Fuzz Testing for Medical Devices
Purpose
Uncover robustness and security issues by fuzzing inputs/protocols relevant to medical devices (parsers, IPC, network/BLE/USB).
When to Apply
- Parsers, protocol handlers, file/log importers, command decoders.
- After major changes to input handling or security-relevant code.
Requirements (testable)
- Target Selection: Identify fuzz targets from threat model and interfaces; prioritize safety/security-critical parsers. Rationale: focus on risk.
- Harness Quality: Build minimal harness with input validation hooks and assertions; run on host where feasible. Rationale: effectiveness.
- Sanitizers: Combine fuzzing with ASan/UBSan/MSan where possible. Rationale: detect memory/UB issues.
- Corpus Management: Seed with structured samples; minimize corpus; store crashes with repro inputs. Rationale: coverage and triage.
- Crash Triage: Deduplicate crashes; file defects with root cause and linkage to requirements/risks; fix or justify. Rationale: closure.
- Coverage: Track coverage metrics; aim to improve over time; MC/DC not required but branch coverage helpful. Rationale: breadth of exploration.
Recommended Practices
- Use lightweight protocol models to guide fuzzing (e.g., length fields, checksums).
- Run fuzzers in CI/nightly on host; for embedded-only code, fuzz extracted libs or use emulation where possible.
- Limit run time per PR; longer campaigns nightly/weekly.
Patterns
LibFuzzer harness (C):
// REQ-FUZZ-HAR-01; TEST-FUZZ-03
int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *data, size_t size) {
if (size < sizeof(cmd_t)) return 0;
if (!validate_msg((const msg_t *)data, size)) return 0;
handle_cmd((const msg_t *)data);
return 0;
}
Seed corpus entry (hex):
// REQ-FUZZ-CORPUS-02
01 00 10 00 AA BB CC DD
Anti-Patterns (risks)
- Fuzzing without sanitizers -> risk: missed memory/UB issues.
- No crash dedup/triage -> risk: unhandled defects.
- Unseeded fuzzing on structured protocols -> risk: slow/ineffective.
- Ignoring outputs/logs from fuzzer -> risk: silent failures.
Verification Checklist
- Fuzz targets selected from threat model/interfaces.
- Harnesses include assertions/validations; run on host/emulated.
- Sanitizers enabled where possible during fuzzing.
- Corpus seeded and managed; crashes stored with repro.
- Crashes triaged/deduped; issues filed/resolved/justified.
- Coverage tracked; improvements monitored.
Traceability
REQ-FUZZ-###to fuzz harness/test IDsTEST-FUZZ-###; crash reports linked to defects and requirements.
References
- AFL/LibFuzzer/oss-fuzz documentation.
- FDA cybersecurity guidance encourages robustness testing (informative).
Changelog
- 1.0.0 (2026-01-04): Initial fuzz testing skill with harness, sanitizer, and triage guidance.
Audit History
- 2026-01-04: Audit performed. Verified:
- AFL/LibFuzzer/oss-fuzz references are accurate
- LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput harness pattern is syntactically correct
- Sanitizer integration (ASan/UBSan/MSan) correctly described