Results for “ransomwatch”

Detects ransomware encryption activity in real time using entropy analysis, file system I/O monitoring, and behavioral heuristics.

Traces ransomware cryptocurrency payment flows using blockchain analysis tools such as Chainalysis Reactor, WalletExplorer, and blockchain.com APIs. Identifies wallet clusters, tracks fund movement through mixers and exchanges, and supports law enforcement attribution.

Identify, collect, and analyze ransomware attack artifacts to determine the variant, initial access vector, encryption scope, and recovery options.

Deploys canary files, honeypot shares, and decoy systems to detect ransomware activity at the earliest possible stage.

Analyze Zeek conn.log and NetFlow data to detect ransomware network indicators including C2 beaconing, TOR exit node connections, data exfiltration, and suspicious DNS patterns.

Deploys and monitors ransomware canary files across critical directories using Python's watchdog library for real-time filesystem event detection, triggering alerts via email, Slack, or syslog when decoy files are accessed.

Deploys canary files (honeytokens) across file systems to detect ransomware encryption activity in real time using file integrity monitoring or OS-level watchdogs.

Detects early-stage ransomware indicators in network traffic before encryption begins, using Zeek, Suricata, Arkime, SIEM correlation rules, and threat intelligence feeds to identify Cobalt Strike beacons, Mimikatz signatures, and RDP brute-force attempts.

Executes a structured ransomware incident response from initial detection through containment, forensic analysis, decryption assessment, recovery, and post-incident hardening.

Detects and exploits ransomware kill switch mechanisms including mutex-based execution guards, domain-based kill switches, and registry-based termination checks. Implements proactive mutex vaccination and kill switch domain monitoring to prevent ransomware from executing.

Plans and facilitates tabletop exercises simulating ransomware incidents to test organizational readiness, decision-making, and communication procedures.

Hunt for Volume Shadow Copy deletion activity that indicates ransomware preparation or anti-forensics by monitoring vssadmin, wmic, and PowerShell shadow copy commands.

Monitors dark web forums, marketplaces, paste sites, and ransomware leak sites for mentions of organizational assets, leaked credentials, threatened attacks, and threat actor communications to provide early warning intelligence.

Executes structured recovery from a ransomware incident following NIST and CISA frameworks, including environment isolation, forensic evidence preservation, clean infrastructure rebuild, prioritized system restoration from verified backups, credential reset, and validation against re-infection.

Validate ransomware recovery plans by testing backup restore operations, measuring RTO/RPO targets, verifying data integrity, and documenting recovery gaps in an isolated lab environment.

Designs and implements a ransomware-resilient backup strategy following the 3-2-1-1-0 methodology, including asset classification, immutable storage configuration, credential isolation, and automated restore testing.

Builds a structured ransomware incident response playbook aligned with the CISA StopRansomware Guide and NIST Cybersecurity Framework, covering preparation, detection, containment, eradication, recovery, and post-incident phases with actionable checklists.

Builds a structured SOC incident response playbook for ransomware attacks covering detection, containment, eradication, and recovery phases with specific SIEM queries, isolation procedures, and decision trees.

Hunt for threats in Windows Event Logs using Chainsaw, a fast Rust-based forensic tool that runs Sigma rules, keyword searches, and artifact analysis offline.

Detect NTLM relay attacks through Windows Security Event correlation by analyzing Event 4624 LogonType 3 for IP-to-hostname mismatches, identifying Responder/LLMNR poisoning artifacts, and auditing SMB and LDAP signing enforcement.

Detect DCOM-based lateral movement by correlating Sysmon process creation and network connection events, WMI event analysis, and RPC endpoint mapper traffic to identify abuse of MMC20.Application, ShellBrowserWindow, and ShellWindows COM objects.

Hunt for adversary persistence and execution via Windows scheduled tasks by analyzing task creation events, suspicious task properties, and unusual execution patterns.