Security: OWASP Agentic AI
Purpose
Treat an agent as a stateful, tool-using actor with broader blast radius than a normal LLM. Walk through the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, lock the autonomy budget, prove the kill switch works, and only then approve release.
Scope and evidence
- Read
references/owasp-agentic.md. - Inventory the agent: planner/loop type, memory stores, tools, sub-agents, scopes/credentials per tool, escalation paths, kill switches.
- Pull the LLM threat surface from
security-owasp-llmand the secrets posture fromsecurity-secrets. - Use Context7 MCP for current OWASP Agentic AI guidance and current agent-framework safety patterns (Anthropic Agent SDK, LangChain, LlamaIndex, AutoGen, CrewAI, etc.).
Assessment
- For each current ASI category (goal hijack, tool misuse, identity and privilege abuse, agentic supply chain, unexpected code execution, memory/context poisoning, inter-agent communication, cascading failures, human-agent trust exploitation, rogue agents), mark Pass/Concern/Fail/Out-of-scope.
- Build an autonomy budget per agent: allowed actions, allowed time, allowed cost, allowed destructive operations, mandatory human-in-the-loop steps.
- Verify least privilege per tool: scope, identity, audit trail, revocation path.
- Run abuse-case evals: poisoned memory injection, ambiguous goal injection, tool spoofing, RCE-via-tool-output, cascading-loop test, kill-switch trigger test.
- Confirm the kill switch: how a user, operator, or monitor can halt the agent within a bounded time; verify by drill.
- Produce remediation plan, owner per finding, and release-gate verdict.
Safety rules
- Use Context7 MCP for current OWASP Agentic AI categories and current framework safety affordances.
- Keep a decision trace: agent architecture, autonomy budget, tool inventory with scopes, eval evidence.
- Refuse to approve any agent with destructive tools and no working kill switch.
- Escalate before granting any agent access to credentials, payments, public posting, or production write paths.
Security record
- Agent architecture diagram (planner, memory, tools, sub-agents, escalation, kill switch)
- Autonomy budget table per agent
- Tool inventory with scopes, identities, audit, revocation
- Per-threat status table with abuse-case eval evidence
- Kill-switch drill record
- Release-gate verdict
Release criteria
- No agent approved without a verified kill switch.
- No tool approved beyond least privilege required to complete the smallest user task.
- No multi-agent system approved without a cascading-loop test.
- No memory store approved without a sanitization or attestation step on read.
- No "trust the LLM to refuse" mitigation. Require deterministic enforcement.
Handoff
Hand off to service-implementation for fixes and to qa-eval so the abuse-case suite enters regression. Re-run on every tool-list change.
References
references/owasp-agentic.md: per-threat checklist, autonomy-budget template, kill-switch drill protocol.