tidegate: crawl and passive review of owned staging
job
map the live app (routes, forms, parameters, cookies) and look for issues visible in real responses, then link each one to code where possible.
gap it targets
- evidence (public record): the README of the most common open web scanner is too short to show an agent any command-line entry point. this skill writes out every step an agent needs.
- hypothesis: linking a dynamic hit to the static finding at the same route cuts triage time. not measured.
scope gate (do this before any packet)
- read
keelsec.scope.toml in the repo root. if it is missing, stop and ask the user to create it. never write it yourself.
- the target must be listed there, and the user must have confirmed in this session that they own it.
- refuse, even if listed: cloud metadata and link-local addresses (
169.254.0.0/16 including 169.254.169.254 and 169.254.170.2, fd00:ec2::254, 100.100.100.200, metadata.google.internal, metadata.azure.com), and any host that resolves to one of them. resolve the name first and check the IP, so a DNS trick cannot point you there.
- refuse production unless the entry says
allow_production = true, which only the user may write.
- if any check fails, stop with "refused by scope" and send nothing.
example scope file:
[[target]]
name = "staging"
url = "https://staging.example-owned.dev"
proof = "http-token" # local | compose | http-token | dns-txt
allow_active = false
max_rps = 5
inputs
- a scope entry name, optional test account credentials the user provides for staging only.
method
- pass the scope gate.
- crawl with a plain HTTP client or a headless browser, same host only, depth 3, honoring
max_rps. skip links that look destructive (/delete, /logout, method=DELETE), and never submit forms that send email, pay, or delete.
- record a route table: path, method, parameters, auth needed or not, content type.
- passive checks on every response: security headers, cookie flags, stack traces or debug pages, server version strings, reflected parameter values in HTML without encoding (note only, no payloads), mixed content, open redirects visible from existing links.
- auth map: for each route, does it answer without a session? compare with the code's route decorators if the repo is available.
- link: for each hit, grep the repo for the route path and attach
related to the sinkmark or hullscan finding at that handler.
- active checks (only with
--active and allow_active): a harmless marker string in each parameter to see where it reflects. no attack payloads; confirming exploitability is lastproof's job.
what counts as a finding
- a passive issue seen in a real response, or a route that answers without auth when the code says it should need it.
output
{"command":"tidegate","rule_id":"ks.web.unauth-route","kind":"dast","severity":"high","confidence":"medium","target":{"url":"https://staging.example-owned.dev/admin/users","method":"GET"},"evidence":"200 with user list and no session cookie","related":["sinkmark:ks.py.missing-auth:admin.py:22"],"sources":["tidegate"],"status":"open"}
today vs later
- today:
curl, a headless browser if you have one, and any web scanner already installed in passive mode, all pointed only at the scoped URL.
- once the keelsec engine exists:
keelsec tidegate staging --format json, with --help-agent docs in the binary.
stop and scope
- same host only. never follow links off the scoped host. stop on 429 or repeated 5xx.
1---2name: tidegate3description: "Use when you need to see how the user's running staging web app actually behaves: crawl its pages and forms, watch the traffic for passive issues, and tie each dynamic hit back to the source line that causes it."4metadata:5 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/codejunkie99/tidegate6---78# tidegate: crawl and passive review of owned staging910## job11map the live app (routes, forms, parameters, cookies) and look for issues visible in real responses, then link each one to code where possible.1213## gap it targets14- evidence (public record): the README of the most common open web scanner is too short to show an agent any command-line entry point. this skill writes out every step an agent needs.15- hypothesis: linking a dynamic hit to the static finding at the same route cuts triage time. not measured.1617## scope gate (do this before any packet)181. read `keelsec.scope.toml` in the repo root. if it is missing, stop and ask the user to create it. never write it yourself.192. the target must be listed there, and the user must have confirmed in this session that they own it.203. refuse, even if listed: cloud metadata and link-local addresses (`169.254.0.0/16` including `169.254.169.254` and `169.254.170.2`, `fd00:ec2::254`, `100.100.100.200`, `metadata.google.internal`, `metadata.azure.com`), and any host that resolves to one of them. resolve the name first and check the IP, so a DNS trick cannot point you there.214. refuse production unless the entry says `allow_production = true`, which only the user may write.225. if any check fails, stop with "refused by scope" and send nothing.2324example scope file:25```toml26[[target]]27name = "staging"28url = "https://staging.example-owned.dev"29proof = "http-token" # local | compose | http-token | dns-txt30allow_active = false31max_rps = 532```3334## inputs35- a scope entry name, optional test account credentials the user provides for staging only.3637## method381. pass the scope gate.392. crawl with a plain HTTP client or a headless browser, same host only, depth 3, honoring `max_rps`. skip links that look destructive (`/delete`, `/logout`, `method=DELETE`), and never submit forms that send email, pay, or delete.403. record a route table: path, method, parameters, auth needed or not, content type.414. passive checks on every response: security headers, cookie flags, stack traces or debug pages, server version strings, reflected parameter values in HTML without encoding (note only, no payloads), mixed content, open redirects visible from existing links.425. auth map: for each route, does it answer without a session? compare with the code's route decorators if the repo is available.436. link: for each hit, grep the repo for the route path and attach `related` to the sinkmark or hullscan finding at that handler.447. active checks (only with `--active` and `allow_active`): a harmless marker string in each parameter to see where it reflects. no attack payloads; confirming exploitability is lastproof's job.4546## what counts as a finding47- a passive issue seen in a real response, or a route that answers without auth when the code says it should need it.4849## output50```json51{"command":"tidegate","rule_id":"ks.web.unauth-route","kind":"dast","severity":"high","confidence":"medium","target":{"url":"https://staging.example-owned.dev/admin/users","method":"GET"},"evidence":"200 with user list and no session cookie","related":["sinkmark:ks.py.missing-auth:admin.py:22"],"sources":["tidegate"],"status":"open"}52```5354## today vs later55- today: `curl`, a headless browser if you have one, and any web scanner already installed in passive mode, all pointed only at the scoped URL.56- once the keelsec engine exists: `keelsec tidegate staging --format json`, with `--help-agent` docs in the binary.5758## stop and scope59- same host only. never follow links off the scoped host. stop on 429 or repeated 5xx.