Results for “exfiltration”

Detect model stealing, model inversion, and membership inference performed through inference-API abuse by monitoring query patterns, applying output perturbation, and red-teaming your own model's extractability.

Audit agent skills, plugins, prompts, manifests, scripts, dependencies, and bundled assets for provenance, prompt-injection, permission, execution, exfiltration, persistence, and update risk. Use when evaluating a third-party skill before installing, enabling, updating, publishing, or distributing it; reviewing an untrusted SKILL.md, agent configuration, MCP integration, archive, or repository; comparing a package with a known-good version; or investigating unexpected tool, network, credential, or filesystem behavior.

Analyzes prompt injection, retrieval poisoning, memory contamination, planner drift, and tool-boundary abuse in agentic systems, mapping trust boundaries and proving exploit chains.

Jailbreak API-served LLMs using G0DM0D3 techniques — Parseltongue input obfuscation (33 techniques), GODMODE CLASSIC system prompt templates, ULTRAPLINIAN multi-model racing, encoding escalation, and Hermes-native prefill/system prompt integration. Use when a user wants to bypass safety filters, jailbreak a model, or red-team model robustness.

Jailbreak LLMs: Parseltongue, GODMODE, ULTRAPLINIAN.

Push the LLM to reconsider, refine, and improve its recent output. Use when user asks for deeper critique or mentions a known deeper critique method, e.g. socratic, first principles, pre-mortem, red team.

Jailbreak LLMs: Parseltongue, GODMODE, ULTRAPLINIAN.

Push the LLM to reconsider, refine, and improve its recent output. Use when user asks for deeper critique or mentions a known deeper critique method, e.g. socratic, first principles, pre-mortem, red team.

Detect poisoned training data and backdoored models across the ML pipeline using statistical analysis, activation clustering, and spectral signatures.

Jailbreak API-served LLMs using G0DM0D3 techniques — Parseltongue input obfuscation (33 techniques), GODMODE CLASSIC system prompt templates, ULTRAPLINIAN multi-model racing, encoding escalation, and Hermes-native prefill/system prompt integration. Use when a user wants to bypass safety filters, jailbreak a model, or red-team model robustness.

Push the LLM to reconsider, refine, and improve its recent output. Use when user asks for deeper critique or mentions a known deeper critique method, e.g. socratic, first principles, pre-mortem, red team.

Lossless LLM-optimized compression of source documents. Use when the user requests to 'distill documents' or 'create a distillate'.

Turn a weak/cheap "Flash" model into a "Pro" performer by wrapping HKUDS UpSkill — captures agent session failures, has a strong Teacher model analyze them and draft a skill, then validates it against the weak Student model in a closed Ralph Loop (up to 3 rounds) before storing it for automatic reuse. Use when the user wants to install UpSkill, run `/upskill-init`, `/upskill-configure`, `/upskill-build`, `/upskill-run`, `/upskill-list`, `/upskill-status`, `/upskill-mode`, `/upskill-model`, `/upskill-remove`, or `/upskill-uninstall`, wants a cheap model to perform closer to a Pro model without switching, or wants a good session (success or failure) distilled into a validated skill. Triggers on: upskill, up-skill, flash to pro, teacher student distillation, ralph loop skill validation, distill agent failures into skills. Routes skill-quality ratcheting to `skill-autoresearch`, scaffolding to `write-a-skill`, and spec-compliance rewrites to `skill-standardization`.

Review docs, tool output, skills, and memory candidates for prompt-injection risk.

Bypasses safety filters on API-served LLMs using jailbreak templates, input obfuscation, and multi-model racing.

Routes a research topic through a structured two-phase workflow: generate an extensible outline, then fan out parallel web-search agents to investigate each item into validated JSON, producing a complete markdown report with table of contents.

Lossless LLM-optimized compression of source documents. Use when the user requests to 'distill documents' or 'create a distillate'.

Alpaca: A Strong, Replicable Instruction-Following Model

Security audit and vulnerability scanner for AI agent skills before installation. Use when: (1) evaluating a skill from an untrusted source, (2) auditing a skill directory or git repo URL for malicious code, (3) pre-install security gate for Claude Code plugins, OpenClaw skills, or Codex skills, (4) scanning Python scripts for dangerous patterns like os.system, eval, subprocess, network exfiltration, (5) detecting prompt injection in SKILL.md files, (6) checking dependency supply chain risks, (7) verifying file system access stays within skill boundaries. Triggers: "audit this skill", "is this skill safe", "scan skill for security", "check skill before install", "skill security check", "skill vulnerability scan".

Security audit orchestrator for agent skills — scans for prompt injection, data exfiltration, credential theft, supply chain risks, and instruction hierarchy violations before any skill is installed, created, improved, or read from a GitHub repo. Load when creating skills from external sources, when improve-skills reads from GitHub repos, when research-skill fetches community SKILL.md files, when a user installs a third-party skill, or when the user asks to audit skill security, scan for injection, check if a skill is safe, scan all skills, or run a security sweep. Orchestrates all secure-* skills in sequence. Content is SAFE only if ALL secure-* skills return SAFE. 36% of community skills contain flaws (Snyk ToxicSkills 2026). This skill is the first line of defense.