How do I install the Cavet Deployment skill?

Run npx skillmds@latest add chaoschild/cavet-deployment in your terminal (requires Node.js), paste this page's agent-chat prompt into Claude, Cursor, or any MCP-connected agent, or download the SKILL.md file and copy it into your agent's skills directory.

Is Cavet Deployment safe to use?

This skill has not completed SkillMD's automated safety review yet. SkillMD never runs a skill's scripts for you; review the SKILL.md before installing.

Which AI agents work with Cavet Deployment?

This skill is tagged as working with Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex. SKILL.md is an open format, so most agents that read a skills directory can load it too.

Is Cavet Deployment free to use?

Yes. Installing skills from SkillMD is free, and the skill stays under its author's original license.

Who published Cavet Deployment?

ChaosChild (@chaoschild) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Cavet Deployment by chaoschild — Agent Skill

Name: Cavet Deployment
Author: ChaosChild

Cavet Deployment

Infrastructure and deployment work — Terraform, CloudFormation, Pulumi, Bicep, Kubernetes manifests, Helm charts, Dockerfiles, Compose files, CI/CD pipelines and workflows, environment and runtime configuration, secrets management, TLS, networking and exposure, deploy scripts. Use whenever such files are written or changed and whenever how something will be deployed or hosted is being decided.

ChaosChild 753db4d 4 files · 8.3 KB Updated Sep 17, 2026

File contents

cavet-deployment

Deployment is where a correct application meets a misconfigured world. Most of what goes wrong here is a default that was never changed. Check the defaults.

If cavet is not installed, invoke cavet-install and resume.

While writing

Apply these as you write; mention only what the operator will notice.

Secrets. Never in IaC source, Dockerfiles, ENV, build args, CI variables printed in logs, or committed .env. Runtime injection from the platform secret store; least-privilege access to that store; rotation path known.

Identity and permissions. One identity per service, scoped to what it uses. Wildcards in IAM policies are a finding. CI: short-lived OIDC federation over long-lived cloud keys; workflow permissions: set to minimum, not default.

Exposure. Nothing public that need not be: storage buckets, databases, admin ports, management endpoints, metrics. Security groups / network policies default deny. Public ingress terminates TLS with a real certificate; internal hops still TLS where they cross a host.

Containers. Non-root user; pinned, minimal base image; no secrets in layers; read-only root filesystem where possible; drop capabilities; resource limits; health checks. Kubernetes: no privileged, no host namespaces, no automountServiceAccountToken unless used, securityContext set.

Storage and data. Encryption at rest on; versioning/backups on for anything that matters; public access blocked at the account level, not per bucket.

Logging and audit. Platform audit logging on; application logs shipped without secrets; retention set deliberately.

Rollback. Know how this deploy is undone before it goes out.

Depth per platform: references/containers.md, references/ci-cd.md, references/cloud.md. Read the one that matches.

Then scan

Run cavet-triage with phase deploy. IaC scanning is in the default scanner set (Trivy). If the operator has enabled Checkov, it runs too.

Container image scanning is opt-in because it mounts the Docker socket into the engine — a real privilege escalation. Do not enable it on your own; tell the operator it exists, what it costs, and let them decide in config.yaml. Filesystem and config scanning need no such access and are always on.

Leave a trace

Deployment decisions with lasting consequence — accepting a public endpoint, choosing not to encrypt something, granting a broad permission for a stated reason — go through cavet raise / cavet resolve like design items, so the reason survives the person who made it.

---name: cavet-deploymentdescription: Infrastructure and deployment work — Terraform, CloudFormation, Pulumi, Bicep, Kubernetes manifests, Helm charts, Dockerfiles, Compose files, CI/CD pipelines and workflows, environment and runtime configuration, secrets management, TLS, networking and exposure, deploy scripts. Use whenever such files are written or changed and whenever how something will be deployed or hosted is being decided.---# cavet-deploymentDeployment is where a correct application meets a misconfigured world. Most of whatgoes wrong here is a default that was never changed. Check the defaults.If `cavet` is not installed, invoke `cavet-install` and resume.## While writingApply these as you write; mention only what the operator will notice.**Secrets.** Never in IaC source, Dockerfiles, `ENV`, build args, CI variablesprinted in logs, or committed `.env`. Runtime injection from the platform secretstore; least-privilege access to that store; rotation path known.**Identity and permissions.** One identity per service, scoped to what it uses.Wildcards in IAM policies are a finding. CI: short-lived OIDC federation overlong-lived cloud keys; workflow `permissions:` set to minimum, not default.**Exposure.** Nothing public that need not be: storage buckets, databases, adminports, management endpoints, metrics. Security groups / network policies defaultdeny. Public ingress terminates TLS with a real certificate; internal hops stillTLS where they cross a host.**Containers.** Non-root user; pinned, minimal base image; no secrets in layers;read-only root filesystem where possible; drop capabilities; resource limits;health checks. Kubernetes: no `privileged`, no host namespaces, no`automountServiceAccountToken` unless used, `securityContext` set.**Storage and data.** Encryption at rest on; versioning/backups on for anythingthat matters; public access blocked at the account level, not per bucket.**Logging and audit.** Platform audit logging on; application logs shipped withoutsecrets; retention set deliberately.**Rollback.** Know how this deploy is undone before it goes out.Depth per platform: `references/containers.md`, `references/ci-cd.md`,`references/cloud.md`. Read the one that matches.## Then scanRun `cavet-triage` with phase deploy. IaC scanning is in the default scanner set(Trivy). If the operator has enabled Checkov, it runs too.**Container image scanning is opt-in** because it mounts the Docker socket into theengine — a real privilege escalation. Do not enable it on your own; tell the operatorit exists, what it costs, and let them decide in `config.yaml`. Filesystem andconfig scanning need no such access and are always on.## Leave a traceDeployment decisions with lasting consequence — accepting a public endpoint,choosing not to encrypt something, granting a broad permission for a stated reason —go through `cavet raise` / `cavet resolve` like design items, so the reason survivesthe person who made it.

Frequently asked questions