Hf Vhf Radio Attack

Skill: Licensed HF/VHF/UHF Radio Attack

Supplementary Files:

• payloads.md -- Complete payload collection organized by licensed radio service (ADS-B, AIS, ACARS, VDL Mode 2, HFDL, POCSAG/FLEX/APOC pagers, APRS, NDB, weather fax, DSC, ATC/maritime VHF voice, MLAT/TIS-B/UAT, Inmarsat/Iridium L-band) -- 18 sections covering RX hardware setup, decoding chains, TX-side spoofing with HackRF/BladeRF, replay attacks, OPSEC for engagements, and red-team aviation/maritime scenarios.
• test-cases.md -- Structured test case templates (12 cases TC-LF-001..TC-LF-012): hardware verification, ADS-B aircraft tracking, AIS maritime decode, ACARS airline comms, VDL Mode 2 digital link, HFDL oceanic intercept, POCSAG pager decode, FLEX pager decode, APRS position reporting, NDB beacon tracking, weather fax reception, DSC maritime distress decode.
• guides/hf-vhf-radio-attack-playbook.md -- Comprehensive playbook: SDR hardware tier table (RX-only, TX/RX, full-duplex), decoding matrix (which tool for which band), real-world research (Povolny ADS-B spoofing 2012, Trend Micro maritime AIS, DEF CON ACARS/POCSAG talks), antenna design basics for HF/VHF/UHF, ITU region licensing and FCC Part 15 vs Part 97 red-team rules of engagement, lab setup with HackRF + GQRX + multimon-ng + dump1090-mutability.

Summary

HF/VHF/UHF licensed radio attack covers the spectrum above Sub-GHz ISM (handled in sdr-rf-attack) and below cellular operator bands (handled in 5g-telecom-attack). This skill targets licensed radio services in the 9 kHz - 1500 MHz range that have safety-of-life or commercial licensing implications: aircraft ADS-B broadcasts at 1090 MHz, maritime AIS at 161.975/162.025 MHz, airline ACARS data link at 131.550 MHz, VDL Mode 2 at 136.975 MHz, HFDL oceanic comms across multiple HF bands, POCSAG/FLEX/APOC pager networks, amateur radio APRS position reporting, aviation NDB beacons (190-535 kHz, 1750 kHz AM), weather fax, maritime DSC distress on Channel 70, ATC voice (118-137 MHz AM), maritime VHF voice (Channel 16 / 156.8 MHz), and ADS-B MLAT / TIS-B / UAT on 978 MHz. Inmarsat and Iridium L-band (1.5/1.6 GHz) are included briefly for context as the upper edge of this spectrum and the lower edge of satellite work.

The defining property of these services is that they are public broadcast or licensed point-to-point services that are trivially receivable with a $30 RTL-SDR dongle and a basic antenna, but transmitting on them requires explicit licensing (FCC Part 87 aviation, Part 80 maritime, Part 97 amateur) and unauthorized transmission is a federal crime in most jurisdictions. The red-team value is asymmetric: receivers can map aircraft, vessels, pagers, and tactical voice traffic without transmitting a single photon, while transmitters (spoofers, jammers) require Faraday-cage containment and explicit legal authorization. This skill emphasizes the receive-side intelligence, OPSEC, and protocol-security research that dominates licensed-band assessment work, with transmit-side attacks documented as research context only.

Tools: HackRF One, BladeRF 2.0 micro, RTL-SDR (rtl-sdr.com V3), PlutoSDR (ADALM-PLUTO), AirSpy R2/Mini/HF+ Discovery, GNU Radio, GQRX/SDR#/SDRangel/CubicSDR, dump1090-mutability/readsb, dump978 (UAT), AIS-catcher/rtl-ais/ShipXplorer, multimon-ng (POCSAG/FLEX), ACARSDeco/dumpvdl2/dumphfdl, URH (Universal Radio Hacker).

Domain: hf-vhf-radio-attack

MITRE ATT&CK: T1595-Active Scanning (RF), T1592-Gather Victim Host Info (RF fingerprinting), T1557-Adversary-in-the-Middle (RF relay), T1580-Cloud Infrastructure Discovery (RF telemetry exfil), T1499-Endpoint Denial of Service (RF jamming, authorized research only).

Detection Methods

RF Spectrum Monitoring

• Unauthorized transmissions: Transmit on aviation/maritime frequencies without license.
• ADS-B anomalies: Aircraft position reports with impossible geometry; signal strength inconsistent with reported altitude.
• POCSAG pager anomalies: Pager messages with malformed capcodes; broadcast vs point-to-point.
• APRS anomalies: Position beacons from fixed location reporting movement.

SIEM Detection Rules

• Splunk SPL (RF): index=rf sourcetype=adsb | where altitude < 0 OR speed > 1500
• SDR monitoring: Continuous spectrum recording; alert on new transmissions in reserved bands.

Defense Evasion Techniques

Transmission Stealth

• Low power: Use minimum TX power needed; reduces detection range.
• Brief transmissions: <5 second bursts; below triangulation threshold.
• Frequency hopping: Spread across many channels; per-channel detection threshold not exceeded.
• Directional antennas: Limit RF footprint to target only; reduces collateral detection.

ADS-B Spoofing Stealth

• Match legitimate aircraft: Use real aircraft Mode S address; mimic flight profile.
• Gradual drift: Slowly drift spoofed position (1 m/s²); avoids sudden jump detection.
• Single target: Don't spoof multiple aircraft simultaneously; reduces anomaly detection.

Differentiation

This skill is explicitly bounded to avoid overlap with two adjacent RF skills:

vs. sdr-rf-attack (Sub-GHz ISM and unlicensed radio)

sdr-rf-attack covers unlicensed ISM band devices: 315/433/868/915 MHz keyfobs, garage door openers, wireless doorbells, weather stations, Sub-GHz IoT (Zigbee/LoRa raw radios at 868/915), plus RFID/NFC at 125 kHz and 13.56 MHz, GSM/LTE cellular, and 2.4 GHz BLE/Zigbee. Those are devices you own, test, and replay at will within ISM band rules.

This skill (hf-vhf-radio-attack) covers licensed services above the ISM band -- aviation, maritime, pager, and amateur radio infrastructure where the transmitters are operated under FCC/ITU licenses and the receivers are anyone with an SDR. The frequencies and protocols are entirely different (1090 MHz ADS-B, 162 MHz AIS, 131.550 MHz ACARS, etc.) and the legal posture is different: receiving is mostly unrestricted, transmitting without a license is a crime.

vs. 5g-telecom-attack (cellular operator infrastructure)

5g-telecom-attack covers the operator-side cellular stack: 5G Core (AMF/SMF/UPF), RAN, and signaling protocols (NGAP/PFCP/GTP/Diameter/SS7), IMSI catchers, and O-RAN security. Those are the carrier network components between the UE and the internet.

This skill does not cover cellular operator infrastructure. It covers licensed non-cellular services: aircraft transponders, ship AIS, airline ACARS data links, pagers, amateur radio APRS, aviation beacons, and maritime distress. Even where there is overlap in frequency (e.g., both 5G and AIS are in the 1.5-2 GHz region for satellite AIS), the protocols, threat models, and tooling are distinct.

Quick frequency map for orientation

Description

Licensed HF/VHF/UHF radio attack encompasses a broad range of receive-side intelligence and (with proper authorization) active RF testing against radio services operated under aviation, maritime, paging, and amateur radio licenses. This skill covers the complete assessment lifecycle from hardware selection and antenna matching through signal capture, protocol decode, anomaly detection, and authorized spoofing/injection research in controlled environments.

Core Attack Surfaces:

• Aircraft Tracking (ADS-B 1090 MHz, UAT 978 MHz): Receive Mode S extended squitters from any aircraft within line of sight; decode ICAO 24-bit address, callsign, position, velocity, altitude, and trajectory intent. Detect spoofed aircraft, MLAT/TIS-B injection, and ghost aircraft. Map real-time air traffic over a 300+ nm radius with a $30 RTL-SDR and a 1090 MHz collinear antenna.
• Maritime Vessel Tracking (AIS 161.975/162.025 MHz): Decode Class A and Class B AIS position reports, static voyage data, and SAR aircraft positions. Detect "dark targets" (vessels with AIS off), spoofed MMSIs, and aid-to-navigation manipulation. AIS is unencrypted by design -- the security question is not "can you read it" but "can you trust what you read."
• Airline Communications (ACARS 131.550 MHz, VDL Mode 2 136.975 MHz, HFDL): Decode aircraft-to-ground data link messages including airline operational comms (AOC), air traffic control (ATC) uplinks, and oceanic position reports. ACARS is partially unencrypted and reveals aircraft intent, ETA, fuel state, and crew messages on many operators. VDL Mode 2 is the VHF digital link successor; HFDL is the HF oceanic counterpart.
• Pager Networks (POCSAG 512/1200/2400 bps, FLEX 1600/3200/6400, APOC): Decode pager messages from public safety, hospital, utility, and enterprise pager fleets. POCSAG and FLEX are unencrypted in nearly all deployments and routinely expose sensitive patient data, dispatch codes, and infrastructure alerts. Pager security research (Andrea Barisani, DEF CON 18) showed nationwide pager fleet coverage from a single rooftop.
• Amateur Radio APRS (144.39 MHz US, 144.64 MHz EU): Decode automatic position reporting system packets from amateur operators, including position, status, messages, weather, and telemetry. Useful for OPSEC assessment of ham radio infrastructure and for understanding AX.25/KISS RF data links.
• Aviation NDB (190-535 kHz, 1750 kHz AM): Track non-directional beacons used for aviation navigation. Continuous wave AM Morse code identification. Useful as a calibration signal and for assessing legacy aviation infrastructure.
• Weather Fax (HF): Decode radiofax images broadcast by meteorological services (NOAA, DWD Germany, JMA Japan) on HF bands for maritime and aviation weather briefings. Demonstrates HF image transmission protocols.
• Maritime DSC (Digital Selective Calling): Decode distress, urgency, safety, and routine calls on VHF Channel 70 (156.525 MHz), MF 2187.5 kHz, and HF 4/6/8/12/16 MHz DSC channels. Reveals maritime distress infrastructure and the unencrypted nature of DSC messaging.
• ATC Voice (118-137 MHz AM): Monitor air traffic control voice communications between pilots and controllers. AM modulation, 25 kHz (or 8.33 kHz in Europe) channel spacing. Critical context for aviation security assessment and red-team OPSEC.
• Maritime VHF Voice (Ch 16 = 156.8 MHz, Ch 13 = 156.65 MHz): Monitor international maritime distress, safety, and bridge-to-bridge communications. NBFM modulation, 25 kHz channel spacing.
• MLAT / TIS-B / UAT (978 MHz): Decode Mode U transponders, Traffic Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B), and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) on the UAT frequency used primarily in US airspace. Complements 1090 MHz ADS-B reception.
• Satellite L-band (Inmarsat / Iridium 1525-1660 MHz): Brief coverage for context -- Inmarsat STD-C (fleet messaging), Iridium bursty transmissions, and the limits of consumer SDR in this band. Full satellite exploitation is out of scope; see sdr-rf-attack/satellite-signal-analysis-guide.md for complementary NOAA/AIS/ADS-B satellite work.

Privacy and OPSEC Implications:

• Aircraft and vessel tracking: Any SDR receiver within line of sight can track aircraft and vessels in real time. This is the basis of Flightradar24, FlightAware, MarineTraffic, and VesselFinder. There is no radio-level privacy on ADS-B or AIS; the privacy question is whether the data is being aggregated and resold.
• Pager interception: Hospital pagers routinely transmit patient PHI (name, room, attending physician, diagnosis). Public safety pagers transmit dispatch codes and addresses. This is unencrypted broadcast data and represents one of the largest unaddressed PHI-leak surfaces in healthcare.
• ACARS intercept: Airline operational communications can reveal aircraft mechanical issues, crew names, diversion decisions, and ATC coordination -- commercially sensitive data that is broadcast in the clear on 131.550 MHz.
• DSC false alerts: Maritime DSC distress false alarms are a real operational problem. Receivers can characterize the local DSC traffic to assess how easily a false distress alert could be injected.

Red-Team Engagement Context:

• Maritime facility assessment: A red team assessing a port or vessel operator can use AIS reception to map vessel traffic patterns, identify dark targets, and characterize the local maritime RF environment before any active testing.
• Aviation facility assessment: ADS-B and ACARS reception at an airport-adjacent facility reveals aircraft callsigns, routes, and operational comms without any active RF emissions.
• Hospital pager audit: Passive reception of POCSAG pagers can document PHI exposure as part of a HIPAA security assessment.
• Critical infrastructure RF survey: Wideband HF/VHF/UHF survey of a facility perimeter can identify unauthorized pager, voice, or telemetry traffic that should not be present.

Related Skills:

• skills/sdr-rf-attack/SKILL.md -- Sub-GHz ISM band devices (keyfobs, IoT, weather stations) and RFID/NFC radio-layer attacks
• skills/5g-telecom-attack/SKILL.md -- Cellular operator infrastructure (5G Core, RAN, signaling)
• skills/bluetooth-rfid-nfc/SKILL.md -- BLE and RFID/NFC protocol-layer attacks
• skills/wifi-pentest/SKILL.md -- WiFi at 2.4/5/6 GHz
• skills/hardware-security/SKILL.md -- Hardware attack vectors including glitching, bus sniffing
• skills/physical-security-testing/SKILL.md -- Physical security assessment context for RF surveillance

Use Cases

1. ADS-B Aircraft Tracking and Anomaly Detection: Deploy a passive ADS-B receiver to map all aircraft within 300+ nm of an engagement site. Detect spoofed aircraft (ghost aircraft with mismatched ICAO 24-bit addresses or impossible trajectories), identify state aircraft (military, government, VIP), and document the air traffic baseline for OPSEC assessment of an aviation-adjacent facility.
2. Maritime AIS Vessel Tracking and Dark Target Detection: Receive AIS position reports to map vessel traffic at a port or coastal engagement site. Identify vessels with AIS disabled (dark targets), detect MMSI spoofing (vessels broadcasting another vessel's MMSI), and characterize fishing, commercial, and military vessel patterns.
3. Airline ACARS Data Link Interception: Passively receive ACARS messages at 131.550 MHz to document the airline operational communications visible from an engagement site. Useful for assessing whether a facility's location near a flight corridor creates information disclosure exposure for client airline operations.
4. Hospital/Healthcare Pager PHI Audit: As part of a HIPAA security assessment, receive POCSAG and FLEX pager messages from a hospital or clinic and document the extent of patient health information being broadcast in the clear. Provide remediation recommendations for migration to encrypted paging or secure messaging.
5. Public Safety Pager Fleet Characterization: For emergency services clients, document the dispatch codes, addresses, and operational data visible in their pager fleet. Useful for OPSEC review of dispatch infrastructure and assessment of pager reliance for sensitive operations.
6. VDL Mode 2 and HFDL Oceanic Comms Research: Decode the modern VHF digital link (VDL Mode 2 at 136.975 MHz) and HF oceanic data link (HFDL across multiple HF bands) to assess the security posture of next-generation aircraft communications and to characterize oceanic position reporting.
7. Amateur Radio APRS OPSEC Review: For amateur radio operators or organizations relying on ham radio for emergency communications, decode APRS traffic to assess OPSEC exposure of position, status, and message data broadcast on 144.39 MHz.
8. ATC Voice Monitoring for Aviation Red Team: As part of an authorized airport or aviation facility assessment, monitor ATC voice traffic on 118-137 MHz AM to characterize traffic flow, identify operational patterns, and document information disclosure risks.
9. Maritime DSC Distress Infrastructure Characterization: Receive DSC calls on VHF Channel 70 and HF DSC frequencies to document the local maritime distress infrastructure, characterize routine DSC traffic, and assess the feasibility of false alert injection (research context only, never transmit).
10. Critical Infrastructure RF Perimeter Survey: Wideband survey of HF/VHF/UHF bands at a critical infrastructure perimeter (substation, water plant, data center) to identify unexpected pager, voice, telemetry, or amateur radio traffic that could indicate unauthorized RF devices or operational leakage.
11. Aviation NDB Beacon Calibration and Tracking: Receive NDB beacons (190-535 kHz AM) as a calibration signal for SDR hardware, and to characterize the legacy aviation navigation infrastructure still in use at many smaller airports.
12. Weather Fax Reception for Maritime Assessment: Decode weather fax broadcasts from meteorological services to support maritime engagement situational awareness and document the data available to vessels in the engagement area.

Core Tools

Methodology

Phase 1: Reconnaissance -- Licensed Band Survey

1. Conduct wideband spectrum scan across the HF/VHF/UHF range relevant to the engagement scope using rtl_power or hackrf_sweep
2. Identify active licensed services (aviation, maritime, paging, amateur) by their characteristic frequencies and modulations
3. Document the baseline RF environment at the engagement site including expected and unexpected signals
4. Identify the specific licensed services in scope for the assessment (e.g., AIS at a port, ADS-B at an airport)

Phase 2: Receive-Side Intelligence (Passive)

1. Configure SDR hardware for the target licensed service with appropriate antenna (1090 MHz collinear for ADS-B, VHF marine for AIS, etc.)
2. Launch the appropriate decoder (dump1090 for ADS-B, AIS-catcher for AIS, multimon-ng for POCSAG, dumpvdl2 for VDL Mode 2)
3. Collect traffic for the assessment period (typically hours to days for traffic pattern analysis)
4. Decode and aggregate data into structured form (vessel list, aircraft list, pager message log, etc.)
5. Identify anomalies: spoofed aircraft, dark targets, PHI leakage in pagers, unexpected vessel callsigns

Phase 3: Protocol Security Analysis

1. Capture raw I/Q samples of the target protocol for offline analysis
2. Examine the protocol for authentication, integrity, and encryption mechanisms (most licensed services have none)
3. Document the data exposure: what sensitive information is broadcast in the clear
4. Cross-reference decoded data with public databases (FAA aircraft registry for ICAO addresses, ITU for MMSI allocations)

Phase 4: Active Testing (Authorized Research Only)

1. CRITICAL: Active RF testing on licensed bands requires explicit written authorization and typically must be conducted in a Faraday cage or shielded enclosure
2. Verify all transmissions are contained (no leakage to live spectrum)
3. Test replay attacks against captured signals in the shielded environment
4. Test spoofing/injection (e.g., ghost ADS-B aircraft) only with the target receiver also in the shielded enclosure
5. Document findings for protocol security research without impacting live services

Phase 5: Reporting and OPSEC Recommendations

1. Document all licensed services observed at the engagement site
2. Quantify sensitive data exposure (e.g., "X patient names observable per hour from hospital pager fleet")
3. Provide remediation recommendations: encrypted paging alternatives, AIS/ADS-B trust verification, etc.
4. Include spectrum analysis evidence, decoded traffic samples (redacted of PHI), and timeline of activities
5. Highlight any unauthorized or unexpected RF signals that may indicate rogue devices or operational security gaps

Practical Steps

Step 1: Hardware Setup and Verification

# Verify HackRF One is detected and report capabilities
hackrf_info

# Check RTL-SDR v3 dongle and report tuner type
rtl_test -t

# Calibrate HackRF PPM offset against a known reference signal (e.g., WWV at 10 MHz)
hackrf_transfer -r /dev/null -f 10000000 -s 8000000 -l 32 -g 20 -n 8000000

# Verify AirSpy HF+ Discovery is detected (ideal for HF bands)
airspy_rx --help 2>&1 | head -5

# List all SDR devices connected via USB
lsusb | grep -i "realtek\|hackrf\|nuand\|airspy\|analog"

Step 2: ADS-B Aircraft Tracking

# Start dump1090-mutability with web GUI on port 8080
dump1090 --net --net-ro-port 30003 --net-sbs-port 30003 \
  --gain 40 --ppm 0 --aggressive --interactive

# Alternative: readsb (more modern, higher performance)
readsb --net --gain 40 --device-type rtlsdr --write-json /run/readsb

# Capture raw ADS-B I/Q for offline analysis
rtl_sdr -f 1090000000 -s 2000000 -g 40 -n 20000000 adsb_raw.raw

# Decode ADS-B from raw capture
dump1090 --ifile adsb_raw.raw --fix --aggressive

# Feed ADS-B data to a local FlightAware PiAware instance
# (PiAware consumes dump1090 on port 30005 and forwards to FlightAware)

Step 3: AIS Maritime Vessel Tracking

# Start AIS-catcher with UDP output to a chartplotter or aggregator
AIS-catcher -u 12345 -v -T -g 40

# Alternative: rtl_ais (simpler, two-channel RTL-SDR decoder)
rtl_ais -T -p -h 127.0.0.1 -P 12345

# Capture raw AIS I/Q on 161.975 MHz for offline analysis
rtl_sdr -f 161975000 -s 250000 -g 40 -n 2500000 ais1.raw

# Decode AIS from raw capture
AIS-catcher --input ais1.raw --output decoded.json

# Forward AIS to OpenCPN network data source (NMEA-0183 over UDP)
AIS-catcher -u 127.0.0.1:10110 -v

Step 4: POCSAG/FLEX Pager Decoding

# Decode POCSAG at 512/1200/2400 bps from a live SDR via rtl_fm
rtl_fm -f 157.775e6 -s 22050 -g 40 - | \
  multimon-ng -t raw -a POCSAG512 -a POCSAG1200 -a POCSAG2400 -a FLEX -

# Decode POCSAG directly from RTL-SDR via the multimon-ng rtl backend
multimon-ng -t rtl --rtl-frequency 157775000 --rtl-gain 40 \
  -a POCSAG512 -a POCSAG1200 -a POCSAG2400 -a FLEX

# Capture pager I/Q for offline analysis
rtl_sdr -f 157775000 -s 250000 -g 40 -n 25000000 pager.raw

# Decode from a captured WAV file (multimon-ng expects 22050 Hz mono)
sox pager.raw -r 22050 -c 1 -e signed-integer -b 16 pager.wav
multimon-ng -t wav -a POCSAG1200 -a FLEX pager.wav

Step 5: ACARS and VDL Mode 2 Aircraft Comms

# Decode ACARS at 131.550 MHz AM
acarsdeco -r 0:131550000 -g 40 --silence-level 5

# Decode VDL Mode 2 at 136.975 MHz
dumpvdl2 --gain 40 --corrupted-messages --output decoded:text:file:stdout

# Capture ACARS I/Q for offline analysis (AM-modulated)
rtl_sdr -f 131550000 -s 250000 -g 40 -n 25000000 acars.raw

# Decode HFDL across multiple HF bands (requires HF-capable SDR like AirSpy HF+ Discovery)
dumphfdl --gain 40 --output decoded:text:file:stdout \
  2941000 5455000 8927000 11306000 15025000 17922000

Step 6: APRS Amateur Radio Position Reporting

# Decode APRS at 144.39 MHz (US) using multimon-ng
rtl_fm -f 144.39e6 -s 22050 -g 40 - | \
  multimon-ng -t raw -a AFSK1200 -

# Alternative: direwolf (full-featured AX.25/KISS TNC)
direwolf -t 0 -r 22050 -b 16

# Pipe rtl_fm to direwolf for live APRS decode
rtl_fm -f 144.39e6 -s 48000 -g 40 - | \
  direwolf -r 48000 -b 16 -

Step 7: ATC Voice and Maritime VHF Voice Monitoring

# Listen to ATC voice (e.g., tower at 118.300 MHz AM)
rtl_fm -M am -f 118.3e6 -s 12000 -r 12000 -g 40 - | \
  play -r 12000 -t s16 -L -c 1 -

# Listen to maritime VHF Channel 16 (156.8 MHz NBFM)
rtl_fm -M fm -f 156.8e6 -s 12000 -r 12000 -g 40 - | \
  play -r 12000 -t s16 -L -c 1 -

# Record ATC voice to a WAV file for OPSEC review
rtl_fm -M am -f 121.5e6 -s 12000 -r 12000 -g 40 - | \
  sox -t s16 -r 12000 -c 1 - atc_guard.wav

Defense Perspective

Detection and Monitoring

• RF perimeter monitoring: Deploy dedicated receivers at critical facilities to detect unauthorized ADS-B/AIS/pager transmissions or rogue devices in restricted bands
• AIS/ADS-B anomaly detection: Cross-reference received position reports with known vessel/aircraft registries to detect spoofed identifiers or impossible trajectories
• Pager fleet auditing: Continuously monitor enterprise pager fleets to detect PHI leakage and unexpected message content
• Direction-finding for rogue transmitters: Use multiple SDR receivers with time-difference-of-arrival (TDOA) or rotating directional antennas to locate unauthorized RF sources

Hardening Recommendations

• Migrate pagers to encrypted paging or secure messaging: Replace unencrypted POCSAG/FLEX with encrypted protocols or move to end-to-end encrypted mobile messaging (e.g., Wickr, Signal) for sensitive dispatch
• AIS trust verification: Cross-reference received AIS positions with radar tracks, satellite AIS, and visual confirmation; flag mismatches as potential spoofing
• ADS-B authentication (future): Support ADS-B authentication proposals (e.g., the FAA's proposed cryptographic authentication of ADS-B messages) as they become available
• Aviation facility RF zoning: Design airport-adjacent facilities to minimize information disclosure from ACARS, ATC voice, and ADS-B reception by third parties
• VDL Mode 2 security upgrade: Where ACARS security is critical, migrate to Secured VDL Mode 2 (SVDL) or future CPDLC over secured links

Compliance Considerations

• Receiving licensed broadcast signals: In most jurisdictions, receiving ADS-B, AIS, ATC voice, ACARS, and POCSAG transmissions is legal because they are unencrypted broadcasts. However, acting on the information received (e.g., disclosing PHI from pagers) may be regulated.
• Transmitting on licensed bands: Transmitting on aviation, maritime, paging, or amateur radio frequencies without an appropriate license is a criminal offense in virtually all jurisdictions. In the US, this is enforced by the FCC (Part 87 aviation, Part 80 maritime, Part 97 amateur) and can result in substantial fines and imprisonment.
• Amateur radio license requirement: Transmitting on amateur radio bands (including APRS at 144.39 MHz) requires an amateur radio license. Reception is unrestricted.
• Maritime and aviation facility testing: RF testing at or near ports, airports, or other licensed-service facilities requires explicit coordination with facility operators and relevant regulators (FAA, USCG, local port authority).
• PHI and dispatch data handling: Decoded pager messages containing PHI or law enforcement dispatch data must be handled in compliance with HIPAA, CJIS, or equivalent regulations. Redact before including in reports.

Countermeasures by Attack Vector

SDR Hardware Comparison (HF/VHF/UHF Focus)

Selection Guidelines:

• ADS-B / AIS / POCSAG reception: RTL-SDR v3 is the workhorse -- $30 gets you a fully functional receiver. Add a 1090 MHz collinear or VHF marine antenna.
• HF band (NDB, weather fax, HFDL, MF DSC): AirSpy HF+ Discovery is the best-in-class for HF dynamic range. RTL-SDR v3 in direct sampling mode is a budget alternative.
• Wideband VHF/UHF with high dynamic range: AirSpy R2 (10 MHz bandwidth) is preferred for environments with strong adjacent-channel signals.
• Authorized TX research (Faraday cage): HackRF One for replay testing; BladeRF 2.0 micro for full-duplex protocol emulation.
• Custom decoders: PlutoSDR or HackRF with GNU Radio for flowgraph-based decoders when off-the-shelf tools don't support a protocol.

Licensed Band Decoding Matrix

Quick reference for which tool decodes which licensed service. All tools are available on Kali Linux (most via apt install or by building from source).

RF Attack Categories (Licensed Band Specific)

Legal and Ethical Framework

ITU Region Licensing

Radio frequencies are allocated internationally by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and administered by national regulators. The three ITU regions are:

• Region 1: Europe, Africa, Middle East, Northern Asia (e.g., ETSI standards)
• Region 2: Americas (e.g., FCC rules)
• Region 3: Asia-Pacific (e.g., MIC Japan, ACMA Australia)

Most licensed services (aviation, maritime) have internationally harmonized frequencies because aircraft and vessels cross regions. Amateur radio allocations vary slightly by region.

FCC Part Numbers (US, Region 2 reference)

Transmitting without a license under these parts is a violation of the Communications Act and can result in FCC enforcement actions (fines, equipment seizure) and criminal prosecution.

Red-Team Rules of Engagement

For engagements that involve licensed band assessment:

1. Receive-only is generally permitted: Passive reception of unencrypted licensed broadcasts (ADS-B, AIS, ATC voice, ACARS, POCSAG) is legal in most jurisdictions. Document the legal basis in the engagement letter.
2. Active transmission requires explicit authorization: Any transmission on licensed bands requires either (a) the operator holding the appropriate license (FCC Part 80/87/97 in the US) or (b) explicit coordination with the licensee and conduct within a Faraday cage.
3. No interference with safety services: Aviation, maritime distress (DSC), and public safety communications are safety-of-life services. Active testing that risks interference is strictly prohibited.
4. PHI and PII handling: Decoded pager messages containing patient data, names, or addresses must be handled as PHI under HIPAA. Redact before including in reports.
5. Coordination with facility operators: For assessments at or near airports, ports, hospitals, or public safety facilities, coordinate with the facility operator before any RF testing.
6. Incident reporting: Any unintended interference with licensed services must be reported immediately to the FCC (in the US) and to the affected service operator.

Jurisdiction-Specific Notes

• United States: FCC regulations govern radio transmissions. 47 USC 605 prohibits unauthorized interception and disclosure of radio communications. ECPA may apply to intercepted comm

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