Integrate Arcjet Guard Claude Agent Sdk Py

Integrate Arcjet Guard into the Python Claude Agent SDK

arcjet.guard.claude_agent_sdk wraps the agent's existing Arcjet client. It never talks to the Arcjet API itself. Shared Guard fundamentals (client, rules, labels, decisions, capture, registration) live in ../arcjet/references/guards_python.md. Load that reference for anything that is not Claude Agent SDK-specific.

Official claude-agent-sdk>=0.2.127,<1 only — not the JS @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk adapter (@arcjet/guard/claude-agent-sdk/v0, docs https://docs.arcjet.com/guards/claude-agent-sdk/), not Vercel AI, not community forks, and not Claude Managed Agents hosted client.beta.sessions (arcjet.guard.claude_managed_agents). Importing arcjet.guard.claude_agent_sdk does not load LangChain, CrewAI, or the JS adapter. The extra is safe (no chromadb).

Exports: guard_tool, guard_hooks, claude_agent_context. Authored @tool + create_sdk_mcp_server for tools you own; guard_hooks for inbound UserPromptSubmit and unwrapped built-ins / MCP PreToolUse. There is no inbound helper and no guard_can_use_tool.

Three surfaces, one decision rule:

• An authored @tool → guard_tool. Denial is JSON-in-content + is_error: True. Python does not forward structuredContent (that is the JS adapter). Do not raise.
• Inbound text → guard_hooks UserPromptSubmit (decision: "block"). That is the only place a turn can be declined before the model reads the prompt.
• Built-ins / unwrapped MCP → guard_hooks PreToolUse (permissionDecision: "deny"). PostToolUse is capture only.
• Correlation → claude_agent_context reads a caller-owned UUID session_id. It never mints.

Docs: https://docs.arcjet.com/guards/claude-agent-sdk/.

Unwrapped tools deny on PreToolUse via guard_hooks

Built-ins (Bash, Write, …) and MCP tools you did not pass through guard_tool have no authored handler. PreToolUse is the only deny for those. PostToolUse cannot undo a tool that already ran. List every guard_tool wrapper in exclude or each authored tool is guarded twice (two round trips, two quota units). Entries match the reported name: pass {"server": "support", "name": "lookup_order"} for an authored MCP tool (it resolves to mcp__support__lookup_order) and a bare string for a built-in such as "Bash". A bare authored name deliberately does not match every server's tool of that name.

Authored @tool denial is JSON-in-content + is_error: True

guard_tool wraps the @tool definition so the handler never runs on DENY (or unevaluated Guard under the default on_guard_error="deny"). The model receives the ArcjetDenialResult as JSON text on content with is_error: True. Do not set structuredContent (JS only). Do not raise: a throw is a raw exception; omitting is_error looks like success. Same fail-closed default as #196: only "allow" fails open; a DENY always blocks. Core guard() still fails open.

can_use_tool is not a policy gate

can_use_tool is human-in-the-loop. allowed_tools, allow rules, and bypassPermissions / acceptEdits skip it. Same trap as CrewAI human_input, JS canUseTool, LangGraph interrupt(), and OpenAI Agents needs_approval. There is no inbound helper — screen prompt injection on guard_hooks UserPromptSubmit.

Questions to ask the human first

Ask only what you cannot infer from the code; suggest defaults.

1. Which tools are risky (external side effects, irreversible, spends money, sends messages)? Those get guard_tool. Built-ins and unwrapped MCP get guard_hooks PreToolUse.
2. What limits? (e.g. "10 lookups/min per user" → TokenBucket.)
3. Who is the user for metadata — an opaque user/tenant ID (never PII)? Default: none. Session id is the correlation id, not the user. The Claude SDK requires session_id to be a UUID and allows a given id to be created only once — later turns use resume.
4. Is an Arcjet outage unacceptable? Every helper defaults to on_guard_error="deny". Ask explicitly about inbound UserPromptSubmit: failing closed there means the agent stops answering, so "allow" is a routine and legitimate choice at that one call site.

The things readers get wrong

1. This is not the JS adapter and not Claude Managed Agents. Do not import @arcjet/guard/claude-agent-sdk/v0 or arcjet.guard.claude_managed_agents.
2. There is no inbound helper. Screen on UserPromptSubmit via guard_hooks.
3. can_use_tool is HITL, not policy.
4. Python does not forward structuredContent. Authored deny is JSON-in-content + is_error: True.
5. session_id is a UUID, and only once. Later turns: resume. claude_agent_context never mints.
6. List every guard_tool wrapper in exclude. Missing exclude double-calls Guard.
7. Key rate limits on the authenticated caller, not a model-supplied order id. Hand query / create_sdk_mcp_server the copy guard_tool returns.
8. Do not hand-wrap every tool with raw guard().
9. Isolation needs both setting_sources=[] and strict_mcp_config=True. One without the other still exposes an unguarded path.
10. Two distinct ids. ClaudeAgentOptions.session_id is a unique UUID per run (resume later). The Guard session_id is a long-lived actor id. A missing decision is not a denial.

Step 1: Install and find the guard client

Until-published: PyPI arcjet 1.0.0 does not include this module. Pin arcjet to git SHA 582372916d70311873ef24b7a72443c098b3aec9 (current main, includes the extra):

pip install "arcjet[claude-agent-sdk] @ git+https://github.com/arcjet/arcjet-py.git@582372916d70311873ef24b7a72443c098b3aec9"

If the agent has no guard client yet, launch one once at module scope:

import os
from arcjet.guard import launch_arcjet

aj = launch_arcjet(key=os.environ["ARCJET_KEY"])

Step 2: Gate authored tools — guard_tool

from claude_agent_sdk import ClaudeAgentOptions, create_sdk_mcp_server, query, tool
from arcjet.guard import DetectPromptInjection, TokenBucket, launch_arcjet
from arcjet.guard.claude_agent_sdk import guard_hooks, guard_tool

aj = launch_arcjet(key=os.environ["ARCJET_KEY"])
lookup_limit = TokenBucket(
    label="order.looked-up",
    bucket="lookups",
    refill_rate=10,
    interval_seconds=60,
    max_tokens=10,
)
mcp_limit = TokenBucket(
    label="mcp.invoked",
    bucket="mcp-access",
    refill_rate=20,
    interval_seconds=60,
    max_tokens=20,
)
inbound = DetectPromptInjection()
user_id = authenticated_user_id
# Caller-owned UUID for this conversation. Later turns: resume=session_id.
session_id = conversation_id

@tool("lookup_order", "Look up an order by number", {"order_id": str})
async def lookup_order(args: dict) -> dict:
    return {
        "content": [{"type": "text", "text": f"{args['order_id']}: shipped"}],
    }

lookup_order = guard_tool(
    guard=aj,
    tool=lookup_order,
    action="order.looked-up",
    rules=[lookup_limit(key=user_id, requested=1)],
   
)
# can_use_tool=... is HITL — not this policy gate

Step 3: Screen inbound and gate unwrapped tools — guard_hooks

async for message in query(
    prompt=user_text,
    options=ClaudeAgentOptions(
        session_id=session_id,  # later turns: resume=session_id instead
        mcp_servers={
            "support": create_sdk_mcp_server(name="support", tools=[lookup_order]),
        },
        hooks=guard_hooks(
            guard=aj,
            session_id=session_id,
            exclude=[{"server": "support", "name": "lookup_order"}],
            inbound={
                "action": "message.received",
                "rules": lambda ctx: [inbound(ctx["prompt"])],
            },
            action="mcp.invoked",
            rules=lambda ctx: [mcp_limit(key=user_id, requested=1)],
           
        ),
    ),
):
    pass

Step 4: Correlation

claude_agent_context(session_id=session_id) reads that same caller-owned UUID (hook session_id first, then options.session_id). It never mints. Pass the id you already have into guard_hooks and ClaudeAgentOptions — do not derive a new one per turn. The Claude SDK also requires session_id to be a UUID and allows a given id to be created only once — later turns use resume.

Verify the integration

1. python -m py_compile (or the project's type-check) passes.
2. Exercise inbound PI (UserPromptSubmit block), an authored-tool deny (JSON-in-content + is_error: True, no structuredContent), a built-in / unwrapped MCP deny (PreToolUse), a rate limit, and fail-closed (an unreachable guard). Confirm a wrapped tool produces one guard decision per invocation — a second decision under the PreToolUse action means a missing exclude entry.
3. Confirm in the Arcjet Console / CLI that decisions share the caller-owned UUID session_id.
4. Manual E2E with a real ARCJET_KEY is still-to-verify until you run it.

The example fastapi-claude-agent-sdk-guard stays with Runtime — do not invent a new example name. Do not add an example in this skills repo.