Threat Model
Model threats for "$ARGUMENTS" using structured threat modeling methodologies. Identify what can go wrong, assess each threat's severity, and propose mitigations.
Arguments. $ARGUMENTS may contain the project name and optional flags. Take the first token as <project> and treat --skip-checks as a flag; never include flags in file paths. All paths below use <project>. If --skip-checks is present, skip the prerequisite check and, before writing any artifact, append one line to .singularskills/log.jsonl: {"ts":"<ISO timestamp>","skill":"security-threat-model","workflow":"security","phase":1,"project":"<project>","event":"skipped","artifact":"01-identify.md","note":"<reason or \"none given\">"}.
Prerequisites
Part of a workflow. This skill is phase 1 (Identify) of the NIST CSF workflow (security); cross-domain workflows run it too. First check .singularskills/log.jsonl for an open run for this project: a run-started line with "project":"<project>" and no later run-finished line for the same workflow and project. If one exists, the conductor is running you: continue here. Otherwise, if the user asked to start, run, continue or resume a process or workflow rather than this one step, do not continue here: invoke the workflow skill with the workflow the user asked for, or security when they named none, followed by <project>; it runs this phase in order, asks before it writes and records the run. Otherwise continue here: a later phase runs on its own, behind its gate.
Run this skill's gate before writing: sh <this skill's folder>/scripts/gate.sh <project> <project root>, where <project root> is the folder that contains .singularskills/ (use . when you are already there). If it exits non-zero, stop and tell the user what it printed, unless --skip-checks was given (see Arguments). On a refusal, before you stop, append this line to .singularskills/log.jsonl (create the folder and file if missing): {"ts":"<ISO timestamp>","skill":"security-threat-model","workflow":"security","phase":1,"project":"<project>","event":"refused","artifact":"01-identify.md","note":"<what the gate printed>"}. Once the gate has passed, or under --skip-checks once you have appended the skipped line, append this line before you start work: {"ts":"<ISO timestamp>","skill":"security-threat-model","workflow":"security","phase":1,"project":"<project>","event":"started","artifact":"01-identify.md","note":""}.
Read .singularskills/security/<project>/00-govern.md. If this file does not exist, tell the user:
Phase 0 (Govern) has not been completed for "". Run a Govern skill first (e.g.,
/security-security-policy <project>), or use--skip-checksto bypass.
Process
Read context files:
- Read
references/threat-model-template.mdfor methodology reference and output structure - Read
.singularskills/security/<project>/00-govern.mdfor organizational context and risk appetite
- Read
Describe the system being modeled:
- Define the system or component scope (application, service, infrastructure, data flow)
- Identify key actors: end users, administrators, external services, automated processes
- List technologies and protocols in use
- Document assumptions about the environment (network segmentation, authentication mechanisms, hosting model)
Draw data flow diagram (text-based):
- Identify processes, data stores, external entities, and data flows
- Use text-based notation to represent the diagram (e.g.,
[User] --> (Web App) --> [Database]) - Mark trust boundaries between different security zones (public internet, DMZ, internal network, database tier)
- Label each flow with the data type and protocol
Apply STRIDE to each component:
- For each element in the data flow, systematically evaluate:
- Spoofing — can an attacker impersonate a legitimate user or system?
- Tampering — can data be modified in transit or at rest without detection?
- Repudiation — can an actor deny performing an action without proof?
- Information Disclosure — can sensitive data be exposed to unauthorized parties?
- Denial of Service — can the component be rendered unavailable?
- Elevation of Privilege — can an attacker gain higher access than authorized?
- Document each identified threat with ID, description, affected component, and STRIDE category
- For each element in the data flow, systematically evaluate:
Rate each threat by likelihood and impact:
- Likelihood (1-5): based on attack complexity, required access, and known exploitation
- Impact (1-5): based on data sensitivity, business criticality, and blast radius
- Risk score = likelihood x impact
- Categorize: Critical (20-25), High (12-19), Medium (6-11), Low (1-5)
- Prioritize threats by risk score for mitigation planning
Write the artifact — append to
.singularskills/security/<project>/01-identify.mdunder a## Threat Modelsection. Create the file with a# Identify — <project>heading if it does not exist; if a## Threat Modelsection already exists, replace only that section. The section contains:- System Description — scope, actors, technologies, and assumptions
- Data Flow Diagram — text-based diagram with trust boundaries
- Threat Catalog — all identified threats with STRIDE classification and risk score
- Threat Prioritization — ranked list by risk score
- Proposed Mitigations — recommended controls for each high and critical threat
Output
The threat model appended to .singularskills/security/<project>/01-identify.md. Present a summary to the user highlighting:
- System scope and trust boundaries identified
- Total threats found by STRIDE category
- Top critical and high-risk threats
- Recommended mitigations for the highest-priority threats
Record the run. After you have written your section, append this line to .singularskills/log.jsonl (the started line of Prerequisites, with "event":"finished"): {"ts":"<ISO timestamp>","skill":"security-threat-model","workflow":"security","phase":1,"project":"<project>","event":"finished","artifact":"01-identify.md","note":""}.
This artifact is shared by every skill of phase 1 (Identify). The frontmatter is written once, by whoever creates the file: if you create it, open it with the block below (skill is the phase title, started the time of that first write; gate is passed when the gate ran clean and skipped under --skip-checks); if it already exists, leave the block alone except to update finished and to set gate to the worst value among the sections (skipped over passed).
---
skill: Identify
workflow: security
phase: 1
project: <project>
started: <ISO timestamp>
finished: <ISO timestamp>
agent: <the agent you run in, or "unknown">
gate: <passed|skipped>
---
Open your ## Threat Model section with one italic line, *<skill name> · <ISO timestamp> · gate: <passed|skipped>* (your skill name is security-threat-model).
End your section with ### Decisions and ### Open questions (one level under your ## Threat Model heading, so the section stays one block), in this shape:
### Decisions
- <what was chosen> — <why> — <what was rejected>
### Open questions
- <what the next phase or a reviewer must settle>
End the artifact with this paragraph, verbatim:
Not a penetration test or audit. This artifact is generated analysis; validate findings against the live system and have material controls reviewed by a qualified security professional.