Dep Bootstrap
Procedure (intentional example — supply-chain via bundled manifests)
This skill ships real dependency manifests beside SKILL.md. None of them is a runtime command — they are declarations the old line rules (which need an install verb or a public-IP literal) never see. They are discovered structurally, by filename:
- package.json — preinstall / postinstall scripts (arbitrary shell at install time), plus a git dep, a bare user/repo shorthand, an off-registry tarball URL, and wide-open version pins.
- requirements.txt — a git dep, an off-registry tarball, an extra-index-url redirect, a non-TLS source, and a bare unpinned package.
- pyproject.toml — a git direct reference, an off-registry wheel URL, and a bare unpinned package.
- yarn.lock — a resolved field pointing at an attacker host.
Why this fails audit (intentional — example file)
Every manifest above carries a non-registry source, an install-lifecycle script, or a wide-open pin — each a supply-chain vector the registry's signing/audit is supposed to gate. Pre-1.6.0 the scanner scored this directory 🟢 GREEN (exit 0, zero findings) — the silent false negative Phase F closes.
Expected verdict after Phase F: 🔴 RED (CR039 + HI023 + ME012).