer), data platform or mesh decisions (data-architect), cloud landing zone, Well-Architected, and migration architecture (cloud-architect), cloud/IaC implementation (infrastructure-engineer, cloud-engineer), internal developer platform product (platform-engineer), or program tracking (technical-program-manager). For business strategy and cases, use business-consultant; for applied AI (RAG, agents, copilots), use applied-ai-architect-commercial-enterprise.

daemon-blockint-tech Bundle

Guides cloud compliance—mapping SOC 2, ISO 27001, HIPAA, PCI DSS, FedRAMP, and data-residency requirements to cloud controls; collecting audit evidence from AWS, GCP, and Azure APIs; shared-responsibility narratives; CSPM/Config continuous monitoring; customer assurance questionnaires (CAIQ/SIG); and cloud-specific gap remediation before attestations. Use when scoping regulated workloads in cloud, preparing cloud control evidence for auditors, interpreting provider compliance artifacts (BAA, PCI AOC, FedRAMP packages), or proving residency and logging in multi-account estates—not for org-wide GRC programs and audit coordination without cloud evidence (compliance-specialist), non-cloud systems evidence automation (compliance-engineer), implementing security guardrails (cloud-security-engineer), legal DPAs or contract redlines (commercial-counsel), security strategy (cybersecurity), or CI pipeline gates only (devsecops).

daemon-blockint-tech Bundle

Guides Kubernetes cluster deployment and operations—cluster bootstrap and upgrades, node pools, add-ons (ingress, CNI, cert-manager), workload delivery with Helm/Kustomize/operators, namespace quotas and RBAC, GitOps sync to clusters, multi-cluster patterns, and production troubleshooting (scheduling, networking, crash loops). Use when deploying or upgrading K8s clusters, installing platform add-ons, rolling out manifests or Helm releases, fixing cluster-level failures, or designing namespace and multi-tenant cluster layout—not for VPC/IaC foundation (infrastructure-engineer), CI pipeline YAML (devops), app rollout strategy canary/blue-green (deployment-strategist), IDP golden paths (platform-engineer), or admission policy program design (devsecops). DC facility design: data-center-design-execution-lead. DC compute supply/efficiency: data-center-compute-supply-efficiency. Rack-ready delivery: senior-data-center-capacity-delivery-manager. RL training jobs on cluster: ml-systems-engineer-rl-engineering.

daemon-blockint-tech Bundle

Design and optimize systems for high concurrency, throughput, scalability, and elastic scale—concurrency models (threads, async/await, actors), lock-free patterns, connection pooling, caching stampede mitigation, horizontal scaling, load balancing, backpressure, queueing, rate limiting, bulkheads, read replicas, sharding, pool tuning, profiling, capacity planning, SLO-driven autoscaling, multi-region and CDN edge architecture. Use when the user asks about high concurrency, scalability, throughput, horizontal scaling, connection pooling, backpressure, rate limiting, caching stampede, read replica, sharding, autoscaling, capacity planning, lock contention, async scalability, or load balancing—not service decomposition (microservices-developer), event buses only (event-driven-architecture), generic CRUD (senior-software-engineer), SRE on-call only (site-reliability-engineer), load tests without architecture (performance-engineer), or cost-only FinOps (cloud-economist).

daemon-blockint-tech Bundle

Guides enterprise-wide security architecture—reference architectures and domains (identity, data, application, network, endpoint), zero-trust and segmentation, framework mapping (NIST CSF, ISO 27001, CIS), EA and risk alignment, architecture executive briefings, and BU/acquisition standards. Use for enterprise security reference models, zero-trust roadmaps, control catalogs, security ARB standards, or acquisition integration—not cloud landing zones (enterprise-cloud-architect), cloud IAM/terraform (cloud-security-engineer), control deployment/SIEM/EDR (information-security-engineer), product ADRs (senior-system-architecture), risk scoring (security-risk-analyst), GRC program (compliance-specialist), evidence automation (compliance-engineer), CI gates (devsecops), or CISO board program (chief-information-security-officer).

daemon-blockint-tech Bundle

Guides information security engineering—implementing and operating security controls, identity and access systems, encryption and secrets management, security tool integrations (SIEM, EDR, SOAR), cloud guardrails, hardening baselines, and remediation engineering for vulnerabilities. Use when building SSO/RBAC/PAM patterns, configuring KMS or certificate lifecycle, deploying WAF/DLP or EDR connectors, writing security-as-code policies (OPA, SCPs, CIS benchmarks), integrating logging to SIEM, automating security workflows, or validating control fixes—not for SOC triage (soc-analyst), pentesting (penetration-tester, network-pentester, web-pentester), red team (red-team-specialist), CI gates only (devsecops), platform provisioning without security ownership (infrastructure-engineer), CISO/exec program (chief-information-security-officer), security program strategy (cybersecurity), GRC program and audit prep (compliance-specialist), or product tenancy isolation (product-infrastructure-security-engineer).

daemon-blockint-tech Bundle

Guides security-focused business continuity and disaster recovery—BIA for critical security and IT services, RTO/RPO for identity and security tooling, cyber-resilient BCP/DRP, ransomware and destructive-attack recovery playbooks, backup/immutability and restore testing, crisis comms coordination with IR, tabletop exercises, and high-level regulatory BCM expectations. Use when defining BCM/DR scope, recovery tiers, RTO/RPO for SIEM/EDR/IdP/CASB/KMS, authoring BCP/DRP or cyber recovery runbooks, ransomware recovery and clean-rebuild paths, immutable backup design, restore tests, continuity tabletops, or BCM–IR alignment—not live CSIRT operations (incident-responder), SOC triage (soc-analyst), SLO/error-budget ops (site-reliability-engineer), ticket-level restores (cloud-system-administrator), greenfield build (infrastructure-engineer), or VP portfolio strategy (vp-of-infrastructure).

daemon-blockint-tech Bundle

Guides data center design and build execution—site and tier selection, capacity and density planning (kW/rack, floor loading), power and cooling architecture, physical layout and containment, network meet-me and carrier connectivity, standards alignment (TIA-942, Uptime tiers), contractor coordination, commissioning, and operational handoff (DCIM, monitoring). Use when planning a new or expanded colo/on-prem facility, reviewing MEP and rack layouts, sizing power/cooling for GPU or HPC density, running DC build phases, or accepting a hall from design—not for cloud VPC/IaC (infrastructure-engineer), K8s deploy (cluster-deployment-engineer), ADRs (senior-system-architecture), GRC-only (cybersecurity), compute utilization (data-center-compute-supply-efficiency), DC portfolio (data-center-portfolio-planning-execution-lead), or capacity delivery schedule (senior-data-center-capacity-delivery-manager).

unboundcompute Skill

Audit how a cluster decides which container images to trust and run: an image referenced by a mutable tag rather than a content digest, a workload pulling from a registry that admits unsigned or unverified images, a signature or attestation policy that is configured but not enforced at admission, and a base image or layer whose origin the pipeline never verified. Covers Kubernetes and container platforms where the image a workload runs is the code that runs, and where tag mutability, signing, and provenance decide whether it is the intended artifact. Use when workloads pull images whose signing and provenance are not enforced end to end. The unverified image reference is the source, the running container is the sink, and the code that runs without proven provenance is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit a Kubernetes namespace that is treated as a tenant isolation boundary for the isolation it does not actually provide: cluster-scoped resources and nodes shared across namespaces, RBAC that grants a tenant reach beyond its own namespace, missing network policy so pods cross namespaces freely, and shared cluster services (DNS, ingress, admission, storage classes) that see or serve every tenant. Covers multi-tenant clusters where each tenant is given a namespace and the namespace is assumed to contain them. Use when a namespace is the unit of tenant separation and the assumption is that a tenant cannot affect or observe another. The tenant confined to a namespace is the source, the cross-tenant resource or namespace it reaches is the sink, and the isolation the namespace does not enforce is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Hunt for node-level Kubernetes endpoints that are reachable and under-authenticated: a kubelet API that allows anonymous or unauthenticated requests to list pods, read logs, or exec into containers, a read-only kubelet port exposing pod and node data, a node-local metadata or debug endpoint reachable from a pod, and a kubelet authorization mode that authenticates but does not restrict what a caller can do. Covers Kubernetes nodes where the kubelet and other node-local services expose control over the pods on that node. Use when node endpoints may be reachable from pods or the network and their authentication is the only thing standing between a caller and node-level control. The reachable caller is the source, the kubelet or node endpoint is the sink, and the anonymous or unauthorized access it permits is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Map what cloud identity a compromised pod can reach and what that identity can then do: a pod bound to a workload identity or role far broader than it needs, a node instance role reachable from any pod through the node metadata endpoint, a service-account token mounted into a pod that federates to cloud, and the chain from one pod's credential to another cloud resource or identity. Covers Kubernetes on cloud where pods obtain cloud credentials through workload identity federation, mounted tokens, or the node role, and where a pod compromise becomes cloud access. Use when pods hold or can reach cloud credentials and the blast radius of a pod compromise is the question. The compromised pod is the source, the cloud resource its credential reaches is the sink, and the over-broad or reachable credential is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit cluster admission control for gaps that let a non-compliant or hostile workload through: a validating webhook that fails open when its backend is unreachable, a policy that scopes by namespace or label and misses the namespaces that matter, a mutating webhook whose changes are trusted downstream, and an ordering or exemption that lets a privileged pod bypass the checks meant to stop it. Covers Kubernetes admission webhooks and policy engines that are supposed to enforce workload security at create and update time. Use when admission policies are the control that keeps privileged, unsigned, or over-permissioned workloads out of the cluster. The workload submitted for admission is the source, the admitted resource is the sink, and the policy gap that let it through is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit event-driven function handlers that trust the event because it arrived from inside the platform: a handler that treats any delivered event as authentic without verifying its true source or integrity, event fields flowing untrusted into a database write, command, downstream call, or constructed path, a function reachable by several event types or actors that runs privileged logic for one that should not trigger it, and an over-broad execution identity that turns a single spoofed or injected event into wide reach. Covers source authentication, event injection, per-event-type and per-actor authorization, and execution-role blast radius across queues, object-store notifications, schedules, topics, and gateways. Use when functions are triggered by events and the handler trusts the payload or its claimed origin. The event payload is the source, the handler's action is the sink, and the assumed-not-verified trust is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit cloud and platform service-account keys for lifecycle weaknesses that turn a non-human credential into standing access: a user-managed key file that never expires and is copied into repos, CI config, or developer laptops, a service account granted far more privilege than its workload needs so the key is a broad credential, a key that is never rotated and has no owner tracking who holds copies, a key that can be created or downloaded by someone who should only use the account, and a disabled or deleted service account whose outstanding keys still authenticate. Use when a non-human identity authenticates with a long-lived key and the scope, rotation, and containment of that key is the boundary. The over-privileged, unrotated, or exportable service-account key is the source, the workload-level access an attacker gains by holding it is the sink, and the excess privilege, missing rotation, or exportable key material is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Hunt privilege-escalation paths in cloud identity and access management: a low-privileged principal that chains role assumptions, policy rewrites, role-passing, and over-broad trust relationships to reach an administrative or data-access principal. Covers the identity-to-permission-to-resource graph, the known escalation primitives (passing a more privileged role to a service, rewriting a policy to a permissive version, assuming a role whose trust condition is too loose), and the boundary controls that should stop the chain. Use when reviewing cloud IAM, role and policy configuration, or an identity graph. A reachable path from an untrusted principal to admin is the finding.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit configuration-management privilege escalation and secret handling for trust that runs as root on every managed host: a task that escalates with become across a whole play when only one step needs it, a role or variable sourced from an untrusted place that runs under that escalation, a vault-encrypted secret whose decryption key is exposed to the runner or logged, and a templated value or module argument that takes attacker-influenceable input while privileged. Covers Ansible and similar agentless tools where a control node runs plays that escalate privilege and decrypt secrets across a fleet. Use when playbooks escalate with become or handle vault secrets across managed hosts. The untrusted role, variable, or input running under escalation is the source, the privileged task or decrypted secret is the sink, and the over-broad escalation or exposed key is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit the host paths and devices a workload mounts for reach across the container boundary onto the node: a writable hostPath into a sensitive node directory, a mount of the host root or a system path that exposes other pods' data and node configuration, a raw device or block volume that grants low-level host access, and a hostPath whose subpath or symlink handling lets a workload escape the intended directory. Covers Kubernetes and container hosts where hostPath volumes and device mounts connect a container to the node filesystem and hardware. Use when workloads mount host paths or devices and the question is what node state that mount exposes. The workload holding the host mount is the source, the node file or device it reaches is the sink, and the host-path or device exposure beyond the workload's need is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit container image build definitions (Dockerfile, containerfile, and the compose or run config that sets runtime flags) for an image that ships over-privileged or carrying a secret, after multi-stage discards and deploy-time overrides are accounted for. Covers an image that runs as root, a secret baked into a layer, remote content pulled unpinned or unverified, a mutable or untagged base, an over-broad copy that pulls in local secrets and history, and a dangerous runtime request such as privileged mode or a sensitive host mount. Use when reviewing the image build plane, not the deploy-time security context or the cloud resource definition. The build definition is the source, the shipped image or run config is the sink, and privilege or a secret that survives into the final image is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit existing infrastructure-as-code definitions (Terraform, OpenTofu, CloudFormation, Bicep, Pulumi) for resource state that would provision an insecure resource, after variables, modules, and account defaults are resolved. Covers storage exposed to the public, a security-group or firewall rule open to the whole internet on a sensitive port, an identity or resource policy with wildcard actions or principals, encryption left off or a snapshot or image shared publicly, logging or audit trails disabled, and a plaintext secret in a variable default or connection string. Use when reviewing the static definition files, not authoring or refactoring them, and not walking the runtime identity graph. The declared resource block is the source, the insecure provisioned resource it would create is the sink, and effective config that violates the baseline is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit the init and sidecar containers a workload runs, including ones injected by a mutating admission webhook, for trust the main container never granted: an injected sidecar that runs with broader privileges, host access, or credentials than the workload, an init container that fetches and executes remote content before the app starts, a shared volume or process namespace that lets a sidecar read the main container's secrets, and an injection whose image and configuration come from a source the workload owner does not control. Covers Kubernetes pods where init and sidecar containers, declared or webhook-injected, share the pod with the application. Use when pods run init or sidecar containers, especially injected ones. The injected or auxiliary container is the source, the pod resource or credential it reaches is the sink, and the trust it holds beyond the main container is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit cluster network segmentation for the reachability a workload should not have: a namespace with no default-deny so every pod can reach every other pod, a missing egress policy that lets a compromised pod call out to the internet or the cloud metadata endpoint, an overly broad selector that admits more sources than intended, and a policy that governs one direction while the other stays open. Covers Kubernetes network policies and equivalent segmentation where pod-to-pod, pod-to-service, and pod-to-external reachability is meant to be constrained. Use when network policy is the control limiting lateral movement and egress in a cluster. The reachable source pod is the source, the pod, service, or external endpoint it can reach is the sink, and the segmentation gap that permits the reach is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit how a workload holds its secrets for the exposure that outlives the secret's intent: a secret passed as an environment variable that any process, crash dump, or child inherits and that debug endpoints echo, a secret volume mounted where a sidecar or a shared process can read it, a secret written into logs or an error, and a Kubernetes secret readable by more service accounts than the one workload that needs it. Covers containerized workloads where secrets reach the process through environment, mounted files, or the orchestrator's secret store. Use when a workload consumes secrets and the question is who or what else can read them. The workload secret is the source, the process, sidecar, log, or extra reader that can see it is the sink, and the exposure beyond the intended consumer is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit infrastructure-state storage and its backend for exposure and tampering: a state file holding plaintext secrets in a backend readable by too many principals, a state bucket or backend without encryption, versioning, or access scoping, a missing or unenforced state lock that allows concurrent corrupting writes, and a backend configuration that lets an attacker redirect state to a location they control. Covers Terraform and similar tools where the state file records real resource attributes and often secret values, and where whoever can read or write state can read those secrets or subvert the next apply. Use when infrastructure state is stored in a shared backend and that backend is the boundary. The principal who can read or write state is the source, the state store is the sink, and the exposed secret or the tamperable state is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Hunt injection through Kubernetes packaging templates and their values: an untrusted value rendered into a manifest without quoting so it injects YAML structure, a value that flows into a container command, an annotation, or an RBAC rule and grants more than intended, and a chart that renders privileged security context or host access from a caller-supplied value. Covers Helm-style templating where a values file or a user-supplied override is rendered into Kubernetes manifests, and where an unescaped or unconstrained value becomes structure, a command, or a permission. Use when charts render manifests from values that a tenant, a pipeline, or a user can influence. The untrusted value rendered into the manifest is the source, the template render is the sink, and the injected YAML structure or widened permission is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Hunt DNS records that point at infrastructure the organization no longer controls, so an attacker can claim the target and serve content under a trusted name. Covers a CNAME or ALIAS to a decommissioned platform host that the provider lets anyone re-register, a dangling NS delegation whose nameserver or zone no longer exists in the account, a record that outlives its resource because infrastructure-as-code or a teardown pipeline deletes the resource but not the record, and a wildcard or unclaimed virtual host routed to a default backend. Use when reviewing DNS zone files, the DNS records declared in infrastructure-as-code, and the pipelines that provision and tear down them. The resolvable record whose target is unclaimed is the source, an attacker serving content on the trusted origin is the sink, and a claimable dangling target is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit cross-account IAM role assumption for trust policies that let the wrong principal assume a role: a trust policy with a wildcard or overbroad principal, a missing or unverifiable external ID on a third-party role, a confused-deputy path where a vendor assumes your role on any customer's behalf, and a role chain that reaches privileges the origin principal should never hold. Covers AWS assume-role trust policies, condition keys that should scope who may assume, and the transitive reach of one assumption into the next. Use when roles in one account can be assumed from another account, a partner, or a service, and the trust policy is the boundary. The external principal permitted by the trust policy is the source, the assume-role grant is the sink, and the trust scope wider than the intended relationship is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Map service-account impersonation and token-generation paths that let a principal act as a more-privileged identity: a role granting impersonation or token creation on a service account, an actAs or token-creator permission that chains one identity into another, and a sequence of such grants that reaches a highly privileged account from a low-privileged start. Covers cloud service-account impersonation, short-lived-token generation, and the transitive graph where each impersonation grant is an edge from one identity to another. Use when principals can impersonate service accounts or mint tokens for them and you need to know where those edges lead. The principal holding an impersonation grant is the source, the impersonate or token-generation call is the sink, and the reachable privileged identity at the chain's end is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit the supply chain of infrastructure-as-code modules and providers for trust that runs at plan or apply time: a module sourced from an unpinned or attacker-influenceable location, a provider or plugin pulled from a registry without integrity pinning, a module that executes local commands or fetches remote content during planning, and a lockfile that is missing, ignored, or not enforced in CI. Covers Terraform and similar declarative tools where a module or provider runs with the credentials of whoever applies it. Use when infrastructure is built from third-party or shared modules and providers and the apply identity is privileged. The untrusted module or provider source is the source, the plan or apply execution is the sink, and the code running under the applier's credentials without integrity pinning is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit the backend a mobile app talks to for authorization that lives only in the client, where a mobile-backend service, a hosted datastore, a storage bucket, or a cloud function trusts the app to enforce access and so lets any client read or write another user's data, call a privileged operation, or reach records it should not, because the service rules are permissive, the operation authorizes by client-set values, or the backend assumes only the genuine app calls it. Use when a mobile app uses a hosted backend or datastore whose access rules and operations you can exercise directly. Covers permissive datastore rules, unauthenticated or over-scoped reads and writes, storage bucket exposure, and client-trusting cloud functions. The direct client request bypassing the app is the source, the backend rule or operation serving it is the sink, and reaching data or actions the user is not entitled to is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Review who can actually read a managed secret: a secrets-manager or vault access policy that grants read to a broader principal set than the secret's consumers, a resource policy and an identity policy that combine to admit an unintended reader, a wildcard on the secret name or path that sweeps in unrelated secrets, and a decryption grant on the underlying key that widens access beyond the store's own policy. Covers cloud secrets managers and vault-style stores where the effective read set is the union of resource policy, identity policy, and key-decrypt permission. Use when applications fetch secrets from a managed store and the access policy is the boundary on who reads them. The principal the combined policy admits is the source, the secret read is the sink, and the reader beyond the secret's intended consumers is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit key-management policies and envelope-encryption design for a decrypt path broader than intended: a key policy or grant that admits a principal who should never decrypt, a wildcard key resource in an identity policy that covers unrelated keys, an encryption context that is not enforced so a data key decrypts outside its intended scope, and a cross-account key grant that widens the decrypt set. Covers cloud key-management services, key policies and grants, and envelope encryption where a data key protects the payload and the key policy protects the data key. Use when data is protected by a managed key and the key policy plus encryption context are the boundary on who can decrypt. The principal the key policy admits is the source, the decrypt operation is the sink, and the decryptor beyond the data's intended readers is the bug.

unboundcompute Skill

Audit Kubernetes manifests for a subject granted more than it needs or a workload that can escape its container, after the binding graph and admission policy are resolved. Covers a RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBinding to cluster-admin or a wildcard-verb role, a pod running privileged or with host namespaces or a sensitive hostPath mount, a container running as root or able to escalate privilege, dangerous added capabilities, a service-account token mounted where the workload does not need the API, and a workload left flat with no network policy. Use when reviewing the Kubernetes YAML plane (roles, bindings, and workload security contexts as declared), not the cloud identity graph or the image build. The manifest is the source, a cluster-admin subject or an escaping workload is the sink, and a grant or a privilege the binding graph and admission actually allow is the bug.