Input Validation Injection

Input Validation and Injection Defense

Ensure untrusted input is validated and never interpreted as code. Prevent injection across SQL, LDAP, OS commands, templating, and JavaScript runtime object graphs.

Core Strategy

• Validate early at trust boundaries with positive (allow-list) validation and canonicalization.
• Treat all untrusted input as data, never as code. Use safe APIs that separate code from data.
• Parameterize queries/commands; escape only as last resort and context-specific.

Validation Playbook

• Syntactic validation: enforce format, type, ranges, and lengths for each field.
• Semantic validation: enforce business rules (e.g., start <= end date, enum allow-lists).
• Normalization: canonicalize encodings before validation; validate complete strings (regex anchors ^$); beware ReDoS.
• Free-form text: define character class allow-lists; normalize Unicode; set length bounds.
• Files: validate by content type (magic), size caps, and safe extensions; server-generate filenames; scan; store outside web root.

SQL Injection Prevention

• Use prepared statements and parameterized queries for 100% of data access.
• Use bind variables for any dynamic SQL within stored procedures -- never concatenate user input into SQL.
• Prefer least-privilege DB users and views; never grant admin to app accounts.
• Escaping is fragile and discouraged; parameterization is the primary defense.

Example (Java PreparedStatement):

String custname = request.getParameter("customerName");
String query = "SELECT account_balance FROM user_data WHERE user_name = ? ";
PreparedStatement pstmt = connection.prepareStatement(query);
pstmt.setString(1, custname);
ResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery();

LDAP Injection Prevention

• Always apply context-appropriate escaping:
  • DN escaping for \ # + < > , ; " = and leading/trailing spaces
  • Filter escaping for * ( ) \ NUL
• Validate inputs with allow-lists before constructing queries; use libraries that provide DN/filter encoders.
• Use least-privilege LDAP connections with bind authentication; avoid anonymous binds for application queries.

OS Command Injection Defense

• Prefer built-in APIs instead of shelling out (e.g., library calls over exec).
• If unavoidable, use structured execution that separates command and arguments (e.g., ProcessBuilder). Do not invoke shells.
• Strictly allow-list commands and validate arguments with allow-list regex; exclude metacharacters (& | ; $ > < \ ! ' " ( ) and whitespace as needed).
• Use -- to delimit arguments where supported to prevent option injection.

Example (Java ProcessBuilder):

ProcessBuilder pb = new ProcessBuilder("TrustedCmd", "Arg1", "Arg2");
Map<String,String> env = pb.environment();
pb.directory(new File("TrustedDir"));
Process p = pb.start();

Query Parameterization Guidance

• Use the platform's parameterization features (JDBC PreparedStatement, .NET SqlCommand, Ruby ActiveRecord bind params, PHP PDO, SQLx bind, etc.).
• For stored procedures, ensure parameters are bound; never build dynamic SQL via string concatenation inside procedures.

Prototype Pollution (JavaScript)

• Use new Set() or new Map() instead of object literals.
• When objects are required, create with Object.create(null) or { __proto__: null } to avoid inherited prototypes.
• Freeze or seal objects that should be immutable; consider Node --disable-proto=delete as defense-in-depth.
• Avoid unsafe deep merge utilities; validate keys against allow-lists and block __proto__, constructor, prototype.

Caching and Transport

• Apply Cache-Control: no-store on responses containing sensitive data; enforce HTTPS across data flows.

Implementation Checklist

• Central validators: types, ranges, lengths, enums; canonicalization before checks
• 100% parameterization coverage for SQL; dynamic identifiers via allow-lists only
• LDAP DN/filter escaping in use; inputs validated prior to query
• No shell invocation for untrusted input; if unavoidable, structured exec + allow-list + regex validation
• JS object graph hardened: safe constructors, blocked prototype paths, safe merge utilities
• File uploads validated by content, size, and extension; stored outside web root and scanned

Test Plan

• Static checks for string concatenation in queries/commands and dangerous DOM/merge sinks.
• Fuzzing for SQL/LDAP/OS injection vectors; unit tests for validator edge cases.
• Negative tests exercising blocked prototype keys and deep merge behavior.