ECSS Operational Safety (space-systems/ecss/q40-operational-safety)
Use when the task is clause 6.6 of ECSS-Q-ST-40C: the hazards that belong to
operating the item rather than to its design, split between the ground set --
transport, handling, integration, launch-site work -- and the flight set,
where a mission-control constraint is only as good as the time it leaves the
operator.
Domain quick reference
- The two sets carry different obligations. A ground operation is graded on
whether personnel are protected by something stronger than a procedure; a
flight constraint is graded on whether the reaction it demands fits inside
the time available.
- Controls rank, they do not merely exist. Eliminating the hazard by design
beats an engineered safety device, which beats a warning device, which
beats procedure and training -- and the severity of the consequence fixes
how far down that order the control is allowed to sit.
- A catastrophic hazard may not rest on a procedure. Procedures are obeyed by
people under schedule pressure at a launch site, so the clause pushes the
control up the order rather than adding another signature to the paperwork.
- A control with no verification is a claim. Every declared control carries
the evidence that it is installed and works, and an unverified one is
reported as open even when its type is strong enough.
- A zero reaction margin is not a pass. Needing exactly the time available
means a single late detection breaks the constraint, so an exactly equal
pair is a finding, recognised through a named tolerance rather than by
shaving the required time.
- Coverage is separate from control quality. A phase the programme declared
hazardous and then left with no operation at all is the gap that a
per-operation review never shows, because there is no row to grade.
Workflow
- Refuse an operation record carrying an unknown key, an unknown phase,
severity or control type, a blank hazard or a non-positive duration.
- Sort each operation into the ground set or the flight set from its phase.
- Rank the declared control and compare it with the weakest rank the
severity allows; report an absent control outright.
- Require a verification behind every declared control.
- For a flight-phase constraint, compute the reaction margin and grade it
positive, exhausted or negative; a constraint with no budget declared at
all is itself a finding.
- For a ground operation exposing personnel, require something stronger than
procedure and training.
- Compare the phases actually covered with the phases the programme declared
hazardous and report each uncovered phase, then roll every finding up into
one verdict.
Pitfalls
- Accepting a procedure as a control because it is written and signed. The
precedence rank, not the existence of paperwork, is what the severity is
graded against.
- Grading flight constraints on the control type alone. A perfectly
engineered constraint that needs more seconds than the pass allows is still
a broken constraint.
- Rounding an exactly equal reaction pair into a pass. The equality is the
worst case, not the boundary case, and it is reported.
- Reading a clean per-operation table as a covered programme. The phases with
no rows at all never appear in that table.
- Applying the personnel-exposure rule to flight phases. Nobody is standing
next to the item in orbit, and firing the rule there buries the ground
findings it exists to raise.
Behavior contract (gate 3)
The record validation, the ground and flight phase split, the control
precedence ranking against severity, the verification requirement, the
reaction-margin computation with its exhausted-margin tolerance, the
personnel-exposure rule and the declared-phase coverage check are exercised
by the gate 3 contract test: scripts/test_q40_operational_safety.py against
scripts/q40_operational_safety_logic.py (stdlib unittest, offline). Run:
python3 scripts/test_q40_operational_safety.py
Compliance
- ECSS standards are freely downloadable (ESA); cite the source and
paraphrase per standards-map.yaml.
- compliance: STANDARDS-REF, gated: false.
1---2name: q40-operational-safety3description: "Evaluate the operational safety provisions of an ECSS-Q-ST-40C clause 6.6 programme: rank every declared control against the design-elimination to procedure-and-training precedence, refuse a catastrophic ground hazard resting on procedure alone, require a verification behind each control, compare the reaction time a mission-control constraint needs with the time the operator has, and report the hazardous phases - transport, handling, integration, launch-site work - left with no operation. Use when ground-operations hazards are controlled, a flight-operations constraint is written, or an operations readiness review asks whether the set is covered. Trigger: ecss, q-st-40c, ecss-operational-safety-constraint, ecss-ground-operations-hazard-control, mission-control-reaction-margin, hazard-control-precedence-rank, launch-site-handling-hazard."4license: Apache-2.05compliance: STANDARDS-REF6standards:7 - id: ecss8 reference-only: true9gated: false10domain: space-systems11pack: space-systems12compatibility: "agentskills.io SKILL.md; any SKILL.md host (Claude Code, Hermes, OpenClaw)"13metadata:14 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/ashfordeou/q40-operational-safety15 domain: space-systems16 subdomain: ecss17 tags: [ecss, q-st-40c-safety-assurance-scope, q40-operational-safety, ecss-operational-safety-constraint, ecss-ground-operations-hazard-control, mission-control-reaction-margin, hazard-control-precedence-rank, launch-site-handling-hazard]18 version: 0.1.019 author: Aero Agent Skills20---2122# ECSS Operational Safety (space-systems/ecss/q40-operational-safety)2324Use when the task is clause 6.6 of ECSS-Q-ST-40C: the hazards that belong to25operating the item rather than to its design, split between the ground set --26transport, handling, integration, launch-site work -- and the flight set,27where a mission-control constraint is only as good as the time it leaves the28operator.2930## Domain quick reference3132- The two sets carry different obligations. A ground operation is graded on33 whether personnel are protected by something stronger than a procedure; a34 flight constraint is graded on whether the reaction it demands fits inside35 the time available.36- Controls rank, they do not merely exist. Eliminating the hazard by design37 beats an engineered safety device, which beats a warning device, which38 beats procedure and training -- and the severity of the consequence fixes39 how far down that order the control is allowed to sit.40- A catastrophic hazard may not rest on a procedure. Procedures are obeyed by41 people under schedule pressure at a launch site, so the clause pushes the42 control up the order rather than adding another signature to the paperwork.43- A control with no verification is a claim. Every declared control carries44 the evidence that it is installed and works, and an unverified one is45 reported as open even when its type is strong enough.46- A zero reaction margin is not a pass. Needing exactly the time available47 means a single late detection breaks the constraint, so an exactly equal48 pair is a finding, recognised through a named tolerance rather than by49 shaving the required time.50- Coverage is separate from control quality. A phase the programme declared51 hazardous and then left with no operation at all is the gap that a52 per-operation review never shows, because there is no row to grade.5354## Workflow55561. Refuse an operation record carrying an unknown key, an unknown phase,57 severity or control type, a blank hazard or a non-positive duration.582. Sort each operation into the ground set or the flight set from its phase.593. Rank the declared control and compare it with the weakest rank the60 severity allows; report an absent control outright.614. Require a verification behind every declared control.625. For a flight-phase constraint, compute the reaction margin and grade it63 positive, exhausted or negative; a constraint with no budget declared at64 all is itself a finding.656. For a ground operation exposing personnel, require something stronger than66 procedure and training.677. Compare the phases actually covered with the phases the programme declared68 hazardous and report each uncovered phase, then roll every finding up into69 one verdict.7071## Pitfalls7273- Accepting a procedure as a control because it is written and signed. The74 precedence rank, not the existence of paperwork, is what the severity is75 graded against.76- Grading flight constraints on the control type alone. A perfectly77 engineered constraint that needs more seconds than the pass allows is still78 a broken constraint.79- Rounding an exactly equal reaction pair into a pass. The equality is the80 worst case, not the boundary case, and it is reported.81- Reading a clean per-operation table as a covered programme. The phases with82 no rows at all never appear in that table.83- Applying the personnel-exposure rule to flight phases. Nobody is standing84 next to the item in orbit, and firing the rule there buries the ground85 findings it exists to raise.8687## Behavior contract (gate 3)8889The record validation, the ground and flight phase split, the control90precedence ranking against severity, the verification requirement, the91reaction-margin computation with its exhausted-margin tolerance, the92personnel-exposure rule and the declared-phase coverage check are exercised93by the gate 3 contract test: scripts/test_q40_operational_safety.py against94scripts/q40_operational_safety_logic.py (stdlib unittest, offline). Run:95python3 scripts/test_q40_operational_safety.py9697## Compliance9899- ECSS standards are freely downloadable (ESA); cite the source and100 paraphrase per standards-map.yaml.101- compliance: STANDARDS-REF, gated: false.