Mitm Prevention

MITM Prevention Baseline

Instructions

Before pinning, get the platform baseline right. Most real-world MITM on mobile comes from misconfigured cleartext or from accepting user-installed CAs.

1. Android: Network Security Config

Ship an explicit res/xml/network_security_config.xml even if you think defaults are fine:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<network-security-config>
  <base-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="false">
    <trust-anchors>
      <certificates src="system"/>
      <!-- user CAs are NOT trusted by default from Android 7+ -->
    </trust-anchors>
  </base-config>

  <domain-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="false">
    <domain includeSubdomains="true">api.example.com</domain>
  </domain-config>

  <debug-overrides>
    <trust-anchors>
      <certificates src="user"/>
    </trust-anchors>
  </debug-overrides>
</network-security-config>

Key points:

• cleartextTrafficPermitted="false" blocks http:// at the platform layer.
• <debug-overrides> only applies to android:debuggable="true" builds — perfect for Charles / mitmproxy in dev, impossible to ship enabled.
• Do not add <certificates src="user"/> to base-config; that is the most common cause of pinned apps being MITMed.

Wire it in AndroidManifest.xml:

<application
    android:networkSecurityConfig="@xml/network_security_config"
    android:usesCleartextTraffic="false"
    ... >

2. iOS: App Transport Security (ATS)

Keep ATS on. The minimum acceptable Info.plist:

<key>NSAppTransportSecurity</key>
<dict>
  <key>NSAllowsArbitraryLoads</key>
  <false/>
  <!-- If you truly need a narrow exception, scope it: -->
  <key>NSExceptionDomains</key>
  <dict>
    <key>legacy.partner.example</key>
    <dict>
      <key>NSIncludesSubdomains</key><true/>
      <key>NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion</key><string>TLSv1.2</string>
      <key>NSExceptionAllowsInsecureHTTPLoads</key><false/>
    </dict>
  </dict>
</dict>

Never set NSAllowsArbitraryLoads=true globally. App Review increasingly rejects it.

3. User-Installed CAs

• Android 7+ (API 24): apps do not trust user CAs unless the manifest opts in. Good default — leave it.
• iOS: user/profile-installed CAs are trusted by default. Pinning is the mitigation (see tls-pinning).
• Neither platform can fully block a rooted / jailbroken device from MITMing your traffic. Layer attestation (api-abuse-protection).

4. Detecting MITM in Production

You usually do not want to proactively detect MITM in-app; it becomes a cat-and-mouse game. Instead:

• Pin.
• Log pin failures server-side as a high-severity anomaly metric.
• Require attestation on sensitive endpoints.

5. WebViews

WebViews inherit system trust — they will happily load a proxied MITM site. Controls:

• Never load user-controlled URLs in a WebView that has access to a JS bridge.
• Disable setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs / setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs on Android.
• On iOS, prefer ASWebAuthenticationSession or SFSafariViewController for any third-party auth — they inherit Safari's protections and can't be MITMed by an in-app JS bridge.

6. Deep Links / Universal Links

A malicious app on Android can claim the same custom scheme as yours. Mitigations:

• Prefer App Links (Android) and Universal Links (iOS), both of which are HTTPS URLs verified by the OS against /.well-known/assetlinks.json or /.well-known/apple-app-site-association.
• Validate any deep-link parameters server-side before acting on them — never trust an amount or to field just because it arrived via the registered scheme.

7. Flutter / RN Specific

• Flutter's dart:io HttpClient respects Android NSC but not iOS ATS in every version — verify on your target. Prefer dart:io on iOS going through URLSession via a native plugin for anything sensitive.
• React Native's JS fetch goes through OkHttp (Android) / NSURLSession (iOS), so platform config applies. XMLHttpRequest for legacy libraries takes the same path.

Checklist

• network_security_config.xml ships with cleartextTrafficPermitted="false" and no user CAs in base-config.
• android:usesCleartextTraffic="false" in the manifest.
• NSAllowsArbitraryLoads is false; any NSExceptionDomains are narrowly scoped.
• Debug / MITM-proxy overrides are gated to debug builds only.
• No WebView exposes file:// access or a JS bridge to arbitrary URLs.
• Third-party auth uses SFSafariViewController / ASWebAuthenticationSession, not an in-app WebView.
• App Links / Universal Links are used for any sensitive deep link; parameters are re-validated server-side.