Cis Eks V180 4.1.10

4.1.10 Minimize access to the proxy sub-resource of nodes (Manual)

Profile Applicability

• Level 1

Description

Users with access to the Proxy sub-resource of Node objects automatically have permissions to use the kubelet API, which may allow for privilege escalation or bypass cluster security controls such as audit logs.

The kubelet provides an API which includes rights to execute commands in any container running on the node. Access to this API is covered by permissions to the main Kubernetes API via the node object. The proxy sub-resource specifically allows wide ranging access to the kubelet API.

Direct access to the kubelet API bypasses controls like audit logging (there is no audit log of kubelet API access) and admission control.

Rationale

The ability to use the proxy sub-resource of node objects opens up possibilities for privilege escalation and should be restricted, where possible.

Impact

Review the users who have access to the proxy sub-resource of node objects in the Kubernetes API.

Audit Procedure

Where possible, remove access to the proxy sub-resource of node objects.

kubectl get clusterroles -o json | jq -r '.items[] | select(.rules[]? | select(.resources[]? == "nodes/proxy")) | .metadata.name'

Remediation

Where possible, remove access to the proxy sub-resource of node objects.

Default Value

By default, the cluster-admin and system:node ClusterRoles have access to the proxy sub-resource of nodes.

References

1. https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/#access-to-proxy-subresource-of-nodes
2. https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/kubelet-authn-authz/#kubelet-authorization

CIS Controls

Profile Applicability

• Level 1