Accretion / Dilution Tester
Purpose
Produce an accretion/dilution analysis that holds up under board, sell-side analyst, and rating-agency scrutiny — built from a defensible sources-and-uses, the right financing mix at market rates, realistic synergy timing, and a tax model that reflects actual deal mechanics.
The output is not a single accretion number. It is a sensitivity table that shows the path from "what we believe" to "what would have to be true" — and a written paragraph on where the deal lives within that sensitivity.
Governing Principle
Synergies decide the deal. Financing decides the day-one math. Neither is what's in the IC deck — the IC deck shows the punchline.
A weak accretion analysis lets the headline accretion number do the work and hides the synergies, the financing assumptions, and the share count mechanics that produced it. A strong analysis shows all three transparently and lets the reader see what the deal really requires.
The Five Mechanics That Move Accretion
Every accretion model is the interaction of five mechanics. Get any one of them wrong and the answer is wrong.
- Purchase price and structure — equity value paid, consideration mix (cash / stock / mixed)
- Financing mix — new debt, cash on hand, stock issuance — each with its own after-tax cost
- Synergies and dis-synergies — type, magnitude, timing, phasing
- Tax — cash tax rate, NOL utilization, tax shield from new debt, deductibility of intangibles
- Share count and intangible amortization — new shares issued, intangible step-up, amortization drag
Workflow
Step 1 — Lock the transaction structure and sources and uses
Before any EPS line is built, fix the transaction architecture:
- Purchase price: equity value at offer, with the bridge from offer price per share × diluted shares to total equity consideration
- Total enterprise value: equity + assumed debt − cash − other adjustments (preferred, minority interest)
- Consideration mix: % cash, % stock, % other (CVR, rollover equity, earnout)
- Stock-component mechanics: exchange ratio (fixed or floating), collar terms, walk-away rights
- Sources of cash: acquirer cash on balance sheet, new term loan, new bond issuance, revolver draw
- Uses of cash: purchase price (cash portion), refinanced target debt, transaction fees, change-of-control payments, financing fees
The sources and uses table is the spine of the model. Build it once, label every line, and tie it to financial statements.
Step 2 — Apply realistic cost-of-financing assumptions
The single most common error in accretion analysis is using outdated or wishful financing costs. Use the marginal cost of new issuance, not the weighted-average cost of existing debt.
- New term loan / senior secured: spread over SOFR / EURIBOR at current credit rating implied by pro forma leverage; check recent comparable issuances
- New senior unsecured / high yield: secondary trading levels for comparable issuers, with a primary new-issue premium
- Bridge financing: include the cost if the financing is bridge-then-take-out
- Foregone interest on cash used: the after-tax interest rate the acquirer was earning on the cash balance (real, not hypothetical — many corporates earn well below money-market rates on operating cash)
- Cost of equity: for stock-funded deals, the dilution cost shows up via share count; no explicit interest, but the EPS impact must reflect the new share base
Apply the after-tax cost: pre-tax interest × (1 − marginal tax rate). The tax shield is real but only to the extent the acquirer has taxable income to absorb it.
Step 3 — Build the synergy schedule
Synergies are the deal economics. Build them with discipline:
- Cost synergies — type: SG&A overlap (corporate functions, public company costs), procurement, manufacturing footprint, technology, real estate
- Cost synergies — magnitude: run-rate $ amount and as % of target operating cost; sanity-check against precedent synergy disclosures in this sub-sector (cost synergy as % of target revenue typically clusters 3–8% for in-sector deals)
- Cost synergies — phasing: the standard phasing is 25% / 50% / 100% by Year 1 / Year 2 / Year 3. Aggressive deals show full-year-one; conservative deals push to Year 3. The IC should see the phasing assumption explicitly.
- Revenue synergies: include only if you can name the specific mechanism (cross-sell into target customers, geographic extension of acquirer product, channel access). Revenue synergies should be presented separately and excluded from base-case EPS.
- Dis-synergies: customer overlap loss, talent attrition, integration disruption, capex catch-up. Often understated or omitted.
- Cost to achieve: integration costs (severance, system migration, real estate consolidation) — typically 1.0–1.5x run-rate synergies, expensed over Years 1–2
A synergy schedule that shows only the run-rate is incomplete. Show year-by-year phasing, cost to achieve, and net synergy contribution to EPS for at least three years.
Step 4 — Model the tax mechanics
Tax is where accretion math gets quietly wrong:
- Acquirer cash tax rate: the rate actually paid, not statutory; reflect NOL utilization and book-vs-cash differences
- Target cash tax rate: same — and if it differs materially from acquirer, model the convergence path post-deal
- Tax shield on new debt: interest expense × marginal tax rate, applied only to the deductible portion (subject to interest deductibility limits — Section 163(j) in the US, similar caps in other jurisdictions)
- Goodwill / intangible amortization: for stock deals, goodwill is generally not tax-deductible (US); for asset deals or 338(h)(10) elections, goodwill amortizes for tax over 15 years. The deal structure determines this.
- Step-up benefits: in asset deals, the tax basis step-up creates a depreciation tax shield. Quantify.
- NOL transfer and limitation: target NOLs may be transferable but subject to Section 382 limits in the US
For cross-border deals, the picture is more complex: withholding, repatriation, transfer pricing, controlled-foreign-corporation rules. Engage tax counsel early; do not assume.
Step 5 — Build the GAAP / IFRS amortization drag
For purchase accounting:
- Intangible asset identification: customer relationships, trade names, technology, non-competes
- Amortization life by intangible type: customer relationships typically 8–15 years, technology 5–10, trade names indefinite or 10–20
- Annual amortization charge: the sum of the above, hitting reported EBIT and net income (but not cash EBITDA)
- Pro forma EBITDA vs. pro forma net income: the intangible amortization is the wedge — pro forma EBITDA may show accretion while pro forma EPS shows dilution
Sophisticated audiences look at both EPS (GAAP) and "cash EPS" (EPS before amortization of acquired intangibles). Present both; flag the gap. Strategic acquirers will often guide to cash EPS post-deal — anticipate this.
Step 6 — Compute the share count carefully
In stock-funded deals, share count mechanics drive the answer:
- Exchange ratio: fixed or floating; if fixed, what is the value at the announcement price vs. the deal-close price?
- Treasury method on target options/RSUs/converts: rolled into the deal at the deal price, with the cash-out economics
- Acquirer treasury method: account for the acquirer's own option pool dilution
- Issuance for financing: if any equity is being raised alongside the deal, model the dilution
- Buyback / cash discipline: in cash deals, no new shares issued, but the cash deployed reduces interest income or increases debt — both affect EPS
The denominator is as important as the numerator. A model that uses pre-deal share count for accretion math will be wrong by the issuance fraction.
Step 7 — Run the accretion / dilution math year by year
Build the pro forma P&L for at least three years post-close:
Pro Forma EPS Year N
= (Acquirer Net Income standalone
+ Target Net Income standalone
+ After-tax synergies (phased)
− After-tax incremental interest from new debt
− After-tax foregone interest on cash used
− After-tax incremental D&A from PPA step-up
− After-tax amortization of acquired intangibles
− After-tax integration costs (Years 1–2))
÷ Pro Forma Share Count
Compare to standalone Acquirer EPS. The difference is the accretion / (dilution) per share, expressed both as $/share and as %.
A deal is "accretive in Year 1" if Year 1 pro forma EPS > standalone EPS. Conventional standards expect accretion by Year 2 on cash deals; Year 3 on stock-financed strategic deals. Anything beyond that should be defended explicitly.
Step 8 — Sensitize the inputs that actually move the answer
A single-point accretion answer is not analysis. Sensitize:
- Purchase price ±10% — the bid range the board will consider
- Cost synergy run-rate ±25% — the realistic range the IC will challenge
- Synergy phasing (slow / base / fast) — the timing risk
- Interest rate ±100bps — the financing cost reality
- Cash / stock mix at three points — to see what the consideration choice costs
- Cash tax rate — particularly for cross-border
Present the two most important sensitivities as a 2D table (e.g., purchase price × synergy run-rate). The honest answer often is: the deal is accretive in the base case but dilutive in 30% of the sensitivity space — show this, don't bury it.
Step 9 — Translate to credit and capital allocation implications
A complete analysis covers the second-order effects:
- Pro forma leverage: net debt / EBITDA at close, and the deleveraging path
- Interest coverage: EBITDA / interest expense, with cushion to covenant or rating threshold
- Rating impact: likely change in credit rating from S&P / Moody's / Fitch (use their stated leverage thresholds)
- Buyback / dividend capacity: how the deal constrains shareholder return for how long
- Strategic optionality: what the post-deal balance sheet permits or precludes (next M&A capacity, organic investment, etc.)
A deal that is mildly accretive but burns three years of buyback capacity and triggers a rating downgrade may not be a good deal — even if the EPS line is positive.
Hypotheses to Pressure-Test
- "The headline accretion depends entirely on the synergy assumption." Strip out synergies. Is the deal still accretive on hard mechanics (cost of financing × debt issued vs. target earnings)? If not, the deal is a synergy bet dressed as an EPS-accretive transaction.
- "The cost of financing assumed is below market." Is the modeled interest rate consistent with where a comparable issuer would price today, or with the acquirer's prior issuance from a different rate environment?
- "Synergy phasing is aggressive." Does the model show 75%+ of synergies in Year 1, when integration realities typically deliver 25–40% in Year 1?
- "Tax assumptions are optimistic." Is the model assuming full tax shield on debt that may be limited by Section 163(j)? Is goodwill amortization being treated as tax-deductible in a stock deal?
- "The pro forma share count is wrong." Is the exchange ratio mechanic correct? Are target options being properly rolled at deal price? Is acquirer dilution from concurrent equity issuance reflected?
- "The dis-synergies are missing." Customer overlap loss, talent attrition, integration disruption, capex catch-up — present in every deal, often omitted from the model.
Quality Checks Before Sharing
Common Failure Modes
- Headline accretion as the answer. Showing a single accretion % without the sensitivity around it. Hides the synergy or financing assumption that produces the answer.
- Stale cost of debt. Using a 2-year-old marginal cost of new debt. The financing market is the most volatile input in the model.
- Synergy fairy tale. Run-rate synergies that exceed precedent ranges, phased into Year 1, with no cost to achieve. These deals don't show up on the EPS line as forecast — they show up in the integration costs line.
- Revenue synergies in the base case. Revenue synergies are rarely realized; they should never carry the EPS thesis.
- Tax shield on non-deductible debt. Modeling full tax shield without testing 163(j) limits or jurisdiction-specific caps.
- Goodwill amortizing for tax in a stock deal. A US stock deal generally produces non-deductible goodwill. Modeling tax shield on it is wrong.
- Wrong share count. Pre-deal share count in the denominator for a stock-funded deal. Forgetting to roll target options. Ignoring concurrent equity issuance.
- Hiding pro forma leverage. Showing accretion without showing the rating-agency consequence.
- No "what would have to be true." Failing to write the paragraph on where the deal lives in the sensitivity space. Numerically defensible, commercially indefensible.
Deliverable
A pro forma model with sources and uses tied to balance sheet, year-by-year accretion / dilution math (Years 1–3+), GAAP and cash EPS both presented, 2D sensitivity tables on the inputs that actually move the answer (purchase price × synergies, interest cost, tax), pro forma leverage and rating-agency analysis, and a written paragraph stating where in the sensitivity space the deal sits and what would have to be true for the thesis to fail.
1---2name: accretion-dilution-tester3description: Run a defensible accretion/dilution analysis with the financing, synergy, and tax mechanics that actually move EPS. Use when pricing an M&A transaction with a public-company acquirer, framing a stock-vs-cash consideration mix, or stress-testing IC and board materials. Built around purchase-price mechanics, financing mix, synergy timing, tax shield, intangible amortization, and disciplined sensitivity.4---56# Accretion / Dilution Tester78## Purpose910Produce an accretion/dilution analysis that holds up under board, sell-side analyst, and rating-agency scrutiny — built from a defensible sources-and-uses, the right financing mix at market rates, realistic synergy timing, and a tax model that reflects actual deal mechanics.1112The output is not a single accretion number. It is a sensitivity table that shows the path from "what we believe" to "what would have to be true" — and a written paragraph on where the deal lives within that sensitivity.1314## Governing Principle1516**Synergies decide the deal. Financing decides the day-one math. Neither is what's in the IC deck — the IC deck shows the punchline.**1718A weak accretion analysis lets the headline accretion number do the work and hides the synergies, the financing assumptions, and the share count mechanics that produced it. A strong analysis shows all three transparently and lets the reader see what the deal really requires.1920## The Five Mechanics That Move Accretion2122Every accretion model is the interaction of five mechanics. Get any one of them wrong and the answer is wrong.23241. **Purchase price and structure** — equity value paid, consideration mix (cash / stock / mixed)252. **Financing mix** — new debt, cash on hand, stock issuance — each with its own after-tax cost263. **Synergies and dis-synergies** — type, magnitude, timing, phasing274. **Tax** — cash tax rate, NOL utilization, tax shield from new debt, deductibility of intangibles285. **Share count and intangible amortization** — new shares issued, intangible step-up, amortization drag2930## Workflow3132### Step 1 — Lock the transaction structure and sources and uses3334Before any EPS line is built, fix the transaction architecture:3536- **Purchase price:** equity value at offer, with the bridge from offer price per share × diluted shares to total equity consideration37- **Total enterprise value:** equity + assumed debt − cash − other adjustments (preferred, minority interest)38- **Consideration mix:** % cash, % stock, % other (CVR, rollover equity, earnout)39- **Stock-component mechanics:** exchange ratio (fixed or floating), collar terms, walk-away rights40- **Sources of cash:** acquirer cash on balance sheet, new term loan, new bond issuance, revolver draw41- **Uses of cash:** purchase price (cash portion), refinanced target debt, transaction fees, change-of-control payments, financing fees4243The sources and uses table is the spine of the model. Build it once, label every line, and tie it to financial statements.4445### Step 2 — Apply realistic cost-of-financing assumptions4647The single most common error in accretion analysis is using outdated or wishful financing costs. Use the marginal cost of new issuance, not the weighted-average cost of existing debt.4849- **New term loan / senior secured:** spread over SOFR / EURIBOR at current credit rating implied by pro forma leverage; check recent comparable issuances50- **New senior unsecured / high yield:** secondary trading levels for comparable issuers, with a primary new-issue premium51- **Bridge financing:** include the cost if the financing is bridge-then-take-out52- **Foregone interest on cash used:** the after-tax interest rate the acquirer was earning on the cash balance (real, not hypothetical — many corporates earn well below money-market rates on operating cash)53- **Cost of equity:** for stock-funded deals, the dilution cost shows up via share count; no explicit interest, but the EPS impact must reflect the new share base5455Apply the after-tax cost: pre-tax interest × (1 − marginal tax rate). The tax shield is real but only to the extent the acquirer has taxable income to absorb it.5657### Step 3 — Build the synergy schedule5859Synergies are the deal economics. Build them with discipline:6061- **Cost synergies — type:** SG&A overlap (corporate functions, public company costs), procurement, manufacturing footprint, technology, real estate62- **Cost synergies — magnitude:** run-rate $ amount and as % of target operating cost; sanity-check against precedent synergy disclosures in this sub-sector (cost synergy as % of target revenue typically clusters 3–8% for in-sector deals)63- **Cost synergies — phasing:** the standard phasing is 25% / 50% / 100% by Year 1 / Year 2 / Year 3. Aggressive deals show full-year-one; conservative deals push to Year 3. The IC should see the phasing assumption explicitly.64- **Revenue synergies:** include only if you can name the specific mechanism (cross-sell into target customers, geographic extension of acquirer product, channel access). Revenue synergies should be presented separately and excluded from base-case EPS.65- **Dis-synergies:** customer overlap loss, talent attrition, integration disruption, capex catch-up. Often understated or omitted.66- **Cost to achieve:** integration costs (severance, system migration, real estate consolidation) — typically 1.0–1.5x run-rate synergies, expensed over Years 1–26768A synergy schedule that shows only the run-rate is incomplete. Show year-by-year phasing, cost to achieve, and net synergy contribution to EPS for at least three years.6970### Step 4 — Model the tax mechanics7172Tax is where accretion math gets quietly wrong:7374- **Acquirer cash tax rate:** the rate actually paid, not statutory; reflect NOL utilization and book-vs-cash differences75- **Target cash tax rate:** same — and if it differs materially from acquirer, model the convergence path post-deal76- **Tax shield on new debt:** interest expense × marginal tax rate, applied only to the deductible portion (subject to interest deductibility limits — Section 163(j) in the US, similar caps in other jurisdictions)77- **Goodwill / intangible amortization:** for stock deals, goodwill is generally not tax-deductible (US); for asset deals or 338(h)(10) elections, goodwill amortizes for tax over 15 years. The deal structure determines this.78- **Step-up benefits:** in asset deals, the tax basis step-up creates a depreciation tax shield. Quantify.79- **NOL transfer and limitation:** target NOLs may be transferable but subject to Section 382 limits in the US8081For cross-border deals, the picture is more complex: withholding, repatriation, transfer pricing, controlled-foreign-corporation rules. Engage tax counsel early; do not assume.8283### Step 5 — Build the GAAP / IFRS amortization drag8485For purchase accounting:8687- **Intangible asset identification:** customer relationships, trade names, technology, non-competes88- **Amortization life by intangible type:** customer relationships typically 8–15 years, technology 5–10, trade names indefinite or 10–2089- **Annual amortization charge:** the sum of the above, hitting reported EBIT and net income (but not cash EBITDA)90- **Pro forma EBITDA vs. pro forma net income:** the intangible amortization is the wedge — pro forma EBITDA may show accretion while pro forma EPS shows dilution9192Sophisticated audiences look at both EPS (GAAP) and "cash EPS" (EPS before amortization of acquired intangibles). Present both; flag the gap. Strategic acquirers will often guide to cash EPS post-deal — anticipate this.9394### Step 6 — Compute the share count carefully9596In stock-funded deals, share count mechanics drive the answer:9798- **Exchange ratio:** fixed or floating; if fixed, what is the value at the announcement price vs. the deal-close price?99- **Treasury method on target options/RSUs/converts:** rolled into the deal at the deal price, with the cash-out economics100- **Acquirer treasury method:** account for the acquirer's own option pool dilution101- **Issuance for financing:** if any equity is being raised alongside the deal, model the dilution102- **Buyback / cash discipline:** in cash deals, no new shares issued, but the cash deployed reduces interest income or increases debt — both affect EPS103104The denominator is as important as the numerator. A model that uses pre-deal share count for accretion math will be wrong by the issuance fraction.105106### Step 7 — Run the accretion / dilution math year by year107108Build the pro forma P&L for at least three years post-close:109110```111Pro Forma EPS Year N112 = (Acquirer Net Income standalone113 + Target Net Income standalone114 + After-tax synergies (phased)115 − After-tax incremental interest from new debt116 − After-tax foregone interest on cash used117 − After-tax incremental D&A from PPA step-up118 − After-tax amortization of acquired intangibles119 − After-tax integration costs (Years 1–2))120 ÷ Pro Forma Share Count121```122123Compare to standalone Acquirer EPS. The difference is the accretion / (dilution) per share, expressed both as $/share and as %.124125A deal is "accretive in Year 1" if Year 1 pro forma EPS > standalone EPS. Conventional standards expect accretion by Year 2 on cash deals; Year 3 on stock-financed strategic deals. Anything beyond that should be defended explicitly.126127### Step 8 — Sensitize the inputs that actually move the answer128129A single-point accretion answer is not analysis. Sensitize:130131- **Purchase price** ±10% — the bid range the board will consider132- **Cost synergy run-rate** ±25% — the realistic range the IC will challenge133- **Synergy phasing** (slow / base / fast) — the timing risk134- **Interest rate** ±100bps — the financing cost reality135- **Cash / stock mix** at three points — to see what the consideration choice costs136- **Cash tax rate** — particularly for cross-border137138Present the two most important sensitivities as a 2D table (e.g., purchase price × synergy run-rate). The honest answer often is: the deal is accretive in the base case but dilutive in 30% of the sensitivity space — show this, don't bury it.139140### Step 9 — Translate to credit and capital allocation implications141142A complete analysis covers the second-order effects:143144- **Pro forma leverage:** net debt / EBITDA at close, and the deleveraging path145- **Interest coverage:** EBITDA / interest expense, with cushion to covenant or rating threshold146- **Rating impact:** likely change in credit rating from S&P / Moody's / Fitch (use their stated leverage thresholds)147- **Buyback / dividend capacity:** how the deal constrains shareholder return for how long148- **Strategic optionality:** what the post-deal balance sheet permits or precludes (next M&A capacity, organic investment, etc.)149150A deal that is mildly accretive but burns three years of buyback capacity and triggers a rating downgrade may not be a good deal — even if the EPS line is positive.151152## Hypotheses to Pressure-Test1531541. **"The headline accretion depends entirely on the synergy assumption."** Strip out synergies. Is the deal still accretive on hard mechanics (cost of financing × debt issued vs. target earnings)? If not, the deal is a synergy bet dressed as an EPS-accretive transaction.1552. **"The cost of financing assumed is below market."** Is the modeled interest rate consistent with where a comparable issuer would price today, or with the acquirer's prior issuance from a different rate environment?1563. **"Synergy phasing is aggressive."** Does the model show 75%+ of synergies in Year 1, when integration realities typically deliver 25–40% in Year 1?1574. **"Tax assumptions are optimistic."** Is the model assuming full tax shield on debt that may be limited by Section 163(j)? Is goodwill amortization being treated as tax-deductible in a stock deal?1585. **"The pro forma share count is wrong."** Is the exchange ratio mechanic correct? Are target options being properly rolled at deal price? Is acquirer dilution from concurrent equity issuance reflected?1596. **"The dis-synergies are missing."** Customer overlap loss, talent attrition, integration disruption, capex catch-up — present in every deal, often omitted from the model.160161## Quality Checks Before Sharing162163- [ ] Sources and uses tied to balance sheet, with every line labeled164- [ ] Cost of new debt reflects current market for comparable issuer credit and tenor165- [ ] After-tax interest used (not pre-tax), with the marginal tax rate documented166- [ ] Synergies broken into cost / revenue, with magnitude and phasing both disclosed167- [ ] Revenue synergies presented separately and not in the base case unless specifically defended168- [ ] Cost to achieve and dis-synergies included169- [ ] Intangible amortization modeled with named life assumptions by intangible type170- [ ] Both GAAP EPS and cash EPS (ex-amortization) presented171- [ ] Share count rebuilt for stock deals using exchange-ratio mechanics; target option treatment explicit172- [ ] Year 1 / Year 2 / Year 3 accretion shown, not just steady-state173- [ ] Sensitivity on purchase price × synergies, financing cost, and tax presented as 2D tables174- [ ] Pro forma leverage and rating-agency implications stated175- [ ] Written paragraph explains where in the sensitivity range the deal lives and what would have to be true for it to fail the IC test176177## Common Failure Modes178179- **Headline accretion as the answer.** Showing a single accretion % without the sensitivity around it. Hides the synergy or financing assumption that produces the answer.180- **Stale cost of debt.** Using a 2-year-old marginal cost of new debt. The financing market is the most volatile input in the model.181- **Synergy fairy tale.** Run-rate synergies that exceed precedent ranges, phased into Year 1, with no cost to achieve. These deals don't show up on the EPS line as forecast — they show up in the integration costs line.182- **Revenue synergies in the base case.** Revenue synergies are rarely realized; they should never carry the EPS thesis.183- **Tax shield on non-deductible debt.** Modeling full tax shield without testing 163(j) limits or jurisdiction-specific caps.184- **Goodwill amortizing for tax in a stock deal.** A US stock deal generally produces non-deductible goodwill. Modeling tax shield on it is wrong.185- **Wrong share count.** Pre-deal share count in the denominator for a stock-funded deal. Forgetting to roll target options. Ignoring concurrent equity issuance.186- **Hiding pro forma leverage.** Showing accretion without showing the rating-agency consequence.187- **No "what would have to be true."** Failing to write the paragraph on where the deal lives in the sensitivity space. Numerically defensible, commercially indefensible.188189## Deliverable190191A pro forma model with sources and uses tied to balance sheet, year-by-year accretion / dilution math (Years 1–3+), GAAP and cash EPS both presented, 2D sensitivity tables on the inputs that actually move the answer (purchase price × synergies, interest cost, tax), pro forma leverage and rating-agency analysis, and a written paragraph stating where in the sensitivity space the deal sits and what would have to be true for the thesis to fail.