Identification Strategy (jfi-identification-strategy)
When to trigger
- Setting up or defending the empirical design of a banking/intermediation paper
- Setting up or defending the assumptions and propositions of a theory paper
Empirical track (applied banking / credit)
JFI referees are unforgiving on identification in bank data. Build a credible causal design and defend
it:
- Source of variation: a regulatory change, supervisory shock, branching deregulation, a discontinuity
in capital/eligibility rules, or a plausibly exogenous credit-supply shifter.
- Modern estimators: staggered DID with heterogeneity-robust estimators (Callaway–Sant'Anna,
Sun–Abraham, de Chaisemartin–D'Haultfœuille), IV with weak-IV-robust inference, or RDD with the
rdrobust toolkit.
- Bank-data-specific threats: bank selection into treatment, borrower–firm sorting, balance-sheet
timing and mechanical reverse causality, and the lending-channel separation of credit supply from
demand (firm×time fixed effects in matched lender–borrower panels).
- Inference: cluster at the level of treatment assignment (often bank or market); wild-cluster
bootstrap when clusters are few.
Theory track (intermediation models)
When the contribution is a model, identification means analytical discipline:
- State assumptions transparently and motivate each economically (what friction it encodes).
- Make results precise as propositions/lemmas; keep proof exposition readable — sketch the
mechanism in the text, full proofs in an appendix.
- Argue generality: which results survive relaxed assumptions, and where the boundary lies.
- A numerical example (see jfi-data-analysis) can illustrate the mechanism without claiming empirical
estimation.
The within-firm benchmark, and when it is not enough
The Khwaja–Mian within-firm estimator is this community's default answer to demand confounds: with
multi-bank firms, firm×time fixed effects difference out borrower demand and isolate the credit-supply
channel. A JFI referee then pushes past the default:
- Multi-bank firms are larger and less bank-dependent — show what the design's external margin
(single-relationship firms) does, or bound how far the within-firm estimate travels.
- "Equal demand across a firm's lenders" is itself an assumption: a firm may cut demand for one bank's
specialized product. Address with loan-purpose controls or product-level fixed effects.
- Firm-level real outcomes cannot carry firm×time FE; aggregate the bank shock to the firm with
pre-period exposure shares, and defend share exogeneity as in shift-share designs.
Design selection for common intermediation shocks
| Variation exploited |
Default design |
Venue-specific threat to pre-empt |
| Staggered regulation/deregulation across states or countries |
Heterogeneity-robust staggered DID |
Banks lobby for timing — show treatment is not predicted by pre-trend bank health |
| Capital- or size-threshold rule |
RDD with density test |
Banks bunch by managing the ratio; McCrary check is mandatory |
| Funding or deposit shock with differential exposure |
Exposure (shift-share) design |
Exposure shares correlate with local demand — balance on borrower observables |
| Run or crisis window |
High-frequency event design |
Mechanical balance-sheet timing; reverse causality from borrower distress |
Worked contrast: one estimate, two readings (illustrative)
A 1pp funding shock reduces bank-level lending by 2.8pp (bank panel, OLS). At JFI that is not yet a
result: the same number is consistent with shocked banks happening to serve shocked borrowers. The
within-firm version at 1.6pp (firm×time FE) is the publishable object — and the 1.2pp gap becomes
evidence on borrower–bank sorting worth its own paragraph, not a nuisance to hide. JFI referees read the
movement of the coefficient across fixed-effect columns as a diagnostic in itself; design the
identification section so that movement is interpreted, not merely displayed.
Execution bridge (StatsPAI / Stata MCP)
Estimate and audit the identification claim, don't only argue it. Full map:
execution-with-mcp. JFI is banking and financial intermediation — typically corporate / bank causal designs built around regulation and shocks.
detect_design → recommend → fit with as_handle=true → audit_result to list
the checks the design still owes.
- Staggered DiD:
callaway_santanna / sun_abraham + bacon_decomposition +
honest_did_from_result (the pre-trend test is low-power, Roth 2022).
- IV:
effective_f_test + an anderson_rubin_ci (valid under weak instruments),
not a 2SLS t-stat alone.
- RDD:
rdrobust (bias-corrected) + rddensity / mccrary_test for manipulation.
- OVB:
oster_delta / sensemakr — how strong a confounder would have to be.
Report the economic magnitude; route the full battery to the appendix; keep every
number reproducible. A run end-to-end (synthetic data, real returns) is in the
JF execution walkthrough. If StatsPAI/Stata are not connected, adapt the
vendored resources/code/ skeleton and flag any unverified number.
Anti-patterns
- OLS-plus-controls dressed up as identification on a bank panel
- Conflating credit supply and demand without firm×time absorption
- A theory whose key result silently depends on an unstated assumption
- Clustering at the wrong level, or ignoring few-cluster inference
Output format
【Track】empirical / theory
【Design or assumptions】<the variation, or the key assumptions>
【Top threat / boundary】<the main objection + answer>
【Inference / generality】<clustering, or which results survive>
【Next skill】jfi-data-analysis
1---2name: jfi-identification-strategy3description: Use when auditing the core analytical engine of a Journal of Financial Intermediation (JFI) paper — for empirics, the causal design that separates credit supply from demand in banking data; for theory, the assumptions, equilibrium discipline, and proof exposition. It pressure-tests the design; it does not run the analysis.4---56# Identification Strategy (jfi-identification-strategy)78## When to trigger910- Setting up or defending the empirical design of a banking/intermediation paper11- Setting up or defending the assumptions and propositions of a theory paper1213## Empirical track (applied banking / credit)1415JFI referees are unforgiving on identification in bank data. Build a credible **causal design** and defend16it:1718- **Source of variation:** a regulatory change, supervisory shock, branching deregulation, a discontinuity19 in capital/eligibility rules, or a plausibly exogenous credit-supply shifter.20- **Modern estimators:** staggered DID with heterogeneity-robust estimators (Callaway–Sant'Anna,21 Sun–Abraham, de Chaisemartin–D'Haultfœuille), IV with weak-IV-robust inference, or RDD with the22 rdrobust toolkit.23- **Bank-data-specific threats:** bank selection into treatment, borrower–firm sorting, balance-sheet24 timing and mechanical reverse causality, and the **lending-channel separation** of credit supply from25 demand (firm×time fixed effects in matched lender–borrower panels).26- **Inference:** cluster at the level of treatment assignment (often bank or market); wild-cluster27 bootstrap when clusters are few.2829## Theory track (intermediation models)3031When the contribution is a **model**, identification means **analytical discipline**:3233- State **assumptions** transparently and motivate each economically (what friction it encodes).34- Make **results** precise as propositions/lemmas; keep **proof exposition** readable — sketch the35 mechanism in the text, full proofs in an appendix.36- Argue **generality**: which results survive relaxed assumptions, and where the boundary lies.37- A **numerical example** (see jfi-data-analysis) can illustrate the mechanism without claiming empirical38 estimation.3940## The within-firm benchmark, and when it is not enough4142The Khwaja–Mian within-firm estimator is this community's default answer to demand confounds: with43multi-bank firms, firm×time fixed effects difference out borrower demand and isolate the credit-supply44channel. A JFI referee then pushes **past** the default:4546- Multi-bank firms are larger and less bank-dependent — show what the design's external margin47 (single-relationship firms) does, or bound how far the within-firm estimate travels.48- "Equal demand across a firm's lenders" is itself an assumption: a firm may cut demand for one bank's49 specialized product. Address with loan-purpose controls or product-level fixed effects.50- Firm-level **real outcomes** cannot carry firm×time FE; aggregate the bank shock to the firm with51 pre-period exposure shares, and defend share exogeneity as in shift-share designs.5253## Design selection for common intermediation shocks5455| Variation exploited | Default design | Venue-specific threat to pre-empt |56|---|---|---|57| Staggered regulation/deregulation across states or countries | Heterogeneity-robust staggered DID | Banks lobby for timing — show treatment is not predicted by pre-trend bank health |58| Capital- or size-threshold rule | RDD with density test | Banks bunch by managing the ratio; McCrary check is mandatory |59| Funding or deposit shock with differential exposure | Exposure (shift-share) design | Exposure shares correlate with local demand — balance on borrower observables |60| Run or crisis window | High-frequency event design | Mechanical balance-sheet timing; reverse causality from borrower distress |6162## Worked contrast: one estimate, two readings (illustrative)6364A 1pp funding shock reduces bank-level lending by 2.8pp (bank panel, OLS). At JFI that is not yet a65result: the same number is consistent with shocked banks happening to serve shocked borrowers. The66within-firm version at 1.6pp (firm×time FE) is the publishable object — and the 1.2pp gap becomes67evidence on borrower–bank sorting worth its own paragraph, not a nuisance to hide. JFI referees read the68movement of the coefficient across fixed-effect columns as a diagnostic in itself; design the69identification section so that movement is interpreted, not merely displayed.7071## Execution bridge (StatsPAI / Stata MCP)7273Estimate and audit the identification claim, don't only argue it. Full map:74[`execution-with-mcp`](../../../shared-resources/empirical-methods/execution-with-mcp.md). JFI is banking and financial intermediation — typically corporate / bank causal designs built around regulation and shocks.75761. `detect_design` → `recommend` → fit with `as_handle=true` → `audit_result` to list77 the checks the design still owes.782. **Staggered DiD:** `callaway_santanna` / `sun_abraham` + `bacon_decomposition` +79 `honest_did_from_result` (the pre-trend test is low-power, Roth 2022).803. **IV:** `effective_f_test` + an `anderson_rubin_ci` (valid under weak instruments),81 not a 2SLS t-stat alone.824. **RDD:** `rdrobust` (bias-corrected) + `rddensity` / `mccrary_test` for manipulation.835. **OVB:** `oster_delta` / `sensemakr` — how strong a confounder would have to be.8485Report the economic magnitude; route the full battery to the appendix; keep every86number reproducible. A run end-to-end (synthetic data, real returns) is in the87[JF execution walkthrough](../../../Journal-of-Finance-Skills/resources/worked-examples/02-execution-walkthrough.md). If StatsPAI/Stata are not connected, adapt the88vendored `resources/code/` skeleton and flag any unverified number.89## Anti-patterns9091- OLS-plus-controls dressed up as identification on a bank panel92- Conflating credit supply and demand without firm×time absorption93- A theory whose key result silently depends on an unstated assumption94- Clustering at the wrong level, or ignoring few-cluster inference9596## Output format9798```99【Track】empirical / theory100【Design or assumptions】<the variation, or the key assumptions>101【Top threat / boundary】<the main objection + answer>102【Inference / generality】<clustering, or which results survive>103【Next skill】jfi-data-analysis104```