Detecting T1003 Credential Dumping with EDR
When to Use
- When hunting for credential theft activity in the environment
- After compromise indicators suggest attacker has elevated privileges
- When EDR alerts fire for LSASS access or suspicious process memory reads
- During incident response to determine scope of credential compromise
- When auditing LSASS protection controls (Credential Guard, RunAsPPL)
Prerequisites
- EDR agent deployed with LSASS access monitoring (CrowdStrike, Defender for Endpoint, SentinelOne)
- Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with LSASS-specific filters
- Windows Security Event ID 4656/4663 (Object Access Auditing)
- LSASS SACL auditing enabled (Windows 10+)
- Registry auditing for SAM hive access
Workflow
- Monitor LSASS Process Access: Track all processes opening handles to lsass.exe with suspicious access rights (PROCESS_VM_READ 0x0010, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS 0x1FFFFF). Non-privileged or unusual processes accessing LSASS are strong indicators.
- Detect Credential Dumping Tools: Hunt for known tool signatures -- Mimikatz (sekurlsa::logonpasswords), procdump.exe targeting LSASS, comsvcs.dll MiniDump, and Task Manager creating LSASS dumps.
- Monitor NTDS.dit Access: Detect Volume Shadow Copy creation (vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy) followed by NTDS.dit file access, or ntdsutil.exe IFM creation.
- Track SAM/SECURITY/SYSTEM Hive Access: Hunt for reg.exe save commands targeting SAM, SECURITY, and SYSTEM registry hives.
- Detect DCSync Activity: Monitor for non-DC accounts requesting directory replication (Event 4662 with replication GUIDs).
- Correlate with Lateral Movement: After credential dumping, attackers typically move laterally. Correlate credential access events with subsequent remote logon attempts.
- Assess Impact: Determine which credentials were potentially compromised and initiate password resets.
Key Concepts
| Concept |
Description |
| T1003.001 |
LSASS Memory -- dumping credentials from LSASS process |
| T1003.002 |
Security Account Manager -- extracting local account hashes from SAM |
| T1003.003 |
NTDS -- extracting domain hashes from Active Directory database |
| T1003.004 |
LSA Secrets -- extracting service account passwords |
| T1003.005 |
Cached Domain Credentials -- extracting DCC2 hashes |
| T1003.006 |
DCSync -- replicating credentials from domain controller |
| Credential Guard |
Virtualization-based isolation of LSASS secrets |
| RunAsPPL |
Protected Process Light for LSASS |
Detection Queries
Splunk -- LSASS Access Detection
index=sysmon EventCode=10
| where match(TargetImage, "(?i)lsass\.exe$")
| where GrantedAccess IN ("0x1FFFFF", "0x1F3FFF", "0x143A", "0x1F0FFF", "0x0040", "0x1010", "0x1410")
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(csrss|lsass|svchost|MsMpEng|WmiPrvSE|taskmgr|procexp|SecurityHealthService)\.exe$")
| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace
Splunk -- Credential Dumping Tool Detection
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(sekurlsa|lsadump|kerberos::list|crypto::certificates)")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)procdump.*-ma.*lsass")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)comsvcs\.dll.*MiniDump")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)ntdsutil.*\"ac i ntds\".*ifm")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)reg\s+save\s+hklm\\\\(sam|security|system)")
OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)vssadmin.*create\s+shadow")
| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage
KQL -- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("LsassAccess", "CredentialDumpingActivity")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,
InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType, AdditionalFields
| sort by Timestamp desc
Sigma Rule -- LSASS Credential Dumping
title: LSASS Memory Credential Dumping Attempt
status: stable
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_access
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
GrantedAccess|contains:
- '0x1FFFFF'
- '0x1F3FFF'
- '0x143A'
- '0x0040'
filter:
SourceImage|endswith:
- '\csrss.exe'
- '\lsass.exe'
- '\MsMpEng.exe'
- '\svchost.exe'
condition: selection and not filter
level: critical
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.001
Common Scenarios
- Mimikatz sekurlsa: Direct LSASS memory reading via
sekurlsa::logonpasswords to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets.
- ProcDump LSASS:
procdump.exe -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp creating a memory dump for offline credential extraction.
- Comsvcs.dll MiniDump:
rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll MiniDump [LSASS_PID] dump.bin full using a built-in Windows DLL for LSASS dumping.
- NTDS.dit Extraction: Creating a Volume Shadow Copy and copying NTDS.dit + SYSTEM hive for offline domain hash extraction with secretsdump.
- SAM Hive Export:
reg save HKLM\SAM sam.save followed by reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.save for local account hash extraction.
- Task Manager Dump: Right-clicking LSASS in Task Manager to create a memory dump -- a legitimate tool abused for credential theft.
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-CRED-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Dumping Method: [LSASS_Access/NTDS/SAM/DCSync]
Source Process: [Tool or process used]
Target: [LSASS/NTDS.dit/SAM/SECURITY]
Access Rights: [Granted access mask]
User Context: [Account performing the dump]
ATT&CK Technique: [T1003.00x]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium]
Credentials at Risk: [Scope assessment]
1---2name: detecting-t1003-credential-dumping-with-edr3description: Detect OS credential dumping (MITRE T1003) targeting LSASS memory, the SAM4 database, NTDS.dit, and cached credentials by correlating EDR telemetry, Sysmon process-access5 events, and Windows security event logs. Use when hunting for Mimikatz-style credential6 theft, triaging an EDR alert on LSASS access, or scoping an incident after suspected7 credential dumping.8domain: cybersecurity9subdomain: threat-hunting10tags:11- threat-hunting12- credential-dumping13- lsass14- mitre-t100315- edr16- mimikatz17- ntds18- sam-database19version: '1.0'20author: mahipal21license: Apache-2.022d3fend_techniques:23- Token Binding24- Execution Isolation25- File Metadata Consistency Validation26- Restore Access27- Application Protocol Command Analysis28nist_csf:29- DE.CM-0130- DE.AE-0231- DE.AE-0732- ID.RA-0533mitre_attack:34- T1003.00135- T1003.00236- T1003.00337- T1003.00638mitre_f3:39 version: '1.1'40 tactics:41 - reconnaissance42 - positioning43 - initial-access44 techniques:45 - id: T155546 name: Credentials from Password Stores47 tactic: reconnaissance48 source: attack49 - id: T1555.00350 name: 'Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers'51 tactic: reconnaissance52 source: attack53 - id: T153954 name: Steal Web Session Cookie55 tactic: positioning56 source: attack57 - id: F100658 name: Account Takeover59 tactic: initial-access60 source: f361 - id: F1006.00262 name: 'Account Takeover: Exposed Login Credential'63 tactic: initial-access64 source: f365metadata:66 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/26zl/detecting-t1003-credential-dumping-with-edr67---6869# Detecting T1003 Credential Dumping with EDR7071## When to Use7273- When hunting for credential theft activity in the environment74- After compromise indicators suggest attacker has elevated privileges75- When EDR alerts fire for LSASS access or suspicious process memory reads76- During incident response to determine scope of credential compromise77- When auditing LSASS protection controls (Credential Guard, RunAsPPL)7879## Prerequisites8081- EDR agent deployed with LSASS access monitoring (CrowdStrike, Defender for Endpoint, SentinelOne)82- Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with LSASS-specific filters83- Windows Security Event ID 4656/4663 (Object Access Auditing)84- LSASS SACL auditing enabled (Windows 10+)85- Registry auditing for SAM hive access8687## Workflow88891. **Monitor LSASS Process Access**: Track all processes opening handles to lsass.exe with suspicious access rights (PROCESS_VM_READ 0x0010, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS 0x1FFFFF). Non-privileged or unusual processes accessing LSASS are strong indicators.902. **Detect Credential Dumping Tools**: Hunt for known tool signatures -- Mimikatz (sekurlsa::logonpasswords), procdump.exe targeting LSASS, comsvcs.dll MiniDump, and Task Manager creating LSASS dumps.913. **Monitor NTDS.dit Access**: Detect Volume Shadow Copy creation (vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy) followed by NTDS.dit file access, or ntdsutil.exe IFM creation.924. **Track SAM/SECURITY/SYSTEM Hive Access**: Hunt for reg.exe save commands targeting SAM, SECURITY, and SYSTEM registry hives.935. **Detect DCSync Activity**: Monitor for non-DC accounts requesting directory replication (Event 4662 with replication GUIDs).946. **Correlate with Lateral Movement**: After credential dumping, attackers typically move laterally. Correlate credential access events with subsequent remote logon attempts.957. **Assess Impact**: Determine which credentials were potentially compromised and initiate password resets.9697## Key Concepts9899| Concept | Description |100|---------|-------------|101| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory -- dumping credentials from LSASS process |102| T1003.002 | Security Account Manager -- extracting local account hashes from SAM |103| T1003.003 | NTDS -- extracting domain hashes from Active Directory database |104| T1003.004 | LSA Secrets -- extracting service account passwords |105| T1003.005 | Cached Domain Credentials -- extracting DCC2 hashes |106| T1003.006 | DCSync -- replicating credentials from domain controller |107| Credential Guard | Virtualization-based isolation of LSASS secrets |108| RunAsPPL | Protected Process Light for LSASS |109110## Detection Queries111112### Splunk -- LSASS Access Detection113```spl114index=sysmon EventCode=10115| where match(TargetImage, "(?i)lsass\.exe$")116| where GrantedAccess IN ("0x1FFFFF", "0x1F3FFF", "0x143A", "0x1F0FFF", "0x0040", "0x1010", "0x1410")117| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(csrss|lsass|svchost|MsMpEng|WmiPrvSE|taskmgr|procexp|SecurityHealthService)\.exe$")118| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace119```120121### Splunk -- Credential Dumping Tool Detection122```spl123index=sysmon EventCode=1124| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(sekurlsa|lsadump|kerberos::list|crypto::certificates)")125 OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)procdump.*-ma.*lsass")126 OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)comsvcs\.dll.*MiniDump")127 OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)ntdsutil.*\"ac i ntds\".*ifm")128 OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)reg\s+save\s+hklm\\\\(sam|security|system)")129 OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)vssadmin.*create\s+shadow")130| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage131```132133### KQL -- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint134```kql135DeviceEvents136| where Timestamp > ago(7d)137| where ActionType in ("LsassAccess", "CredentialDumpingActivity")138| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,139 InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType, AdditionalFields140| sort by Timestamp desc141```142143### Sigma Rule -- LSASS Credential Dumping144```yaml145title: LSASS Memory Credential Dumping Attempt146status: stable147logsource:148 product: windows149 category: process_access150detection:151 selection:152 TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'153 GrantedAccess|contains:154 - '0x1FFFFF'155 - '0x1F3FFF'156 - '0x143A'157 - '0x0040'158 filter:159 SourceImage|endswith:160 - '\csrss.exe'161 - '\lsass.exe'162 - '\MsMpEng.exe'163 - '\svchost.exe'164 condition: selection and not filter165level: critical166tags:167 - attack.credential_access168 - attack.t1003.001169```170171## Common Scenarios1721731. **Mimikatz sekurlsa**: Direct LSASS memory reading via `sekurlsa::logonpasswords` to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets.1742. **ProcDump LSASS**: `procdump.exe -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp` creating a memory dump for offline credential extraction.1753. **Comsvcs.dll MiniDump**: `rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll MiniDump [LSASS_PID] dump.bin full` using a built-in Windows DLL for LSASS dumping.1764. **NTDS.dit Extraction**: Creating a Volume Shadow Copy and copying NTDS.dit + SYSTEM hive for offline domain hash extraction with secretsdump.1775. **SAM Hive Export**: `reg save HKLM\SAM sam.save` followed by `reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.save` for local account hash extraction.1786. **Task Manager Dump**: Right-clicking LSASS in Task Manager to create a memory dump -- a legitimate tool abused for credential theft.179180## Output Format181182```183Hunt ID: TH-CRED-[DATE]-[SEQ]184Host: [Hostname]185Dumping Method: [LSASS_Access/NTDS/SAM/DCSync]186Source Process: [Tool or process used]187Target: [LSASS/NTDS.dit/SAM/SECURITY]188Access Rights: [Granted access mask]189User Context: [Account performing the dump]190ATT&CK Technique: [T1003.00x]191Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium]192Credentials at Risk: [Scope assessment]193```