Splunk Enterprise Public Internet Exposure Hardening
Prerequisites
| Tool or access |
Purpose |
Verify |
| Bash and Python 3 |
Run bundled setup and validation helpers |
bash --version && python3 --version |
| Required product/platform access |
Inspect or configure the selected target |
Complete the documented preflight |
| Credential files for live modes |
Keep secrets out of chat |
Verify paths only |
Workflow Overview
┌───────────┐ ┌───────────────┐ ┌───────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐
│ Preflight │ → │ Render/review │ → │ Apply/handoff │ → │ Validate evidence │
└───────────┘ └───────────────┘ └───────────────┘ └─────────────────┘
When to Activate
- Expose Splunk Enterprise on the public internet, harden a Splunk search head against internet exposure, configure
TLS / HSTS / CSP / mTLS / per-IP rate limit / DMZ heavy forwarder, lock down splunkd or the KV store, fix
splunk.secret /.
- Preview and review the splunk enterprise public exposure hardening workflow before any live apply phase.
- Diagnose failed prerequisites, generated assets, configuration, or validation evidence.
Scope
Follow the documented read-only or render-first path whenever it is available.
This skill does not imply permission to mutate live systems. Require explicit
apply flags, protected credentials, and operator review for state changes.
Examples
Inspect the supported setup modes before selecting one:
bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/setup.sh --help
Expected output: usage, supported modes, and required arguments are displayed
without changing the target environment.
Inspect validation modes before running completion checks:
bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/validate.sh --help
Expected output: offline, live, and completion options are displayed when the
skill supports them; help exits without mutation.
Troubleshooting
| Issue |
Cause |
Resolution |
| Preflight fails |
A required tool or access path is missing |
Resolve it before rendering or applying |
| Rendered assets are incomplete |
Required non-secret inputs are absent |
Complete intake and render again |
| Apply is blocked |
Review, credentials, or explicit acceptance is missing |
Use the documented handoff |
| Validation is incomplete |
Live evidence is unavailable |
Record the gap and keep completion open |
This skill prepares an on-prem Splunk Enterprise deployment for
public-internet exposure with defense in depth across the Splunk node, the
reverse-proxy / WAF tier, and the network, plus an explicit operator
handoff for parts that cannot be safely automated. It is render-first: the
default phase produces a reviewable directory of *.conf overlays,
nginx / HAProxy / firewall templates, and operator handoff Markdown — and
refuses to apply changes until the operator passes --accept-public-exposure.
Read this first — what Splunk does NOT have
Splunk Enterprise is "designed to run on a trusted network." Several
common assumptions about Splunk Web are wrong, and the skill explicitly
guards against them:
- No
customHttpHeaders setting in web.conf. Browser security
headers (Strict-Transport-Security, Content-Security-Policy,
X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy,
Cache-Control) come from the reverse proxy only.
- No CAPTCHA / bot challenge on the login form.
- No native WebAuthn / FIDO2 in Splunk Web — federate to an IdP
(Okta, Entra ID, Duo Universal Prompt) for phishing-resistant MFA.
lockoutAttempts is per-user, not per-IP. The admin role ships
with never_lockout = enabled. The skill flips this to disabled and
the WAF / proxy provides the per-IP rate limit.
- No XFF /
trustedProxiesList. When tools.proxy.on = true Splunk
trusts X-Forwarded-* from any immediate client. Combine with
acceptFrom on web.conf [settings] AND server.conf [httpServer]
to lock down the trust boundary.
- Splunkd 8089, the KV store on 8191,
appServerPorts on 8065, and
the indexer-cluster replication port on 9887 must NEVER be reachable
from the public internet. Preflight and validate fail closed if
they are.
Architecture the skill assumes
Public Internet
│
▼
CDN / DDoS (Cloudflare / AWS / Akamai) ── operator handoff
│
▼
WAF rules (OWASP CRS, rate limit, geo) ── operator handoff
│
▼
Reverse proxy (nginx / HAProxy in DMZ) ── rendered templates
│ TLS termination + browser headers + return_to / header sanitisation
▼
Splunk Search Head + HEC + DMZ Heavy Forwarder
│ Splunkd / KV / replication NEVER public.
▼
Indexer cluster (private)
Agent behavior — credentials
Never paste secrets into chat or pass them on argv. The skill consumes
file paths for every secret it needs and never embeds secret values
in rendered output:
bash skills/shared/scripts/write_secret_file.sh /tmp/splunk_admin_password
bash skills/shared/scripts/write_secret_file.sh /tmp/splunk_pass4symmkey
bash skills/shared/scripts/write_secret_file.sh /tmp/splunk_ssl_key_password
bash skills/shared/scripts/write_secret_file.sh /tmp/splunk_idp_signing_cert
Pass them in via --admin-password-file, --pass4symmkey-file,
--ssl-key-password-file, etc.
For non-secret values (FQDN, IPs, indexes, role names) use
template.example.
Quick start
Render the full hardening bundle for a single search head with proxy in
front, public Splunk Web only:
bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/setup.sh \
--phase render \
--topology single-search-head \
--public-fqdn splunk.example.com \
--proxy-cidr 10.0.10.0/24 \
--enable-web true \
--enable-hec false \
--enable-s2s false
Render with HEC and DMZ heavy forwarder for ingest:
bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/setup.sh \
--phase render \
--topology shc-with-hec-and-hf \
--public-fqdn splunk.example.com \
--hec-fqdn hec.example.com \
--proxy-cidr 10.0.10.0/24 \
--enable-web true \
--enable-hec true \
--enable-s2s true \
--hec-mtls true \
--indexer-cluster-cidr 10.0.20.0/24
Run preflight against a live host (read-only checks; refuses to apply):
bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/setup.sh \
--phase preflight \
--public-fqdn splunk.example.com \
--public-ca-file /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/public-proxy-ca.pem \
--external-probe-cmd "ssh probe@bastion.example.com nc -zv"
Omit --public-ca-file for a publicly trusted certificate. Public probes use
system trust by default and always verify the certificate chain and FQDN;
there is no insecure curl -k production-pass path. The external probe value
is parsed once as POSIX-style argv, never evaluated as shell source, and the
target FQDN and port are appended as separate arguments. Shell metacharacters
and control characters are rejected.
Apply the hardening app on a search head (mutates Splunk; requires the
explicit accept flag):
bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/setup.sh \
--phase apply \
--apply-target search-head \
--public-fqdn splunk.example.com \
--accept-public-exposure \
--pass4symmkey-file /tmp/splunk_pass4symmkey
Validate live state post-apply:
bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/validate.sh \
--public-fqdn splunk.example.com
What it renders
Under the project root in splunk-public-exposure-rendered/:
splunk/apps/000_public_exposure_hardening/ — Splunk app with
app.conf, web.conf, server.conf, inputs.conf, outputs.conf,
authentication.conf, authorize.conf, limits.conf, commands.conf,
and metadata/{default,local}.meta. Drop into
$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/ (or the SHC deployer's shcluster/apps/).
splunk/apply-search-head.sh, apply-hec-tier.sh,
apply-s2s-receiver.sh, apply-heavy-forwarder.sh,
apply-deployer.sh, apply-cluster-manager.sh,
apply-license-manager.sh — role-aware local-host scripts selected with
--apply-target. Search-head, HEC-tier, and heavy-forwarder targets mutate
directly. S2S-receiver and cluster-manager targets exit nonzero and delegate
to the indexer-cluster workflow so a single peer is never restarted and an
undocumented secret-file CLI flag is never invented. Deployer stages the
bundle then exits nonzero pending a secret-safe SHC bundle handoff;
license-manager also delegates and exits nonzero.
SHC topologies reject direct search-head/hec-tier mutation and require
the deployer path.
splunk/transaction-helpers.sh — shared direct-apply transaction engine.
It securely reads secret files through no-follow descriptors, stages in a
private directory on the target filesystem, snapshots the prior app and
splunk-launch.conf, validates btool before restart, and restores plus
restart-verifies the exact prior state on any error or signal.
splunk/rotate-pass4symmkey.sh, rotate-splunk-secret.sh — secret
rotation helpers that read keys from local files only.
splunk/certificates/verify-certs.sh,
generate-csr-template.sh — operator-side cert helpers.
proxy/nginx/{splunk-web.conf,splunk-hec.conf} — production nginx
vhosts with TLS, HSTS, CSP, header sanitisation, return_to allowlist,
per-IP rate limit, streaming-safe timeouts, WebSocket plumbing.
proxy/haproxy/{splunk-web.cfg,splunk-hec.cfg} — HAProxy equivalents
using option http-server-close (NOT option httpclose).
proxy/firewall/{iptables.rules,nftables.conf,firewalld.xml,aws-sg.json}
— internet-edge firewall snippets that explicitly drop 8089,
8191, 8065, 9887, plus direct 9997 and 8088 from the
public CIDR.
handoff/ — Markdown checklists for WAF (Cloudflare / AWS / F5+Imperva),
SAML IdP, Duo MFA, certificate procurement, SOC alerting,
backup-and-restore, splunk.secret incident response, compliance.
preflight.sh and validate.sh — fail-closed scripts the operator
runs from this directory.
README.md and metadata.json — full documentation and rendered
configuration manifest.
Phases
render (default) — produce the reviewable rendered directory.
preflight — render then run the 20-step preflight against the live
host (default-cert detection, SVD floor, splunk.secret posture,
pass4SymmKey rotation, capability hygiene, firewall reachability,
TLS scan, header-injection probe, return_to redirect probe, cookie
scrubbing, etc.). Refuses to mark the deployment ready when any check
fails.
apply — render, run the fail-closed live preflight, then run the apply
script for the role you specified. Requires --accept-public-exposure (a
single-flag acknowledgement that you are about to bind Splunk to a
public-facing FQDN). Search-head, HEC-tier, and heavy-forwarder applies are
transactional and roll back both disk state and the Splunk restart if any
btool, restart, encryption, or post-restart readback check fails.
Preflight and validation treat failed, empty, missing, or unexpected btool
output as a failure; role_admin.never_lockout must be disabled, and
authType must be a recognized non-Scripted value matching the render.
validate — render then run the live validation probes.
all — render + preflight + apply + validate for direct local targets,
gated by --accept-public-exposure. Delegated cluster/license targets stop
nonzero at their handoff, so validation must run after the child workflow.
SVD floor (refuses to apply below this)
| Series |
Required version |
Source |
| 10.4.x |
10.4.0 |
Not affected by SVD-2026-0304/0303 at GA; use latest 10.4.x maintenance |
| 10.2.x |
10.2.2 |
SVD-2026-0304, SVD-2026-0303 |
| 10.0.x |
10.0.5 |
SVD-2026-0303, SVD-2025-1006 |
| 9.4.x |
9.4.10 |
SVD-2025-1006, SVD-2025-1203 |
| 9.3.x |
9.3.11 |
SVD-2025-1006, SVD-2025-1203 |
Floor lives in
references/cve-svd-floor.json and
ships embedded in the renderer; --svd-floor-file can override.
Cross-skill handoff matrix
The skill consumes — does not duplicate — these. When you also use
one of the adjacent skills below, run THIS skill's preflight +
validate against the fronting search head, then layer the adjacent
skill's hardening on top.
| Adjacent skill |
What it owns |
What this skill provides |
| splunk-platform-pki-setup |
Full TLS / PKI lifecycle (Private CA or Public CSR + handoff to Vault PKI / ACME / AD CS / EJBCA), per-component cert distribution across every Splunk surface, FIPS 140-2/140-3 wiring, three TLS algorithm presets, KV-Store dual-EKU enforcement, replication-port TLS migration, SAML SP signing cert, LDAPS trust, cacert.pem alignment, delegated rotation runbook |
Consumes the cert paths the PKI skill provisions; this skill's preflight refuses to declare a public-exposed SH ready until PKI verify-leaf has returned OK; the PKI skill consumes this skill's --enable-fips / --fips-version semantics rather than redefining |
| splunk-hec-service-setup |
HEC token lifecycle, allowed indexes, ACS HEC tokens |
HEC TLS / mTLS rendering, body-size alignment, proxy vhost, sensitive-path denies |
| splunk-enterprise-host-setup |
Splunk host install / cluster bootstrap |
Preflight refuses unbootstrapped hosts; SVD floor enforcement |
| splunk-indexer-cluster-setup |
Indexer cluster bundle |
pass4SymmKey rotation helper + acceptFrom enforcement for cluster CIDR |
| splunk-agent-management-setup |
SHC deployer, server classes |
Hardening app drops into shcluster/apps/; SHC deployer pass4SymmKey rotation |
| splunk-license-manager-setup |
License manager / peer wiring |
License master 8089 acceptFrom + pass4SymmKey rotation |
| splunk-cloud-acs-admin-setup |
Splunk Cloud ACS allowlists |
Out of scope — this skill is on-prem only |
| splunk-federated-search-setup |
Federation provider/consumer wiring |
Provider-side acceptFrom + service-account rotation helper (federation auth is NOT pass4SymmKey) |
| splunk-monitoring-console-setup |
Monitoring Console distributed config |
MC integration: forward _audit and platform alerts on hardening drift |
| splunk-connect-for-syslog-setup |
SC4S Docker/Helm runtime, syslog TLS listener |
If SC4S delivers via HEC, run THIS skill against the HEC-receiving SH first |
| splunk-connect-for-snmp-setup |
SC4SNMP Docker/Helm runtime |
Same as SC4S |
| splunk-mcp-server-setup |
MCP server install + token issuance |
If MCP is exposed publicly, run THIS skill against the SH fronting it; MCP token policy is owned by the MCP skill |
| splunk-stream-setup |
Wire data capture stack |
Stream is internal-only; this skill does not apply |
| splunk-index-lifecycle-smartstore-setup |
SmartStore S3/GCS/Azure backend |
Outbound-to-storage; this skill does not apply |
| splunk-enterprise-security-config (and ES/SOAR/ITSI/UBA/ARI/AA) |
Premium apps + additional capabilities |
Run THIS skill first; then re-audit role_public_reader against the premium-apps-capability-overlay |
References
Read reference.md before any apply. Topical deep dives:
- references/tls-hardening.md
- references/reverse-proxy-templates.md
- references/waf-cdn-handoff.md
- references/auth-mfa-saml.md
- references/network-segmentation.md
- references/role-capability-hardening.md
- references/risky-command-safeguards.md
- references/splunk-secret-rotation.md
- references/cve-svd-tracking.md
- references/threat-intel.md
- references/disa-stig-cross-reference.md
- references/compliance-gap-statement.md
- references/dmz-heavy-forwarder-pattern.md
- references/operator-handoff-checklist.md
- references/setting-name-corrections.md
- references/fips-mode.md
- references/auth-ldap-hardening.md
- references/premium-apps-capability-overlay.md
- premium-apps-capability-overlay.json (machine-readable companion consumed by preflight)
- references/secure-gateway-handoff.md
- references/federated-search-provider-hardening.md
- references/cve-svd-floor.json (Splunk core + SG-app per-branch floors)
- references/default-cert-fingerprints.json (machine-readable companion to default-cert-fingerprints / verify-certs.sh)
What this skill does NOT do
- Procure certificates or talk to a CA. (Provides a CSR template +
verify-certs.sh.)
- Push WAF / CDN config to vendor APIs. (Operator-driven via
handoff/.)
- Bootstrap the Splunk host itself —
splunk-enterprise-host-setup.
- Issue HEC tokens —
splunk-hec-service-setup.
- Patch / upgrade Splunk — preflight refuses below the SVD floor and the
operator must upgrade first.
- Implement IdP-side configuration (Okta, Entra, Duo) — handoff docs only.
- Provide compliance attestation. The skill maps controls (DISA STIG
cross-reference) but does not certify PCI / HIPAA / FedRAMP / SOC 2.
- Configure Splunk Secure Gateway, Splunk Mobile, SC4S, or the Splunk
MCP Server for public exposure — each needs its own threat model.
1---2name: splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening3description: "Use when the user asks to expose Splunk Enterprise on the public internet, harden a Splunk search head4 against internet exposure, configure TLS / HSTS / CSP / mTLS / per-IP rate limit / DMZ heavy forwarder,5 lock down splunkd or the KV store, fix splunk.secret / pass4SymmKey defaults, evaluate against the6 latest SVD floor (10.4.0 / 10.2.2 / 10.0.5 / 9.4.10 / 9.3.11), or render nginx / HAProxy / WAF reference7 configs in front of Splunk. Render, preflight, apply, and validate hardening of an on-prem Splunk8 Enterprise deployment for public-internet exposure across all four edge surfaces (Splunk Web on 8000,9 HEC on 8088, Splunk-to-Splunk on 9997, splunkd REST on 8089) plus reference reverse-proxy / WAF /10 firewall templates and a structured operator handoff."11compatibility: "Splunk Cloud Platform 10.5.2605: not applicable. This self-managed runtime workflow remains on the public Splunk Enterprise or Universal Forwarder 10.4 baseline."12metadata:13 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/chambear2809/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening14 splunk_cloud_10_5: "self-managed-10.4"15 compatibility_verified: "2026-08-20"16---1718# Splunk Enterprise Public Internet Exposure Hardening1920## Prerequisites2122| Tool or access | Purpose | Verify |23|---|---|---|24| Bash and Python 3 | Run bundled setup and validation helpers | `bash --version && python3 --version` |25| Required product/platform access | Inspect or configure the selected target | Complete the documented preflight |26| Credential files for live modes | Keep secrets out of chat | Verify paths only |2728## Workflow Overview2930```text31┌───────────┐ ┌───────────────┐ ┌───────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐32│ Preflight │ → │ Render/review │ → │ Apply/handoff │ → │ Validate evidence │33└───────────┘ └───────────────┘ └───────────────┘ └─────────────────┘34```3536## When to Activate3738- Expose Splunk Enterprise on the public internet, harden a Splunk search head against internet exposure, configure39 TLS / HSTS / CSP / mTLS / per-IP rate limit / DMZ heavy forwarder, lock down splunkd or the KV store, fix40 splunk.secret /.41- Preview and review the splunk enterprise public exposure hardening workflow before any live apply phase.42- Diagnose failed prerequisites, generated assets, configuration, or validation evidence.4344## Scope4546Follow the documented read-only or render-first path whenever it is available.47This skill does not imply permission to mutate live systems. Require explicit48apply flags, protected credentials, and operator review for state changes.4950## Examples5152Inspect the supported setup modes before selecting one:5354```bash55bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/setup.sh --help56```5758Expected output: usage, supported modes, and required arguments are displayed59without changing the target environment.6061Inspect validation modes before running completion checks:6263```bash64bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/validate.sh --help65```6667Expected output: offline, live, and completion options are displayed when the68skill supports them; help exits without mutation.6970## Troubleshooting7172| Issue | Cause | Resolution |73|---|---|---|74| Preflight fails | A required tool or access path is missing | Resolve it before rendering or applying |75| Rendered assets are incomplete | Required non-secret inputs are absent | Complete intake and render again |76| Apply is blocked | Review, credentials, or explicit acceptance is missing | Use the documented handoff |77| Validation is incomplete | Live evidence is unavailable | Record the gap and keep completion open |7879This skill prepares an **on-prem Splunk Enterprise** deployment for80public-internet exposure with **defense in depth across the Splunk node, the81reverse-proxy / WAF tier, and the network**, plus an explicit operator82handoff for parts that cannot be safely automated. It is render-first: the83default phase produces a reviewable directory of `*.conf` overlays,84nginx / HAProxy / firewall templates, and operator handoff Markdown — and85refuses to apply changes until the operator passes `--accept-public-exposure`.8687## Read this first — what Splunk does NOT have8889Splunk Enterprise is "designed to run on a trusted network." Several90common assumptions about Splunk Web are wrong, and the skill explicitly91guards against them:9293- **No `customHttpHeaders` setting in `web.conf`.** Browser security94 headers (`Strict-Transport-Security`, `Content-Security-Policy`,95 `X-Content-Type-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`,96 `Cache-Control`) come from the **reverse proxy only**.97- **No CAPTCHA / bot challenge** on the login form.98- **No native WebAuthn / FIDO2** in Splunk Web — federate to an IdP99 (Okta, Entra ID, Duo Universal Prompt) for phishing-resistant MFA.100- **`lockoutAttempts` is per-user**, not per-IP. The `admin` role ships101 with `never_lockout = enabled`. The skill flips this to `disabled` and102 the WAF / proxy provides the per-IP rate limit.103- **No XFF / `trustedProxiesList`.** When `tools.proxy.on = true` Splunk104 trusts `X-Forwarded-*` from any immediate client. Combine with105 `acceptFrom` on `web.conf [settings]` AND `server.conf [httpServer]`106 to lock down the trust boundary.107- **Splunkd 8089, the KV store on 8191, `appServerPorts` on 8065, and108 the indexer-cluster replication port on 9887 must NEVER be reachable109 from the public internet.** Preflight and validate fail closed if110 they are.111112## Architecture the skill assumes113114```115Public Internet116 │117 ▼118CDN / DDoS (Cloudflare / AWS / Akamai) ── operator handoff119 │120 ▼121WAF rules (OWASP CRS, rate limit, geo) ── operator handoff122 │123 ▼124Reverse proxy (nginx / HAProxy in DMZ) ── rendered templates125 │ TLS termination + browser headers + return_to / header sanitisation126 ▼127Splunk Search Head + HEC + DMZ Heavy Forwarder128 │ Splunkd / KV / replication NEVER public.129 ▼130Indexer cluster (private)131```132133## Agent behavior — credentials134135Never paste secrets into chat or pass them on argv. The skill consumes136**file paths** for every secret it needs and never embeds secret values137in rendered output:138139```bash140bash skills/shared/scripts/write_secret_file.sh /tmp/splunk_admin_password141bash skills/shared/scripts/write_secret_file.sh /tmp/splunk_pass4symmkey142bash skills/shared/scripts/write_secret_file.sh /tmp/splunk_ssl_key_password143bash skills/shared/scripts/write_secret_file.sh /tmp/splunk_idp_signing_cert144```145146Pass them in via `--admin-password-file`, `--pass4symmkey-file`,147`--ssl-key-password-file`, etc.148149For non-secret values (FQDN, IPs, indexes, role names) use150`template.example`.151152## Quick start153154Render the full hardening bundle for a single search head with proxy in155front, public Splunk Web only:156157```bash158bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/setup.sh \159 --phase render \160 --topology single-search-head \161 --public-fqdn splunk.example.com \162 --proxy-cidr 10.0.10.0/24 \163 --enable-web true \164 --enable-hec false \165 --enable-s2s false166```167168Render with HEC and DMZ heavy forwarder for ingest:169170```bash171bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/setup.sh \172 --phase render \173 --topology shc-with-hec-and-hf \174 --public-fqdn splunk.example.com \175 --hec-fqdn hec.example.com \176 --proxy-cidr 10.0.10.0/24 \177 --enable-web true \178 --enable-hec true \179 --enable-s2s true \180 --hec-mtls true \181 --indexer-cluster-cidr 10.0.20.0/24182```183184Run preflight against a live host (read-only checks; refuses to apply):185186```bash187bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/setup.sh \188 --phase preflight \189 --public-fqdn splunk.example.com \190 --public-ca-file /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/public-proxy-ca.pem \191 --external-probe-cmd "ssh probe@bastion.example.com nc -zv"192```193194Omit `--public-ca-file` for a publicly trusted certificate. Public probes use195system trust by default and always verify the certificate chain and FQDN;196there is no insecure `curl -k` production-pass path. The external probe value197is parsed once as POSIX-style argv, never evaluated as shell source, and the198target FQDN and port are appended as separate arguments. Shell metacharacters199and control characters are rejected.200201Apply the hardening app on a search head (mutates Splunk; requires the202explicit accept flag):203204```bash205bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/setup.sh \206 --phase apply \207 --apply-target search-head \208 --public-fqdn splunk.example.com \209 --accept-public-exposure \210 --pass4symmkey-file /tmp/splunk_pass4symmkey211```212213Validate live state post-apply:214215```bash216bash skills/splunk-enterprise-public-exposure-hardening/scripts/validate.sh \217 --public-fqdn splunk.example.com218```219220## What it renders221222Under the project root in `splunk-public-exposure-rendered/`:223224- `splunk/apps/000_public_exposure_hardening/` — Splunk app with225 `app.conf`, `web.conf`, `server.conf`, `inputs.conf`, `outputs.conf`,226 `authentication.conf`, `authorize.conf`, `limits.conf`, `commands.conf`,227 and `metadata/{default,local}.meta`. Drop into228 `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/` (or the SHC deployer's `shcluster/apps/`).229- `splunk/apply-search-head.sh`, `apply-hec-tier.sh`,230 `apply-s2s-receiver.sh`, `apply-heavy-forwarder.sh`,231 `apply-deployer.sh`, `apply-cluster-manager.sh`,232 `apply-license-manager.sh` — role-aware local-host scripts selected with233 `--apply-target`. Search-head, HEC-tier, and heavy-forwarder targets mutate234 directly. S2S-receiver and cluster-manager targets exit nonzero and delegate235 to the indexer-cluster workflow so a single peer is never restarted and an236 undocumented secret-file CLI flag is never invented. Deployer stages the237 bundle then exits nonzero pending a secret-safe SHC bundle handoff;238 license-manager also delegates and exits nonzero.239 SHC topologies reject direct `search-head`/`hec-tier` mutation and require240 the deployer path.241- `splunk/transaction-helpers.sh` — shared direct-apply transaction engine.242 It securely reads secret files through no-follow descriptors, stages in a243 private directory on the target filesystem, snapshots the prior app and244 `splunk-launch.conf`, validates btool before restart, and restores plus245 restart-verifies the exact prior state on any error or signal.246- `splunk/rotate-pass4symmkey.sh`, `rotate-splunk-secret.sh` — secret247 rotation helpers that read keys from local files only.248- `splunk/certificates/verify-certs.sh`,249 `generate-csr-template.sh` — operator-side cert helpers.250- `proxy/nginx/{splunk-web.conf,splunk-hec.conf}` — production nginx251 vhosts with TLS, HSTS, CSP, header sanitisation, return_to allowlist,252 per-IP rate limit, streaming-safe timeouts, WebSocket plumbing.253- `proxy/haproxy/{splunk-web.cfg,splunk-hec.cfg}` — HAProxy equivalents254 using `option http-server-close` (NOT `option httpclose`).255- `proxy/firewall/{iptables.rules,nftables.conf,firewalld.xml,aws-sg.json}`256 — internet-edge firewall snippets that explicitly drop `8089`,257 `8191`, `8065`, `9887`, plus direct `9997` and `8088` from the258 public CIDR.259- `handoff/` — Markdown checklists for WAF (Cloudflare / AWS / F5+Imperva),260 SAML IdP, Duo MFA, certificate procurement, SOC alerting,261 backup-and-restore, splunk.secret incident response, compliance.262- `preflight.sh` and `validate.sh` — fail-closed scripts the operator263 runs from this directory.264- `README.md` and `metadata.json` — full documentation and rendered265 configuration manifest.266267## Phases268269- `render` (default) — produce the reviewable rendered directory.270- `preflight` — render then run the 20-step preflight against the live271 host (default-cert detection, SVD floor, `splunk.secret` posture,272 `pass4SymmKey` rotation, capability hygiene, firewall reachability,273 TLS scan, header-injection probe, `return_to` redirect probe, cookie274 scrubbing, etc.). Refuses to mark the deployment ready when any check275 fails.276- `apply` — render, run the fail-closed live preflight, then run the apply277 script for the role you specified. Requires `--accept-public-exposure` (a278 single-flag acknowledgement that you are about to bind Splunk to a279 public-facing FQDN). Search-head, HEC-tier, and heavy-forwarder applies are280 transactional and roll back both disk state and the Splunk restart if any281 btool, restart, encryption, or post-restart readback check fails.282 Preflight and validation treat failed, empty, missing, or unexpected btool283 output as a failure; `role_admin.never_lockout` must be `disabled`, and284 `authType` must be a recognized non-Scripted value matching the render.285- `validate` — render then run the live validation probes.286- `all` — render + preflight + apply + validate for direct local targets,287 gated by `--accept-public-exposure`. Delegated cluster/license targets stop288 nonzero at their handoff, so validation must run after the child workflow.289290## SVD floor (refuses to apply below this)291292| Series | Required version | Source |293|---|---|---|294| 10.4.x | 10.4.0 | Not affected by SVD-2026-0304/0303 at GA; use latest 10.4.x maintenance |295| 10.2.x | 10.2.2 | SVD-2026-0304, SVD-2026-0303 |296| 10.0.x | 10.0.5 | SVD-2026-0303, SVD-2025-1006 |297| 9.4.x | 9.4.10 | SVD-2025-1006, SVD-2025-1203 |298| 9.3.x | 9.3.11 | SVD-2025-1006, SVD-2025-1203 |299300Floor lives in301[references/cve-svd-floor.json](references/cve-svd-floor.json) and302ships embedded in the renderer; `--svd-floor-file` can override.303304## Cross-skill handoff matrix305306The skill consumes — does not duplicate — these. When you also use307one of the adjacent skills below, run THIS skill's preflight +308validate against the fronting search head, then layer the adjacent309skill's hardening on top.310311| Adjacent skill | What it owns | What this skill provides |312|---|---|---|313| [splunk-platform-pki-setup](../splunk-platform-pki-setup/SKILL.md) | Full TLS / PKI lifecycle (Private CA or Public CSR + handoff to Vault PKI / ACME / AD CS / EJBCA), per-component cert distribution across every Splunk surface, FIPS 140-2/140-3 wiring, three TLS algorithm presets, KV-Store dual-EKU enforcement, replication-port TLS migration, SAML SP signing cert, LDAPS trust, `cacert.pem` alignment, delegated rotation runbook | Consumes the cert paths the PKI skill provisions; this skill's preflight refuses to declare a public-exposed SH ready until PKI verify-leaf has returned `OK`; the PKI skill consumes this skill's `--enable-fips` / `--fips-version` semantics rather than redefining |314| [splunk-hec-service-setup](../splunk-hec-service-setup/SKILL.md) | HEC token lifecycle, allowed indexes, ACS HEC tokens | HEC TLS / mTLS rendering, body-size alignment, proxy vhost, sensitive-path denies |315| [splunk-enterprise-host-setup](../splunk-enterprise-host-setup/SKILL.md) | Splunk host install / cluster bootstrap | Preflight refuses unbootstrapped hosts; SVD floor enforcement |316| [splunk-indexer-cluster-setup](../splunk-indexer-cluster-setup/SKILL.md) | Indexer cluster bundle | `pass4SymmKey` rotation helper + acceptFrom enforcement for cluster CIDR |317| [splunk-agent-management-setup](../splunk-agent-management-setup/SKILL.md) | SHC deployer, server classes | Hardening app drops into `shcluster/apps/`; SHC deployer pass4SymmKey rotation |318| [splunk-license-manager-setup](../splunk-license-manager-setup/SKILL.md) | License manager / peer wiring | License master 8089 acceptFrom + pass4SymmKey rotation |319| [splunk-cloud-acs-admin-setup](../splunk-cloud-acs-admin-setup/SKILL.md) | Splunk **Cloud** ACS allowlists | Out of scope — this skill is on-prem only |320| [splunk-federated-search-setup](../splunk-federated-search-setup/SKILL.md) | Federation provider/consumer wiring | Provider-side acceptFrom + service-account rotation helper (federation auth is NOT pass4SymmKey) |321| [splunk-monitoring-console-setup](../splunk-monitoring-console-setup/SKILL.md) | Monitoring Console distributed config | MC integration: forward `_audit` and platform alerts on hardening drift |322| [splunk-connect-for-syslog-setup](../splunk-connect-for-syslog-setup/SKILL.md) | SC4S Docker/Helm runtime, syslog TLS listener | If SC4S delivers via HEC, run THIS skill against the HEC-receiving SH first |323| [splunk-connect-for-snmp-setup](../splunk-connect-for-snmp-setup/SKILL.md) | SC4SNMP Docker/Helm runtime | Same as SC4S |324| [splunk-mcp-server-setup](../splunk-mcp-server-setup/SKILL.md) | MCP server install + token issuance | If MCP is exposed publicly, run THIS skill against the SH fronting it; MCP token policy is owned by the MCP skill |325| [splunk-stream-setup](../splunk-stream-setup/SKILL.md) | Wire data capture stack | Stream is internal-only; this skill does not apply |326| [splunk-index-lifecycle-smartstore-setup](../splunk-index-lifecycle-smartstore-setup/SKILL.md) | SmartStore S3/GCS/Azure backend | Outbound-to-storage; this skill does not apply |327| [splunk-enterprise-security-config](../splunk-enterprise-security-config/SKILL.md) (and ES/SOAR/ITSI/UBA/ARI/AA) | Premium apps + additional capabilities | Run THIS skill first; then re-audit `role_public_reader` against the [premium-apps-capability-overlay](references/premium-apps-capability-overlay.md) |328329## References330331Read [reference.md](reference.md) before any apply. Topical deep dives:332333- [references/tls-hardening.md](references/tls-hardening.md)334- [references/reverse-proxy-templates.md](references/reverse-proxy-templates.md)335- [references/waf-cdn-handoff.md](references/waf-cdn-handoff.md)336- [references/auth-mfa-saml.md](references/auth-mfa-saml.md)337- [references/network-segmentation.md](references/network-segmentation.md)338- [references/role-capability-hardening.md](references/role-capability-hardening.md)339- [references/risky-command-safeguards.md](references/risky-command-safeguards.md)340- [references/splunk-secret-rotation.md](references/splunk-secret-rotation.md)341- [references/cve-svd-tracking.md](references/cve-svd-tracking.md)342- [references/threat-intel.md](references/threat-intel.md)343- [references/disa-stig-cross-reference.md](references/disa-stig-cross-reference.md)344- [references/compliance-gap-statement.md](references/compliance-gap-statement.md)345- [references/dmz-heavy-forwarder-pattern.md](references/dmz-heavy-forwarder-pattern.md)346- [references/operator-handoff-checklist.md](references/operator-handoff-checklist.md)347- [references/setting-name-corrections.md](references/setting-name-corrections.md)348- [references/fips-mode.md](references/fips-mode.md)349- [references/auth-ldap-hardening.md](references/auth-ldap-hardening.md)350- [references/premium-apps-capability-overlay.md](references/premium-apps-capability-overlay.md)351 + [premium-apps-capability-overlay.json](references/premium-apps-capability-overlay.json) (machine-readable companion consumed by preflight)352- [references/secure-gateway-handoff.md](references/secure-gateway-handoff.md)353- [references/federated-search-provider-hardening.md](references/federated-search-provider-hardening.md)354- [references/cve-svd-floor.json](references/cve-svd-floor.json) (Splunk core + SG-app per-branch floors)355- [references/default-cert-fingerprints.json](references/default-cert-fingerprints.json) (machine-readable companion to default-cert-fingerprints / verify-certs.sh)356357## What this skill does NOT do358359- Procure certificates or talk to a CA. (Provides a CSR template +360 `verify-certs.sh`.)361- Push WAF / CDN config to vendor APIs. (Operator-driven via `handoff/`.)362- Bootstrap the Splunk host itself —363 [splunk-enterprise-host-setup](../splunk-enterprise-host-setup/SKILL.md).364- Issue HEC tokens —365 [splunk-hec-service-setup](../splunk-hec-service-setup/SKILL.md).366- Patch / upgrade Splunk — preflight refuses below the SVD floor and the367 operator must upgrade first.368- Implement IdP-side configuration (Okta, Entra, Duo) — handoff docs only.369- Provide compliance attestation. The skill maps controls (DISA STIG370 cross-reference) but does not certify PCI / HIPAA / FedRAMP / SOC 2.371- Configure Splunk Secure Gateway, Splunk Mobile, SC4S, or the Splunk372 MCP Server for public exposure — each needs its own threat model.