Security Sentinel

security-sentinel — find what an attacker would find first

When to use this skill

Trigger when the user wants a security pass. Strong signals:

• "security audit", "security review", "is this safe?"
• "check for vulnerabilities", "scan for secrets"
• Before any release touching auth, payments, file uploads, PII
• "we're going through a SOC 2 review"

Do not trigger for: penetration testing of third-party systems without authorization, weaponizing exploits, or for incident response (that needs an actual responder, not a code review).

The output contract

A security report with:

1. Severity-ranked findings — CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, INFO — each tied to real impact (CVSS-style reasoning, not a guess)
2. An exploit sketch for each finding — how an attacker would actually trigger it (1–3 sentences)
3. The smallest fix — the minimum diff that closes the issue
4. A "no findings" verdict when honest — don't fabricate to look thorough
5. What was NOT checked — be explicit about scope so the user doesn't think this was a full pen test

Workflow

1 — Scope

Ask:

• Diff review or full codebase?
• Are there areas off-limits or low-priority (e.g., internal admin tools)?
• Is there a threat model to match against (e.g., "we care about tenant isolation more than DDoS")?

State the scope in the report. "Reviewed src/api/, did not review infrastructure/."

2 — Mechanical scan first

Run the cheap, automated wins before reading code:

• Secrets: gitleaks detect --no-banner or trufflehog filesystem . — anything found is treated as leaked, even if it's "just dev". Rotate immediately.
• Dependencies: npm audit --omit=dev, pnpm audit, pip-audit, cargo audit, bundler-audit, govulncheck. Note the criticals + highs.
• Static analysis: if semgrep / bandit / gosec / brakeman is in the toolchain, run it. Triage the results — most SAST output is noise; the real findings are gold.

3 — Walk the OWASP Top 10 systematically

For each, look at the actual code:

A01: Broken Access Control

• Every authenticated endpoint must check ownership for the resource being accessed. Find places like getOrder(req.params.id) without checking that the order belongs to the user. This is IDOR — the #1 web bug.
• Check for "horizontal" privilege escalation (one user accessing another's data) and "vertical" (regular user hitting admin endpoints).

A02: Cryptographic Failures

• Are passwords hashed with argon2id or bcrypt (cost ≥ 12)? Not MD5, SHA-1, or plain SHA-256.
• Are tokens compared with crypto.timingSafeEqual? Not ===.
• Is TLS terminated correctly? Strict-Transport-Security header set?
• Are session cookies HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict (or Lax with explicit reasoning)?

A03: Injection

• SQL: every query that interpolates user data — is it parameterized? Look for template strings, string concat, or ORM raw queries.
• Command: any child_process.exec(...${input}...) is broken. Use execFile with an args array.
• Path traversal: fs.readFile(path.join(BASE, req.params.file)) is vulnerable. Resolve and check startsWith(BASE).
• NoSQL: Mongo query with user-controlled keys ({ user: req.body.user } where body could be { $ne: null }).
• LDAP, XPath, log injection, template injection (Handlebars, Jinja2 with autoescape off).

A04: Insecure Design

• Auth flows: rate limits on login, password reset, signup? Account enumeration in error messages?
• Password reset tokens: short-lived, single-use, tied to the user, sent via the verified channel only?
• 2FA: backup codes one-time, rate-limited verification?

A05: Security Misconfiguration

• CORS: is Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * paired with credentials? (That's a bug.)
• Express/Fastify default headers (X-Powered-By, etc.) removed?
• app.use(express.json({ limit: '...' })) set? Otherwise it's a DoS vector.
• Error pages leak stack traces in prod?
• Default credentials anywhere (admin/admin)?

A06: Vulnerable Components

• The audit results from step 2. Anything CRITICAL/HIGH gets ticketed.
• Are dependencies pinned? Floating ^1.0.0 ranges let a future minor break security guarantees.

A07: Identification & Authentication

• Session fixation? Session ID rotates on login?
• JWT: alg: none rejected explicitly? kid validated against an allowlist? Algorithm pinned (not "auto")?
• Multi-tenancy: org_id baked into every query, or relied on at the app layer (fragile)?

A08: Software & Data Integrity

• package.json lockfile committed?
• Container base images pinned to a digest, not just a tag?
• CI uses actions/checkout@v4 or similar, not @main?
• Webhooks: signatures verified with crypto.timingSafeEqual?

A09: Logging & Monitoring

• Auth failures logged with rate (not just per event)?
• PII not in logs (passwords, tokens, full PANs, SSNs)?
• Errors surfaced to a monitoring system, not just stdout?

A10: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

• Any code that fetches a user-supplied URL? Must validate the URL doesn't resolve to private IP space (10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, IPv6 equivalents).
• The check happens after DNS resolution, not just on the string.

4 — Adjacent classics worth a sweep

• Prototype pollution (JS): any _.merge, Object.assign over user-controlled JSON? Lodash < 4.17.21 is famous for this.
• Deserialization: pickle.loads, Marshal.load, yaml.load (vs yaml.safe_load), unserialize (PHP) on untrusted input → RCE.
• XSS: every dangerouslySetInnerHTML, v-html, innerHTML =, document.write — what's the source?
• Open redirect: res.redirect(req.query.next) without allowlist.
• Race conditions: TOCTOU on file ops, double-charge on payment retries, double-redemption of coupon codes.
• Mass assignment: User.update(req.body) allowing is_admin: true to slip through. Use explicit allowlists.

5 — Write the report

For each finding:

[SEVERITY] <title>
  File:        src/api/orders.ts:42
  Category:    OWASP A01 — Broken Access Control (IDOR)
  Impact:      Any authenticated user can read any order by guessing its ID.
  Exploit:     curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer <user A's token>' /api/orders/<user B's order ID>
  Fix:         Add `where userId = req.user.id` to the query, OR call a shared `assertOrgAccess(req.user, order.orgId)` before returning.
  References:  https://owasp.org/Top10/A01_2021-Broken_Access_Control/

End with:

• Scope reviewed — paths covered
• Scope NOT reviewed — paths skipped + why
• Open dependency vulns — count + criticals
• Verdict — one of: "Safe to ship; no findings above MEDIUM" / "Block release; CRITICALs to address" / "Ship with mitigations: "

Patterns and anti-patterns

✅ Do:

• Trace user input from entry to sink. The bug is usually in the join.
• Treat any committed secret as compromised. Rotate first, dig into git history second.
• Default-deny for new endpoints. Auth + authz checks should be a middleware, not optional per route.
• For multi-tenant apps, enforce org_id filtering in the data layer, not the app layer — easier to audit, harder to forget.

❌ Don't:

• Don't recommend a WAF as a substitute for fixing the underlying bug.
• Don't trust client-side validation. Ever. The browser is hostile.
• Don't write your own crypto. Use the language's standard library; pick libsodium / crypto / ring over hand-rolling.
• Don't blocklist for input validation when an allowlist works. Blocklists always miss a case.
• Don't fix the symptom (sanitize this string) when you can fix the cause (use a parameterized query).

Example invocation

User: "Run a security audit on the auth module before we launch."

1. Scope: src/auth/, including the routes and middleware. Not reviewing infrastructure or third-party SaaS configs.
2. Mechanical: gitleaks clean; npm audit shows 1 HIGH (jsonwebtoken < 9.0.0, signature bypass) — already on 9.0.2, false positive in transitive, but pinning needs to be confirmed.
3. Walk OWASP:
   • CRITICAL auth/reset.ts:42 — token compared with ===. Timing attack. Use crypto.timingSafeEqual.
   • HIGH auth/login.ts:23 — no rate limit. Brute force feasible. Wrap with existing rateLimit('auth.login', { max: 5, window: '15m' }).
   • HIGH auth/signup.ts:88 — different response between "email exists" and "email created" enables enumeration. Return the same 202 in both cases; send the differentiator via email.
   • MEDIUM auth/session.ts:55 — session cookie missing SameSite. Add SameSite=Strict.
   • LOW auth/utils.ts:14 — password complexity check is hard-coded; move to config.
4. Open vulns: 0 critical, 0 high after pinning verification.
5. Verdict: Block release — fix the timing-safe compare and rate limit before launch. Others can be a follow-up PR within the week.

See also

• code-auditor — broader code-quality review that includes some of these findings
• mcp-forge — sweep newly-generated MCP servers for the auth/secrets pitfalls
• ship-it — set up the protected-branch and required-checks rules in CI