Detecting Ransomware Precursors in Network Traffic
When to Use
- Building detection rules for pre-ransomware network activity (the average time from Cobalt Strike deployment to encryption is 17 minutes)
- Monitoring for initial access broker (IAB) indicators that precede ransomware deployment
- Creating SIEM correlation rules that chain multiple precursor events into high-confidence alerts
- Tuning network detection systems to distinguish ransomware staging from normal administrative activity
- Investigating suspicious network patterns that may indicate ransomware operators have established a foothold
Do not use for post-encryption response (see recovering-from-ransomware-attack). This skill focuses on the pre-encryption detection window where containment can prevent data loss.
Prerequisites
- Network detection platform (Zeek/Bro, Suricata, or Arkime/Moloch) deployed on network TAP or SPAN ports
- SIEM platform (Splunk, Elastic Security, Microsoft Sentinel, or QRadar) ingesting network logs
- Threat intelligence feeds covering ransomware IOCs (CISA, abuse.ch, OTX, MISP)
- Network flow data (NetFlow/IPFIX) from core routers and firewalls
- DNS query logging from internal resolvers
- Full packet capture capability for incident investigation
Workflow
Step 1: Identify Ransomware Kill Chain Phases in Network Traffic
Map network-observable indicators to each pre-encryption phase:
| Kill Chain Phase |
Network Indicators |
Detection Source |
| Initial Access |
RDP brute force, VPN credential stuffing, phishing callback |
Firewall logs, IDS, proxy logs |
| C2 Establishment |
Cobalt Strike beacons (HTTPS/DNS), Sliver/Brute Ratel callbacks |
Zeek SSL/HTTP logs, DNS logs |
| Credential Harvesting |
NTLM relay, Kerberoasting, DCSync traffic |
Zeek Kerberos/NTLM logs, DC logs |
| Reconnaissance |
Internal port scanning, AD enumeration (LDAP/SMB) |
Zeek conn.log, flow data |
| Lateral Movement |
PsExec/WMI/WinRM traffic, RDP pivoting, SMB file copies |
Zeek SMB/DCE-RPC logs |
| Staging |
Data aggregation, archive creation, cloud upload prep |
Proxy logs, DNS logs, DLP |
Step 2: Deploy Network Detection Rules
Suricata rules for common ransomware precursors:
# Cobalt Strike default HTTPS beacon profile detection
alert tls $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Cobalt Strike Default TLS Certificate"; tls.cert_subject; content:"Major Cobalt Strike"; sid:3000001; rev:1;)
# Cobalt Strike DNS beacon
alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any 53 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Cobalt Strike DNS Beacon Pattern"; dns.query; pcre:"/^[a-z0-9]{3}\.[a-z]{4,8}\./"; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 50, seconds 60; sid:3000002; rev:1;)
# Mimikatz network signature (DCSync - DRS GetNCChanges)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 135 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Possible DCSync/Mimikatz"; content:"|05 00 0b|"; offset:0; depth:3; content:"|e3 51 4d 2b 4b 47 15 d2|"; sid:3000003; rev:1;)
# Internal network scanning (many connections, few bytes)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Internal Port Scan"; flags:S; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 100, seconds 10; sid:3000004; rev:1;)
# PsExec service installation over SMB
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - PsExec Service Install"; content:"|ff|SMB"; content:"PSEXESVC"; nocase; sid:3000005; rev:1;)
# RDP brute force from internal host (lateral movement)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 3389 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Internal RDP Brute Force"; flow:to_server,established; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 20, seconds 60; sid:3000006; rev:1;)
# Large SMB file transfer (data staging)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Large SMB Transfer Possible Staging"; flow:to_server,established; dsize:>60000; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 100, seconds 300; sid:3000007; rev:1;)
Zeek scripts for behavioral detection:
# detect_ransomware_precursors.zeek
# Detect high volume of failed SMB connections (credential testing)
@load base/protocols/smb
module RansomwarePrecursor;
export {
redef enum Notice::Type += {
SMB_Brute_Force,
Suspicious_Internal_Scan,
Excessive_DNS_Queries,
SMB_Admin_Share_Access,
};
const smb_fail_threshold = 10 &redef;
const scan_threshold = 50 &redef;
const dns_query_threshold = 200 &redef;
}
global smb_fail_count: table[addr] of count &default=0 &create_expire=5min;
global conn_count: table[addr] of set[addr] &create_expire=1min;
event smb2_message(c: connection, hdr: SMB2::Header, is_orig: bool) {
if (hdr$status != 0) {
++smb_fail_count[c$id$orig_h];
if (smb_fail_count[c$id$orig_h] >= smb_fail_threshold) {
NOTICE([$note=SMB_Brute_Force,
$msg=fmt("Host %s has %d failed SMB attempts", c$id$orig_h, smb_fail_count[c$id$orig_h]),
$src=c$id$orig_h,
$identifier=cat(c$id$orig_h)]);
}
}
}
event new_connection(c: connection) {
if (c$id$orig_h in Site::local_nets && c$id$resp_h in Site::local_nets) {
if (c$id$orig_h !in conn_count)
conn_count[c$id$orig_h] = set();
add conn_count[c$id$orig_h][c$id$resp_h];
if (|conn_count[c$id$orig_h]| >= scan_threshold) {
NOTICE([$note=Suspicious_Internal_Scan,
$msg=fmt("Host %s connected to %d internal hosts in 1 min", c$id$orig_h, |conn_count[c$id$orig_h]|),
$src=c$id$orig_h,
$identifier=cat(c$id$orig_h)]);
}
}
}
Step 3: Create SIEM Correlation Rules
Splunk correlation for ransomware precursor chain:
| tstats count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic
WHERE earliest=-24h All_Traffic.dest_port IN (445, 135, 139, 3389, 5985, 5986)
AND All_Traffic.src_ip IN 10.0.0.0/8
AND All_Traffic.dest_ip IN 10.0.0.0/8
BY All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_port, _time span=1h
| stats dc(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port_count,
values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as ports,
count as total_conns
BY All_Traffic.src_ip
| where port_count >= 3 AND total_conns > 50
| rename All_Traffic.src_ip as src_ip
| lookup threat_intel_ioc ip as src_ip OUTPUT threat_type
| eval risk_score = case(
port_count >= 5 AND total_conns > 200, "CRITICAL",
port_count >= 3 AND total_conns > 50, "HIGH",
1=1, "MEDIUM")
| table src_ip, ports, port_count, total_conns, risk_score, threat_type
Microsoft Sentinel KQL - Ransomware precursor correlation:
let timeframe = 24h;
let RDPBruteForce = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4625
| where LogonType == 10
| summarize FailedRDP = count() by TargetAccount, IpAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where FailedRDP > 10;
let SuspiciousSMB = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 5145
| where ShareName has "ADMIN$" or ShareName has "C$" or ShareName has "IPC$"
| summarize AdminShareAccess = count() by SubjectUserName, IpAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where AdminShareAccess > 5;
let ServiceInstalls = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 7045
| where ServiceName has_any ("PSEXESVC", "meterpreter", "beacon");
RDPBruteForce
| join kind=inner SuspiciousSMB on IpAddress
| project TimeGenerated, IpAddress, TargetAccount, FailedRDP, SubjectUserName, AdminShareAccess
| extend AlertTitle = "Ransomware Precursor: RDP Brute Force + Admin Share Access"
Step 4: Integrate Threat Intelligence
Configure automated IOC feeds for known ransomware infrastructure:
# Download and update ransomware C2 blocklists
# abuse.ch Feodo Tracker (Cobalt Strike, TrickBot, BazarLoader C2s)
curl -s https://feodotracker.abuse.ch/downloads/ipblocklist.csv | \
grep -v "^#" | cut -d, -f2 > /opt/threat-intel/feodo_ips.txt
# abuse.ch URLhaus (malware distribution URLs)
curl -s https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/downloads/csv_recent/ | \
grep -v "^#" | cut -d, -f3 > /opt/threat-intel/urlhaus_urls.txt
# abuse.ch ThreatFox (ransomware IOCs)
curl -s https://threatfox.abuse.ch/export/csv/recent/ | \
grep -i "ransomware" | cut -d, -f3 > /opt/threat-intel/ransomware_iocs.txt
# CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (initial access vectors)
curl -s https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json | \
python3 -c "import json,sys; data=json.load(sys.stdin); [print(v['cveID'],v['vendorProject'],v['product']) for v in data['vulnerabilities'] if 'ransomware' in v.get('knownRansomwareCampaignUse','').lower()]"
Step 5: Establish Alert Triage and Escalation
Define triage procedures based on precursor confidence level:
| Alert Type |
Confidence |
Response Time |
Action |
| Confirmed Cobalt Strike beacon |
High |
15 minutes |
Isolate host immediately, trigger IR |
| DCSync/Kerberoasting from non-DC |
High |
15 minutes |
Disable account, isolate host, trigger IR |
| Internal port scan + admin share access |
Medium-High |
30 minutes |
Investigate source host, check EDR telemetry |
| RDP brute force from internal host |
Medium |
1 hour |
Verify if legitimate admin activity, check host |
| Unusual DNS query volume |
Low-Medium |
4 hours |
Check for DNS tunneling, correlate with other alerts |
Key Concepts
| Term |
Definition |
| Ransomware Precursor |
Network activity that precedes ransomware encryption, including C2 communication, lateral movement, and data staging |
| Dwell Time |
Time between initial compromise and ransomware deployment, averaging 21 days but sometimes as short as 17 minutes |
| Initial Access Broker (IAB) |
Threat actors who sell compromised network access to ransomware operators on dark web markets |
| Beaconing |
Periodic C2 callbacks from implants (Cobalt Strike, Sliver) that can be detected by analyzing connection timing patterns |
| Kerberoasting |
Credential harvesting technique requesting Kerberos service tickets for offline cracking, detectable via unusual TGS-REQ patterns |
| DCSync |
Technique using Directory Replication Service to extract password hashes from domain controllers, critical ransomware precursor |
Tools & Systems
- Zeek (formerly Bro): Network analysis framework generating structured logs for SMB, Kerberos, DNS, HTTP, and TLS connections
- Suricata: High-performance IDS/IPS with protocol analysis and multi-threading support for ransomware signature detection
- Arkime (formerly Moloch): Full packet capture and search platform for deep forensic investigation of network events
- RITA (Real Intelligence Threat Analytics): Open-source tool for detecting beaconing, DNS tunneling, and long connections in Zeek logs
- AC-Hunter: Network threat hunting platform from Active Countermeasures for beacon detection and C2 identification
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Detecting LockBit Precursors in a Manufacturing Network
Context: A manufacturing company's SOC receives an alert for unusual SMB traffic from a workstation (10.1.5.42) in the engineering department. The workstation connected to 47 internal hosts on port 445 within 5 minutes at 2:00 AM.
Approach:
- Zeek conn.log analysis shows 10.1.5.42 initiated connections to 47 unique internal IPs on port 445, 135, and 3389 between 01:55-02:05
- Zeek ssl.log reveals an outbound HTTPS connection to 185.x.x.x every 60 seconds with consistent 48-byte payloads (Cobalt Strike beacon pattern)
- RITA beacon analysis confirms high beacon score (0.96) for the external IP with 60-second jitter
- Zeek kerberos.log shows TGS-REQ for multiple SPN accounts from 10.1.5.42 (Kerberoasting)
- SMB tree_connect events show access to ADMIN$ shares on 12 hosts (lateral movement staging)
- Containment: Host isolated, credentials for engineering user reset, blocking rule for C2 IP deployed
- Full IR initiated before ransomware deployment could begin
Pitfalls:
- Dismissing internal port scans as vulnerability scanner activity without verifying the source is an authorized scanner
- Not correlating individual low-severity alerts (DNS anomaly + SMB access + failed logins) into a high-severity chain
- Setting detection thresholds too high to avoid false positives, missing low-and-slow reconnaissance
- Ignoring encrypted traffic analysis (JA3/JA4 fingerprinting) that can identify Cobalt Strike even in TLS tunnels
Output Format
## Ransomware Precursor Detection Alert
**Alert ID**: [SIEM-generated ID]
**Detection Time**: [Timestamp]
**Source Host**: [IP / Hostname]
**Confidence**: [High / Medium / Low]
**Kill Chain Phase**: [Initial Access / C2 / Credential Harvest / Recon / Lateral Movement / Staging]
### Indicators Detected
| Indicator | Source | Detail | MITRE ATT&CK |
|-----------|--------|--------|--------------|
| [Type] | [Zeek/Suricata/SIEM] | [Description] | [T-ID] |
### Correlation Chain
1. [Timestamp] - [Event 1]
2. [Timestamp] - [Event 2]
3. [Timestamp] - [Event 3]
### Recommended Actions
- [ ] Isolate source host from network
- [ ] Check EDR telemetry for host-based indicators
- [ ] Reset credentials for affected user accounts
- [ ] Block identified C2 infrastructure
- [ ] Escalate to incident response team
1---2name: detecting-ransomware-precursors-in-network3description: 'Detects early-stage ransomware indicators in network traffic before4 encryption begins, including initial access broker activity, command-and-control5 beaconing, credential harvesting, reconnaissance scanning, and staging behavior.6 Uses network detection tools (Zeek, Suricata, Arkime), SIEM correlation rules, and7 threat intelligence feeds to identify ransomware precursor patterns such as Cobalt8 Strike beacons, Mimikatz network signatures, and RDP brute-force attempts. Activates9 for requests involving pre-ransomware detection, network-based ransomware indicators,10 or early warning ransomware monitoring.1112 '13domain: cybersecurity14subdomain: ransomware-defense15tags:16- ransomware17- detection18- network-security19- incident-response20- defense21version: 1.0.022author: mahipal23license: Apache-2.024nist_csf:25- PR.DS-1126- RS.MA-0127- RC.RP-0128- PR.IR-0129mitre_attack:30- T107831- T119032- T105933- T100334- T111035mitre_f3:36 version: '1.1'37 tactics:38 - initial-access39 - positioning40 - monetization41 techniques:42 - id: T111043 name: Brute Force44 tactic: initial-access45 source: attack46 - id: T121947 name: Remote Access Tools48 tactic: positioning49 source: attack50 - id: T165051 name: Acquire Access52 tactic: resource-development53 source: attack54 - id: F101855 name: Convert to Cryptocurrency56 tactic: monetization57 source: f358metadata:59 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/26zl/detecting-ransomware-precursors-in-network60---6162# Detecting Ransomware Precursors in Network Traffic6364## When to Use6566- Building detection rules for pre-ransomware network activity (the average time from Cobalt Strike deployment to encryption is 17 minutes)67- Monitoring for initial access broker (IAB) indicators that precede ransomware deployment68- Creating SIEM correlation rules that chain multiple precursor events into high-confidence alerts69- Tuning network detection systems to distinguish ransomware staging from normal administrative activity70- Investigating suspicious network patterns that may indicate ransomware operators have established a foothold7172**Do not use** for post-encryption response (see recovering-from-ransomware-attack). This skill focuses on the pre-encryption detection window where containment can prevent data loss.7374## Prerequisites7576- Network detection platform (Zeek/Bro, Suricata, or Arkime/Moloch) deployed on network TAP or SPAN ports77- SIEM platform (Splunk, Elastic Security, Microsoft Sentinel, or QRadar) ingesting network logs78- Threat intelligence feeds covering ransomware IOCs (CISA, abuse.ch, OTX, MISP)79- Network flow data (NetFlow/IPFIX) from core routers and firewalls80- DNS query logging from internal resolvers81- Full packet capture capability for incident investigation8283## Workflow8485### Step 1: Identify Ransomware Kill Chain Phases in Network Traffic8687Map network-observable indicators to each pre-encryption phase:8889| Kill Chain Phase | Network Indicators | Detection Source |90|------------------|--------------------|------------------|91| Initial Access | RDP brute force, VPN credential stuffing, phishing callback | Firewall logs, IDS, proxy logs |92| C2 Establishment | Cobalt Strike beacons (HTTPS/DNS), Sliver/Brute Ratel callbacks | Zeek SSL/HTTP logs, DNS logs |93| Credential Harvesting | NTLM relay, Kerberoasting, DCSync traffic | Zeek Kerberos/NTLM logs, DC logs |94| Reconnaissance | Internal port scanning, AD enumeration (LDAP/SMB) | Zeek conn.log, flow data |95| Lateral Movement | PsExec/WMI/WinRM traffic, RDP pivoting, SMB file copies | Zeek SMB/DCE-RPC logs |96| Staging | Data aggregation, archive creation, cloud upload prep | Proxy logs, DNS logs, DLP |9798### Step 2: Deploy Network Detection Rules99100**Suricata rules for common ransomware precursors:**101102```yaml103# Cobalt Strike default HTTPS beacon profile detection104alert tls $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Cobalt Strike Default TLS Certificate"; tls.cert_subject; content:"Major Cobalt Strike"; sid:3000001; rev:1;)105106# Cobalt Strike DNS beacon107alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any 53 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Cobalt Strike DNS Beacon Pattern"; dns.query; pcre:"/^[a-z0-9]{3}\.[a-z]{4,8}\./"; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 50, seconds 60; sid:3000002; rev:1;)108109# Mimikatz network signature (DCSync - DRS GetNCChanges)110alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 135 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Possible DCSync/Mimikatz"; content:"|05 00 0b|"; offset:0; depth:3; content:"|e3 51 4d 2b 4b 47 15 d2|"; sid:3000003; rev:1;)111112# Internal network scanning (many connections, few bytes)113alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Internal Port Scan"; flags:S; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 100, seconds 10; sid:3000004; rev:1;)114115# PsExec service installation over SMB116alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - PsExec Service Install"; content:"|ff|SMB"; content:"PSEXESVC"; nocase; sid:3000005; rev:1;)117118# RDP brute force from internal host (lateral movement)119alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 3389 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Internal RDP Brute Force"; flow:to_server,established; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 20, seconds 60; sid:3000006; rev:1;)120121# Large SMB file transfer (data staging)122alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"RANSOMWARE PRECURSOR - Large SMB Transfer Possible Staging"; flow:to_server,established; dsize:>60000; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 100, seconds 300; sid:3000007; rev:1;)123```124125**Zeek scripts for behavioral detection:**126127```zeek128# detect_ransomware_precursors.zeek129# Detect high volume of failed SMB connections (credential testing)130131@load base/protocols/smb132133module RansomwarePrecursor;134135export {136 redef enum Notice::Type += {137 SMB_Brute_Force,138 Suspicious_Internal_Scan,139 Excessive_DNS_Queries,140 SMB_Admin_Share_Access,141 };142143 const smb_fail_threshold = 10 &redef;144 const scan_threshold = 50 &redef;145 const dns_query_threshold = 200 &redef;146}147148global smb_fail_count: table[addr] of count &default=0 &create_expire=5min;149global conn_count: table[addr] of set[addr] &create_expire=1min;150151event smb2_message(c: connection, hdr: SMB2::Header, is_orig: bool) {152 if (hdr$status != 0) {153 ++smb_fail_count[c$id$orig_h];154 if (smb_fail_count[c$id$orig_h] >= smb_fail_threshold) {155 NOTICE([$note=SMB_Brute_Force,156 $msg=fmt("Host %s has %d failed SMB attempts", c$id$orig_h, smb_fail_count[c$id$orig_h]),157 $src=c$id$orig_h,158 $identifier=cat(c$id$orig_h)]);159 }160 }161}162163event new_connection(c: connection) {164 if (c$id$orig_h in Site::local_nets && c$id$resp_h in Site::local_nets) {165 if (c$id$orig_h !in conn_count)166 conn_count[c$id$orig_h] = set();167 add conn_count[c$id$orig_h][c$id$resp_h];168 if (|conn_count[c$id$orig_h]| >= scan_threshold) {169 NOTICE([$note=Suspicious_Internal_Scan,170 $msg=fmt("Host %s connected to %d internal hosts in 1 min", c$id$orig_h, |conn_count[c$id$orig_h]|),171 $src=c$id$orig_h,172 $identifier=cat(c$id$orig_h)]);173 }174 }175}176```177178### Step 3: Create SIEM Correlation Rules179180**Splunk correlation for ransomware precursor chain:**181182```spl183| tstats count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic184 WHERE earliest=-24h All_Traffic.dest_port IN (445, 135, 139, 3389, 5985, 5986)185 AND All_Traffic.src_ip IN 10.0.0.0/8186 AND All_Traffic.dest_ip IN 10.0.0.0/8187 BY All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_port, _time span=1h188| stats dc(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port_count,189 values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as ports,190 count as total_conns191 BY All_Traffic.src_ip192| where port_count >= 3 AND total_conns > 50193| rename All_Traffic.src_ip as src_ip194| lookup threat_intel_ioc ip as src_ip OUTPUT threat_type195| eval risk_score = case(196 port_count >= 5 AND total_conns > 200, "CRITICAL",197 port_count >= 3 AND total_conns > 50, "HIGH",198 1=1, "MEDIUM")199| table src_ip, ports, port_count, total_conns, risk_score, threat_type200```201202**Microsoft Sentinel KQL - Ransomware precursor correlation:**203204```kql205let timeframe = 24h;206let RDPBruteForce = SecurityEvent207| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)208| where EventID == 4625209| where LogonType == 10210| summarize FailedRDP = count() by TargetAccount, IpAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)211| where FailedRDP > 10;212let SuspiciousSMB = SecurityEvent213| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)214| where EventID == 5145215| where ShareName has "ADMIN$" or ShareName has "C$" or ShareName has "IPC$"216| summarize AdminShareAccess = count() by SubjectUserName, IpAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)217| where AdminShareAccess > 5;218let ServiceInstalls = SecurityEvent219| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)220| where EventID == 7045221| where ServiceName has_any ("PSEXESVC", "meterpreter", "beacon");222RDPBruteForce223| join kind=inner SuspiciousSMB on IpAddress224| project TimeGenerated, IpAddress, TargetAccount, FailedRDP, SubjectUserName, AdminShareAccess225| extend AlertTitle = "Ransomware Precursor: RDP Brute Force + Admin Share Access"226```227228### Step 4: Integrate Threat Intelligence229230Configure automated IOC feeds for known ransomware infrastructure:231232```bash233# Download and update ransomware C2 blocklists234# abuse.ch Feodo Tracker (Cobalt Strike, TrickBot, BazarLoader C2s)235curl -s https://feodotracker.abuse.ch/downloads/ipblocklist.csv | \236 grep -v "^#" | cut -d, -f2 > /opt/threat-intel/feodo_ips.txt237238# abuse.ch URLhaus (malware distribution URLs)239curl -s https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/downloads/csv_recent/ | \240 grep -v "^#" | cut -d, -f3 > /opt/threat-intel/urlhaus_urls.txt241242# abuse.ch ThreatFox (ransomware IOCs)243curl -s https://threatfox.abuse.ch/export/csv/recent/ | \244 grep -i "ransomware" | cut -d, -f3 > /opt/threat-intel/ransomware_iocs.txt245246# CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (initial access vectors)247curl -s https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json | \248 python3 -c "import json,sys; data=json.load(sys.stdin); [print(v['cveID'],v['vendorProject'],v['product']) for v in data['vulnerabilities'] if 'ransomware' in v.get('knownRansomwareCampaignUse','').lower()]"249```250251### Step 5: Establish Alert Triage and Escalation252253Define triage procedures based on precursor confidence level:254255| Alert Type | Confidence | Response Time | Action |256|------------|-----------|---------------|--------|257| Confirmed Cobalt Strike beacon | High | 15 minutes | Isolate host immediately, trigger IR |258| DCSync/Kerberoasting from non-DC | High | 15 minutes | Disable account, isolate host, trigger IR |259| Internal port scan + admin share access | Medium-High | 30 minutes | Investigate source host, check EDR telemetry |260| RDP brute force from internal host | Medium | 1 hour | Verify if legitimate admin activity, check host |261| Unusual DNS query volume | Low-Medium | 4 hours | Check for DNS tunneling, correlate with other alerts |262263## Key Concepts264265| Term | Definition |266|------|------------|267| **Ransomware Precursor** | Network activity that precedes ransomware encryption, including C2 communication, lateral movement, and data staging |268| **Dwell Time** | Time between initial compromise and ransomware deployment, averaging 21 days but sometimes as short as 17 minutes |269| **Initial Access Broker (IAB)** | Threat actors who sell compromised network access to ransomware operators on dark web markets |270| **Beaconing** | Periodic C2 callbacks from implants (Cobalt Strike, Sliver) that can be detected by analyzing connection timing patterns |271| **Kerberoasting** | Credential harvesting technique requesting Kerberos service tickets for offline cracking, detectable via unusual TGS-REQ patterns |272| **DCSync** | Technique using Directory Replication Service to extract password hashes from domain controllers, critical ransomware precursor |273274## Tools & Systems275276- **Zeek (formerly Bro)**: Network analysis framework generating structured logs for SMB, Kerberos, DNS, HTTP, and TLS connections277- **Suricata**: High-performance IDS/IPS with protocol analysis and multi-threading support for ransomware signature detection278- **Arkime (formerly Moloch)**: Full packet capture and search platform for deep forensic investigation of network events279- **RITA (Real Intelligence Threat Analytics)**: Open-source tool for detecting beaconing, DNS tunneling, and long connections in Zeek logs280- **AC-Hunter**: Network threat hunting platform from Active Countermeasures for beacon detection and C2 identification281282## Common Scenarios283284### Scenario: Detecting LockBit Precursors in a Manufacturing Network285286**Context**: A manufacturing company's SOC receives an alert for unusual SMB traffic from a workstation (10.1.5.42) in the engineering department. The workstation connected to 47 internal hosts on port 445 within 5 minutes at 2:00 AM.287288**Approach**:2891. Zeek conn.log analysis shows 10.1.5.42 initiated connections to 47 unique internal IPs on port 445, 135, and 3389 between 01:55-02:052902. Zeek ssl.log reveals an outbound HTTPS connection to 185.x.x.x every 60 seconds with consistent 48-byte payloads (Cobalt Strike beacon pattern)2913. RITA beacon analysis confirms high beacon score (0.96) for the external IP with 60-second jitter2924. Zeek kerberos.log shows TGS-REQ for multiple SPN accounts from 10.1.5.42 (Kerberoasting)2935. SMB tree_connect events show access to ADMIN$ shares on 12 hosts (lateral movement staging)2946. Containment: Host isolated, credentials for engineering user reset, blocking rule for C2 IP deployed2957. Full IR initiated before ransomware deployment could begin296297**Pitfalls**:298- Dismissing internal port scans as vulnerability scanner activity without verifying the source is an authorized scanner299- Not correlating individual low-severity alerts (DNS anomaly + SMB access + failed logins) into a high-severity chain300- Setting detection thresholds too high to avoid false positives, missing low-and-slow reconnaissance301- Ignoring encrypted traffic analysis (JA3/JA4 fingerprinting) that can identify Cobalt Strike even in TLS tunnels302303## Output Format304305```306## Ransomware Precursor Detection Alert307308**Alert ID**: [SIEM-generated ID]309**Detection Time**: [Timestamp]310**Source Host**: [IP / Hostname]311**Confidence**: [High / Medium / Low]312**Kill Chain Phase**: [Initial Access / C2 / Credential Harvest / Recon / Lateral Movement / Staging]313314### Indicators Detected315| Indicator | Source | Detail | MITRE ATT&CK |316|-----------|--------|--------|--------------|317| [Type] | [Zeek/Suricata/SIEM] | [Description] | [T-ID] |318319### Correlation Chain3201. [Timestamp] - [Event 1]3212. [Timestamp] - [Event 2]3223. [Timestamp] - [Event 3]323324### Recommended Actions325- [ ] Isolate source host from network326- [ ] Check EDR telemetry for host-based indicators327- [ ] Reset credentials for affected user accounts328- [ ] Block identified C2 infrastructure329- [ ] Escalate to incident response team330```