agent-activity
Host-posture checks answer "did anything change on this machine". They do not answer "did the agent reading twelve RSS feeds get talked into doing something". This tool answers the second question, by showing what its outbound-capable tools were actually asked to do.
Every call it reports carries a string the agent chose — a URL, a query, a recipient. That string is the exfiltration channel if there is one, so the argument matters more than the tool name.
What counts as outbound-capable
Anything that leaves the machine or writes somewhere durable: web fetches and searches, feed and mail readers, the paper and finance lookups, image generation, vault writes, and script execution. Perception tools that only read local state are excluded — they cannot carry anything out.
Reading the result
You are looking for a call whose argument does not follow from what the agent was doing. Some shapes worth attention:
- a URL carrying data in its path or query that resembles the agent's own context — the classic exfiltration channel
- a fetch of a host with no relation to the turn's subject, especially shortly after the agent read a feed item, a clipped page or an email
- a vault write or script execution in a turn that began as ordinary reading
- a burst of calls in one turn where the agent normally makes one
None of these is proof. A run of unusual calls is a reason to read that turn's reasoning trace, not a finding on its own. Say which turn you want and read it before reporting anything.
Absence of findings is a normal, reportable result. Do not manufacture suspicion to have something to say.
Examples
{"thought": "audit Jill's outbound calls since yesterday", "tool": "agent-activity", "character": "Jill"}
{"thought": "widen to a week to see the pattern", "tool": "agent-activity", "character": "Jill", "hours": 168, "limit": 200}