Database Security

Database Security

Purpose

Protect the data store itself: who can connect, what the app account can do, how injection is made impossible, how sensitive data is classified and encrypted, and how access is audited. Complements ../../backend/backend-security (app layer) and feeds ../../security-review.

When to Use

• When provisioning a database, hardening an existing one, or handling new sensitive data classes.
• Not as the release audit itself (../../security-review).

Inputs

• Data-sensitivity map (../../backend/backend-security), tenancy model (../../backend/ownership-authorization).
• Deployment topology (who/what can reach the database), compliance constraints.

Discovery Questions

• What data classes live here (credentials, PII, payment/financial, health) and what do compliance rules demand of each?
• Who connects: app, migrations, humans, analytics — with what privileges each?
• Is the database network-reachable from anywhere beyond the app (it shouldn't be)?

Responsibilities

• Least-privilege accounts: the app's runtime account gets CRUD on its schema only — no DDL, no superuser (migrations run under a separate, deploy-scoped account — database-migrations); humans get personal, audited, read-limited access; analytics gets replicas/views, not the primary's write account.
• Network isolation: private network/VPC only, no public listener; TLS on connections; access from production paths only — dev machines don't hold prod credentials.
• Credentials: secret store/env per ../../backend/backend-security, rotated, never in code/logs/dumps; per-environment separation absolute.
• Injection prevention: parameterized queries only — ORMs default to this, raw escape hatches ($queryRaw, sql templates, Mongo operator injection via unvalidated objects) hold the discipline (../../backend/backend-validation blocks operator-shaped input like {$gt: ''}).
• Encryption: at rest (storage/provider level), in transit (TLS), and application-level encryption for the truly sensitive fields (tokens, secrets users store with you) — with key management stated; hashing where reversibility isn't needed (../../backend/backend-authentication credentials).
• PII discipline: classify columns/fields; minimize collection; define retention + deletion paths (account-deletion actually deletes/anonymizes — including backups policy awareness backup-recovery); PII never in logs (../../backend/backend-observability) or dev seeds (seed-data).
• Tenant isolation depth: scoped queries are the floor (ownership-authorization); evaluate row-level security or per-tenant schemas where the risk profile demands database-enforced isolation — recorded decision either way.
• Auditing: who connected, admin/DDL actions, bulk exports — logged and reviewable.

Required Workflow

1. Classify data; map compliance demands per class.
2. Define accounts + privileges per connector; isolate the network.
3. Verify parameterized-only access across the data layer (audit raw usages).
4. Set encryption per class (rest/transit/field) with key management.
5. Define PII retention/deletion paths.
6. Record the tenant-isolation depth decision; wire access auditing.
7. Hand to ../../security-review before release.

Decision Rules

• The app account can't do what the app never does — DDL rights in runtime accounts are standing self-harm.
• Any string-built query is a defect regardless of "we control that input."
• Field-level encryption is for data whose leak survives a database dump; don't encrypt-everything into unqueryable mush — classify first.
• Real production data never seeds lower environments (seed-data).

Rules

• Never print/commit credentials while working; flag + rotate on discovery.
• Every raw-query usage is inventoried and reviewed.
• Deletion paths are tested, not asserted.

Anti-Patterns

• App connecting as superuser/owner "temporarily forever."
• Database on a public IP with password auth.
• String interpolation in the one legacy raw query nobody reviews.
• PII in logs, fixtures, and three abandoned analytics exports.
• "Encrypted at rest" (disk) presented as the answer to field-sensitivity questions.
• Account deletion that flips a boolean and keeps everything.

Validation Checklist

• Data classified; compliance mapped.
• Least-privilege accounts per connector; migration account separate.
• Network private; TLS enforced.
• Parameterized-only verified; raw usages inventoried.
• Encryption per class + key management recorded.
• PII retention/deletion paths defined and tested.
• Tenant-isolation depth decision recorded; auditing wired.

Definition of Done

A recorded database-security posture — least-privilege access, isolated network, injection-proof data layer, class-appropriate encryption, tested PII deletion, explicit tenant-isolation depth, and auditing — queued for security review.

Related Skills

../../backend/backend-security, ../../security-review, ../../backend/ownership-authorization, ../../backend/backend-validation, ../../backend/backend-authentication, backup-recovery, seed-data, database-migrations, ../../environment-audit.

Related Knowledge

../../../knowledge/ (data classes, compliance regime, topology).

Related References

../../../references/database/security/ (classification table, when populated).

Context Loading Guidance

• Requires: sensitivity map, tenancy model, topology, connector list.
• Does not require: application feature code, query-by-query review (sample raw usages).
• May load: backup-recovery (backup encryption/PII), ../../security-review (hand-off).
• Stop when: the posture is recorded and handed to review.

Token Efficiency Guidance

The classification table (field class → encryption → retention → access) plus the account-privilege matrix carry the design; never echo actual secrets or real data while working.