Threat Modeling

Threat Modeling

Purpose

Find the threats worth defending against before they're built in: map assets, trust boundaries, and attackers, enumerate what could go wrong, and turn that into prioritized mitigations that route to the specialist security skills. It frames the whole security effort; it doesn't scan code.

When to Use

• At design time for a new system/feature, and when architecture changes trust boundaries.
• Not as a code scan (specialist skills) or a post-hoc audit alone (../../security-review) — though it guides both.

Inputs

• Architecture + data flow (../../architecture-design), data-sensitivity map (../../backend/backend-security).
• Applications, integrations, and who the users/attackers are.

Discovery Questions

• What are the assets worth protecting (user data, money, credentials, availability, reputation)?
• Where are the trust boundaries (client↔server, service↔service, tenant↔tenant, third-party edges)?
• Who are the attackers (external anonymous, authenticated user abusing scope, malicious insider, compromised dependency)?
• What's the impact if each asset is compromised?

Responsibilities

• Map assets, entry points, trust boundaries, and data flows across the system (each boundary is where threats concentrate).
• Enumerate threats systematically (STRIDE as a checklist: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege) per boundary/asset.
• Prioritize by likelihood × impact — model the plausible, not every theoretical attack.
• Turn each significant threat into a mitigation routed to a specialist skill:
  • identity/session threats → authentication-security;
  • access/scope/IDOR → authorization-security;
  • injection/API abuse → api-security, web-security;
  • data exposure → database-security, privacy-review;
  • secret exposure → secrets-audit; dependency compromise → dependency-security;
  • automated abuse/DoS → abuse-prevention; platform-specific → mobile-security/web-security.
• Make mitigations testable — each should become a security regression test (security-regression-testing).

Required Workflow

1. Inventory assets, entry points, trust boundaries, data flows.
2. Enumerate threats per boundary (STRIDE checklist).
3. Prioritize by likelihood × impact.
4. Assign each significant threat a mitigation + owning specialist skill.
5. Record the model; feed mitigations to the specialists and to security-regression-testing.

Decision Rules

• Model the plausible attacker and realistic impact — infinite theoretical threats aren't a plan; prioritize.
• Trust boundaries are where to look hardest — data crossing one is untrusted until validated/authorized.
• Every mitigation names an owner (a specialist skill) and is testable — otherwise it's a wish.
• Revisit the model when architecture changes boundaries; it's living, not one-time.

Rules

• Threats prioritized, not exhaustively listed without triage.
• Mitigations routed to specialist skills and made testable.
• The model is recorded and revisited on boundary changes.

Anti-Patterns

• Skipping threat modeling and discovering the attack surface in production.
• An unprioritized wall of every conceivable threat, actioned on none.
• Mitigations with no owner or no test.
• Modeling once and never updating as the system changes.
• Treating a vulnerability scanner's output as a threat model.

Validation Checklist

• Assets, entry points, trust boundaries, data flows mapped.
• Threats enumerated per boundary (STRIDE).
• Prioritized by likelihood × impact.
• Each significant threat → mitigation + owning specialist skill.
• Mitigations testable; fed to security-regression-testing.

Definition of Done

A recorded, prioritized threat model — assets, boundaries, attackers, and STRIDE threats — with each significant threat mapped to a testable mitigation owned by a specialist security skill, revisited when boundaries change.

Related Skills

authentication-security, authorization-security, api-security, web-security, mobile-security, database-security, secrets-audit, dependency-security, abuse-prevention, privacy-review, security-regression-testing, ../../security-review, ../../architecture-design.

Related Knowledge

../../../knowledge/ (assets, attackers, impact tolerances).

Related References

../../../references/security/ (threat-model templates, when populated).

Context Loading Guidance

• Requires: architecture + data flow, data-sensitivity map, user/attacker context.
• Does not require: code-level detail (specialists handle it), full source.
• May load: the specialist skills a threat routes to.
• Stop when: the prioritized model + routed mitigations are recorded.

Token Efficiency Guidance

The threat table (boundary/asset → STRIDE threat → priority → mitigation → owning skill) is the whole artifact.