How do I install the Cyber Physical skill?

Run npx skillmds@latest add claude-dev-suite/cyber-physical in your terminal (requires Node.js), paste this page's agent-chat prompt into Claude, Cursor, or any MCP-connected agent, or download the SKILL.md file and copy it into your agent's skills directory.

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Which AI agents work with Cyber Physical?

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Is Cyber Physical free to use?

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Who published Cyber Physical?

claude-dev-suite (@claude-dev-suite) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Cyber Physical by claude-dev-suite — Agent Skill

Name: Cyber Physical
Rating: 4.2 (5 reviews)
Author: claude-dev-suite

Cyber Physical

Cyber-physical / industrial control system (ICS-SCADA) architecture in general: the Purdue model levels, control loops, IT/OT convergence, OT security (IEC 62443, segmentation, zero-trust for OT), safety, determinism, and redundancy. Architect-level, beyond any specific DCS/PLC product. USE WHEN: designing/evaluating industrial control, SCADA, robotics, energy, automotive, or IoT-at-scale systems, "OT security", "Purdue model", "PLC/RTU/ SCADA architecture", "IT/OT convergence", "IEC 62443", "control loop", safety instrumented systems. DO NOT USE FOR: specific DCS platforms / IEC 61131 / ISA formats (use the `industrial/*` skills); pure RTOS scheduling (use `embedded-rtos`); app security (use `security-architecture`).

claude-dev-suite Updated Sep 8, 2026 28 repo stars

File contents

Cyber-Physical / ICS-SCADA Architecture (general)

Generalizes the product-specific industrial/* skills (DCS, IEC 61131, ISA) into engine-agnostic control-system design. A cyber-physical system couples computation with physical processes through sensors and actuators in closed control loops, where a software fault can have physical consequences.

The Purdue reference model (segment by level)

L5/4  Enterprise / MES / ERP         (IT)
------------------- IT/OT boundary (DMZ) -------------------
L3    Operations / historians / engineering workstations
L2    SCADA / HMI / supervisory control
L1    Controllers: PLC / RTU / DCS
L0    Field devices: sensors, actuators, drives  (physical process)

Architecture is organized by these levels; the IT/OT boundary is the critical trust boundary to design and defend.

Defining constraints

Determinism & real-time: control loops have hard cycle times and deadlines (see embedded-rtos); jitter degrades control.
Safety: safety-instrumented systems (SIS) are separated from control; fail-safe/fail-operational design, redundancy (TMR), and standards like IEC 61508 / 61511.
Availability over confidentiality: unlike IT, OT prioritizes uptime and safety — you cannot just patch/reboot a running plant.

OT security (IT/OT convergence)

The air gap is largely a myth now — connectivity for analytics/remote ops is pervasive. Design for it.
IEC 62443 is the reference standard. Apply zone-and-conduit segmentation, an IT/OT DMZ, least-privilege, and increasingly zero-trust for OT (authenticate every cross-zone flow). Pairs with security-architecture.
Legacy devices have weak/no auth → compensate with network segmentation, monitoring, and protocol-aware firewalls rather than assuming endpoint security.

Guidance

Treat the IT/OT boundary as the primary trust boundary; segment by Purdue level; keep safety functions independent and redundant; design for determinism and availability first; and assume connectivity — secure it (IEC 62443) rather than relying on isolation.

---name: cyber-physicaldescription: Cyber-physical / industrial control system (ICS-SCADA) architecture in general: the Purdue model levels, control loops, IT/OT convergence, OT security (IEC 62443, segmentation, zero-trust for OT), safety, determinism, and redundancy. Architect-level, beyond any specific DCS/PLC product. USE WHEN: designing/evaluating industrial control, SCADA, robotics, energy, automotive, or IoT-at-scale systems, "OT security", "Purdue model", "PLC/RTU/ SCADA architecture", "IT/OT convergence", "IEC 62443", "control loop", safety instrumented systems. DO NOT USE FOR: specific DCS platforms / IEC 61131 / ISA formats (use the `industrial/*` skills); pure RTOS scheduling (use `embedded-rtos`); app security (use `security-architecture`).---# Cyber-Physical / ICS-SCADA Architecture (general)Generalizes the product-specific `industrial/*` skills (DCS, IEC 61131, ISA) intoengine-agnostic control-system design. A cyber-physical system couples**computation with physical processes** through sensors and actuators inclosed control loops, where a software fault can have physical consequences.## The Purdue reference model (segment by level)```L5/4 Enterprise / MES / ERP (IT)------------------- IT/OT boundary (DMZ) -------------------L3 Operations / historians / engineering workstationsL2 SCADA / HMI / supervisory controlL1 Controllers: PLC / RTU / DCSL0 Field devices: sensors, actuators, drives (physical process)```Architecture is organized by these levels; the **IT/OT boundary** is thecritical trust boundary to design and defend.## Defining constraints- **Determinism & real-time**: control loops have hard cycle times and deadlines (see `embedded-rtos`); jitter degrades control.- **Safety**: safety-instrumented systems (SIS) are separated from control; fail-safe/fail-operational design, redundancy (TMR), and standards like IEC 61508 / 61511.- **Availability over confidentiality**: unlike IT, OT prioritizes uptime and safety — you cannot just patch/reboot a running plant.## OT security (IT/OT convergence)- The **air gap is largely a myth** now — connectivity for analytics/remote ops is pervasive. Design for it.- **IEC 62443** is the reference standard. Apply **zone-and-conduit segmentation**, an IT/OT DMZ, least-privilege, and increasingly **zero-trust for OT** (authenticate every cross-zone flow). Pairs with `security-architecture`.- Legacy devices have weak/no auth → compensate with network segmentation, monitoring, and protocol-aware firewalls rather than assuming endpoint security.## GuidanceTreat the IT/OT boundary as the primary trust boundary; segment by Purdue level;keep safety functions independent and redundant; design for determinism andavailability first; and assume connectivity — secure it (IEC 62443) rather thanrelying on isolation.

Frequently asked questions