Knowledge Operations (knowledge-ops)
Summary
Knowledge-ops transforms ephemeral session findings into reusable intelligence — connecting entities, tracking confidence over time, and enabling recall across engagements.
Domain: knowledge
Skill Identity
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| Domain | Knowledge Operations |
| Skill ID | knowledge-ops |
| Version | 1.0.0 |
| Hacker Laws | Law 3 (Intelligence Over Force), Law 8 (Learn from Every Operation), Law 9 (Systematic Over Random) |
| Related Skills | codebase-onboarding, deep-research, social-intelligence |
Purpose
Build and maintain structured, persistent knowledge graphs across sessions. Knowledge-ops transforms ephemeral session findings into reusable intelligence — connecting entities, tracking confidence over time, and enabling recall across engagements.
Without knowledge-ops, every session starts from zero. With it, each session builds on the last.
Core Concepts
Knowledge Unit
The atomic element of the knowledge graph. Each unit contains:
{
"id": "KU-2026-05-001",
"type": "finding | entity | relationship | pattern | hypothesis",
"created": "2026-05-11",
"updated": "2026-05-11",
"confidence": 78,
"tags": ["auth", "JWT", "CVE"],
"content": "The auth service uses HS256 with a static secret in config.go:45",
"source": "codebase-onboarding:auth-service",
"linked_to": ["KU-2026-04-012", "KU-2026-05-003"],
"expires": null
}
Knowledge Graph
A network of linked knowledge units. Relationships between units reveal:
- Attack chains (A → B → C = full exploit path)
- Pattern recurrence (same vuln type across multiple targets)
- Confidence evolution (a finding confirmed 3 times = higher confidence)
Knowledge Base
A collection of knowledge graphs organized by domain (target, technology, vulnerability type). Stored in the memory/ directory as markdown files with structured frontmatter.
Knowledge Types
| Type | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
entity |
A person, system, domain, IP, org | target.com, admin@target.com, 192.168.1.1 |
finding |
A discovered fact about a target | SQL injection in search endpoint |
relationship |
Link between two entities | User X administers System Y |
pattern |
Recurring vulnerability or behavior | This org consistently uses outdated JWT libs |
hypothesis |
Unconfirmed, needs validation | Admin portal may be accessible via VPN bypass |
intelligence |
Aggregated, analyzed insight | Target org has poor patch management practices |
Methodology
Phase 1: Capture
Extract knowledge units from session outputs:
- After codebase-onboarding: capture architecture map, security surfaces, confidence scores
- After deep-research: capture key findings, IOCs, CVEs, linked entities
- After social-intelligence: capture sentiment, key actors, timeline events
- After an exploitation attempt: capture what worked, what failed, and why
Phase 2: Structure
Assign type, tags, confidence, and links to each unit. Establish relationships between related units.
Phase 3: Store
Write structured units to the appropriate memory file. Follow the naming convention: memory/YYYY-MM-DD-[topic].md.
Phase 4: Retrieve
At session start, query the knowledge base for relevant units. Use tags, entity names, and linked IDs to surface prior context.
Phase 5: Maintain
Update confidence scores as findings are confirmed or refuted. Mark expired intelligence. Remove stale hypotheses that were disproven.
Confidence Model
Confidence scores represent certainty about a knowledge unit:
| Score | Meaning | Action |
|---|---|---|
| 0–25 | Speculation — no evidence | Label as hypothesis |
| 26–50 | Unconfirmed — single source | Needs validation |
| 51–75 | Probable — multiple consistent signals | Use with caution |
| 76–90 | High confidence — independently confirmed | Act on it |
| 91–100 | Verified — demonstrated/exploited | Treat as fact |
Confidence is not static. Update it when:
- A second source confirms a finding (+15 to +25)
- An attempt fails that should have worked (-10 to -30)
- A CVE is confirmed to affect the target (+20)
- A hypothesis is proven false (set to 0, mark archived)
Storage Format
Knowledge File Template
---
id: KU-[YYYY]-[MM]-[NNN]
type: [finding|entity|relationship|pattern|hypothesis|intelligence]
target: [target name or scope]
confidence: [0-100]
created: [YYYY-MM-DD]
updated: [YYYY-MM-DD]
tags: [tag1, tag2, tag3]
linked: [KU-ID-1, KU-ID-2]
source: [skill that produced this]
expires: [YYYY-MM-DD or null]
---
## Detail
[Full context, evidence, commands used, observed behavior]
## Connections
- **Confirms**: [what this validates]
- **Contradicts**: [what this disproves]
- **Leads to**: [next investigation or action]
## Confidence History
| Date | Score | Reason |
|------|-------|--------|
| [date] | [score] | [why this score] |
Use Cases
- Target Intelligence Accumulation: Track everything learned about a target across multiple sessions
- Vulnerability Pattern Tracking: Recognize when the same weakness appears in different systems
- Cross-Engagement Intelligence: Identify recurring patterns across different targets (org-level behavior)
- Pentest Report Preparation: Aggregate structured findings for final report generation
- Knowledge Handoff: Pass complete context to another session or team member
Detection Methods
Knowledge Base Audit
- Document access anomalies: Bulk access to many documents in short window.
- Cross-tenant data access: User accessing documents outside their tenant.
- Vector store poisoning: Documents with embedding far from cluster centroid.
- Retrieval anomalies: Specific queries consistently retrieving same documents (backdoor signature).
SIEM Detection Rules
- Splunk SPL:
index=kb sourcetype=document_access | stats dc(doc_id) by user_id | where dc > 100 - Custom KB monitoring: Anomaly detection on RAG retrieval patterns.
Defense Evasion Techniques
Knowledge Base Exfiltration Stealth
- Distribute across queries: Pace document reads; below rate limit.
- Use legitimate search: Mimic analyst search behavior; avoid bulk export patterns.
- Cache results: Avoid re-querying same documents; reduces read-count anomaly.
Vector Store Poisoning Stealth
- Match embedding distribution: Poisoned documents close to legitimate cluster centroid.
- Trigger-based backdoor: Activates only on specific query patterns.
- Cross-tenant indexing: Index poison in tenant A; affect queries from tenant B (if not isolated).
Integration
- Input from: codebase-onboarding, deep-research, social-intelligence, any skill that produces findings
- Output to: article-writing (for reports), MEMORY.md (for distilled summaries)
- Session startup: load relevant knowledge units before beginning any task
- Session end: capture all new findings into knowledge base before closing
Hacker Laws Alignment
- Law 3 (Intelligence Over Force): Accumulated knowledge makes every subsequent session more effective
- Law 8 (Learn from Every Operation): Systematically capturing what worked and what failed
- Law 9 (Systematic Over Random): Structured knowledge graph beats random memory