Client Secret Exposure Audit

Client-Side Secret & Sensitive-File Exposure Audit

Overview

Modern web apps ship a lot of code and config to the browser. When credentials leak into that client-visible surface — hardcoded in JavaScript, tucked into HTML meta/data-* attributes or comments, or served as raw source/config/deploy files that were never meant to be public — anyone can read them with curl and a browser. This skill is a defensive, read-only workflow for finding that class of exposure on a web app you are authorized to assess.

It maps to OWASP A02:2021 Cryptographic Failures (sensitive data exposure), A05:2021 Security Misconfiguration, and CWE-798 (hardcoded credentials), CWE-200 (sensitive information exposure), CWE-540 (source code in a production build). It only fetches resources the server already hands to any anonymous visitor — it does not exploit, brute-force, or mutate anything.

When to Use This Skill

• Use when you need to check whether a deployed site leaks API keys, tokens, or passwords in its client-side bundle before shipping or during a review.
• Use when working with a static/SPA deployment (Vercel, Netlify, Nginx, S3, GitHub Pages) and you want to confirm no source/config/deploy files are publicly reachable.
• Use when the user asks to "find secrets," "audit exposed files," "check the JS/HTML for credentials," or run a lightweight sensitive-data-exposure pass on a URL they own or are authorized to test.
• Do not use this to attack third-party sites. See Security & Safety Notes.

How It Works

Set the target once. Every command below reads only what the server serves publicly.

BASE="https://TARGET.example"     # authorized target, no trailing path
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; cd "$WORK"

Step 1: Fetch the page and inspect response headers

curl -s -D headers.txt -o body.html "$BASE/"
cat headers.txt

Flag on the headers:

• access-control-allow-origin: * — permissive CORS (worse when paired with credentials).
• Missing Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options/frame-ancestors, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy.
• Missing/weak Strict-Transport-Security.
• Server/framework version banners that fingerprint the stack.

Step 2: Grep the HTML for secrets and sinks

grep -inE "secret|passwd|password|api[_-]?key|apikey|token|bearer|authorization|\
akia|sk_live|sk_test|pk_live|whsec_|ghp_|aiza|private[_-]?key|mongodb(\+srv)?://|\
data-[a-z-]*(secret|token|key|access)" body.html
grep -inE "<!--" body.html            # read every HTML comment
grep -ioE '<meta[^>]+>' body.html     # meta tags often carry keys/ids
grep -ioE '<script[^>]+src="[^"]+"'   body.html   # enumerate JS bundles

Secrets hide in data-* attributes, <meta> tags, hidden <div>s, and <!-- comments --> at least as often as in scripts.

Step 3: Pull every JavaScript bundle and scan it

# extract script srcs, resolve relative paths against $BASE, fetch and scan
grep -ioE 'src="[^"]+\.js"' body.html | sed -E 's/^src="//; s/"$//' \
 | while read -r p; do
     u="$p"; case "$p" in http*) ;; /*) u="$BASE$p";; *) u="$BASE/$p";; esac
     f="js_$(echo "$p" | tr '/:' '__')"
     curl -s "$u" -o "$f" && echo "== $u =="
   done
grep -rinE "secret|password|api[_-]?key|token|bearer|sk_(live|test)|pk_(live|test)|\
whsec_|akia|aiza|jwt|signing[_-]?key|admin[_-]?token|mongodb|redis://" js_* 2>/dev/null

Also scan any sourcemaps (*.js.map) — they can rebuild original source with comments intact.

Step 4: Probe for publicly reachable source / config / deploy files

SPAs often have a catch-all rewrite that returns index.html for unknown paths, so compare response sizes — a path whose size differs from the SPA fallback is a real, distinct file.

FALLBACK=$(curl -s "$BASE/____nope____$RANDOM" | wc -c)   # SPA fallback size
for p in /.env /.env.local /.env.production /.git/config /.git/HEAD \
  /package.json /package-lock.json /vercel.json /.vercel/project.json \
  /Dockerfile /docker-compose.yml /wrangler.toml /.gitignore \
  /server/index.js /src/config/app.config.js /config.js \
  /src/services/payment.service.js /webpack.config.js /next.config.js; do
    read -r code size < <(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} %{size_download}" "$BASE$p")
    [ "$code" = "200" ] && [ "$size" != "$FALLBACK" ] && echo "REAL FILE  $code $size  $p"
done

For any real file found, fetch it and re-run the Step 2/3 secret grep. Follow require(...)/import paths inside those files to discover more source files (routes, controllers, services, webhooks) and repeat.

Step 5: Triage and score

Rate each finding by blast radius, not by where it was found:

A key being "test/demo" does not make it safe if the pattern would ship a live key the same way — report the pattern.

Step 6: Report

Write findings as Markdown using the format in references/example-report.md: one row/section per finding with Severity · Category (OWASP/CWE) · Location · Evidence (redacted) · Impact · Remediation. Redact real secret material to a prefix + length. End with prioritized remediation and a note on which secrets must be rotated, not just removed (anything committed/served is already compromised).

Examples

Example 1: Secrets in HTML meta and hidden elements

BASE="https://demo-for-opensource.vercel.app"; curl -s "$BASE/" -o body.html
grep -inE "recaptcha-secret|data-aws-secret|data-webhook-secret|mongodb\+srv" body.html
# -> meta recaptcha-secret=..., data-aws-access=AKIA…/data-aws-secret=…,
#    data-webhook-secret=whsec_…, and a hidden JSON blob with a mongodb+srv URI
#    (username:password@cluster). All reachable with a single unauthenticated GET.

Example 2: Hardcoded credentials in a JS config bundle

curl -s "$BASE/public/assets/js/config.js" | \
  grep -inE "API_SECRET|ADMIN_TOKEN|JWT_SECRET|DATABASE_PASSWORD|PAYMENT_SIGNING_KEY"
# -> API_SECRET, ADMIN_TOKEN (JWT), JWT_SECRET, DATABASE_PASSWORD, and a payment
#    signing key, all assigned as plain string constants shipped to every browser.

Example 3: Server source exposed behind a SPA fallback

FALLBACK=$(curl -s "$BASE/__nope__" | wc -c)
for p in /server/index.js /docker-compose.yml /src/services/payment.service.js; do
  sz=$(curl -s "$BASE$p" | wc -c); [ "$sz" != "$FALLBACK" ] && echo "REAL $sz $p"
done
# -> docker-compose.yml leaks a Redis password; payment.service.js leaks
#    Stripe/Khalti secret keys + webhook secret. Distinct sizes prove they are
#    real files, not the SPA catch-all page.

A full worked report for this target is in references/example-report.md.

Best Practices

• ✅ Confirm written authorization and scope (the exact hostnames) before fetching.
• ✅ Compare every probed path against the SPA fallback size to avoid false 200s.
• ✅ Follow require/import chains in any exposed source file to find more files.
• ✅ Redact real secret values in the report; record enough to identify, not reuse.
• ✅ Flag secrets for rotation — served/committed secrets are already burned.
• ❌ Don't use discovered credentials to authenticate, pivot, or access data.
• ❌ Don't run this against sites you don't own or aren't authorized to test.
• ❌ Don't treat "it's a test/demo key" as safe — report the shipping pattern.

Limitations

• Read-only reconnaissance of client-served assets; it does not test injection, auth logic, IDOR, or server-side flaws — pair with @web-security-testing.
• Path probing uses a wordlist; it finds common exposures, not every file.
• This skill does not replace environment-specific validation, testing, or expert review.
• Stop and ask for clarification if authorization, scope, or safety boundaries are missing.

Security & Safety Notes

• Authorized targets only. Run exclusively against systems you own or have explicit written permission to assess. Unauthorized scanning may be illegal.
• Every command here performs only unauthenticated GET requests for resources the server already serves publicly — no exploitation, brute force, or mutation.
• Handle any real secrets you uncover as sensitive: store findings in an access- controlled location, redact them in shared reports, and recommend rotation.
• Do not exfiltrate data or reuse discovered credentials — locating an exposure is the deliverable; using it is out of scope.

Common Pitfalls

• Problem: Every probed path returns HTTP 200, hiding real files. Solution: SPA catch-all rewrite. Baseline the fallback body size and only treat paths with a different size as real files.
• Problem: Grep misses secrets stored in data-* attributes or comments. Solution: Also scan <meta>, data-*, hidden elements, and every <!-- comment -->, not just <script> bodies.
• Problem: Dismissing a finding because the key is labeled "test/demo." Solution: Report the pattern — the same code path would ship a live key.

Related Skills

• @web-security-testing — broader OWASP Top 10 workflow; use for injection, auth, and access-control testing this skill does not cover.
• @dependency-management-deps-audit — pairs well for supply-chain/component risk once client exposure is triaged.