SR-4(2) Track and Trace
Enhancement of: SR-4
High-Level Description
Family: Supply Chain Risk Management (SR) Framework: NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5
Tracking the unique identification of systems and system components during development and transport activities provides a foundational identity structure for the establishment and maintenance of provenance. For example, system components may be labeled using serial numbers or tagged using radio-frequency identification tags. Labels and tags can help provide better visibility into the provenance of a system or system component. A system or system component may have more than one unique identifier. Identification methods are sufficient to support a forensic investigation after a supply chain compromise or event.
What to Check
- Verify SR-4(2) Track and Trace is documented in SSP
- Confirm control is operating effectively
- Review evidence of continuous monitoring for SR-4(2)
- Verify enhancement builds upon base control SR-4
How to Test
Step 1: Review Documentation
Examine the System Security Plan (SSP) and related artifacts for SR-4(2) implementation details. Verify the organization has documented how this control is satisfied.
Step 2: Validate Implementation
# For cloud environments, use cloud-audit-mcp tools
# For on-premises, review system configurations directly
# Example: Check if account management policies exist
grep -r "account.management\|access.control" /etc/security/ 2>/dev/null
Step 3: Test Operating Effectiveness
Verify the control is actively functioning, not just documented. Check logs, configurations, and operational evidence.
Tools
| Tool | Purpose | Usage |
|---|---|---|
| Manual Review | Documentation and interview-based | N/A |
Remediation Guide
Control Statement
Establish and maintain unique identification of the following systems and critical system components for tracking through the supply chain: [organization-defined].
Implementation Guidance
Tracking the unique identification of systems and system components during development and transport activities provides a foundational identity structure for the establishment and maintenance of provenance. For example, system components may be labeled using serial numbers or tagged using radio-frequency identification tags. Labels and tags can help provide better visibility into the provenance of a system or system component. A system or system component may have more than one unique identifier. Identification methods are sufficient to support a forensic investigation after a supply chain compromise or event.
Risk Assessment
| Finding | Severity | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| SR-4(2) Track and Trace not implemented | Medium | Supply Chain Risk Management |
| SR-4(2) partially implemented | Low | Incomplete Supply Chain Risk Management |
CWE Categories
| CWE ID | Title |
|---|---|
| N/A | No direct CWE mapping |
References
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 - SR-4(2)
- NIST SP 800-53A Rev 5 (Assessment Procedures)
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Full Catalog
Checklist
- Control documented in SSP
- Implementation evidence collected
- Operating effectiveness validated
- Continuous monitoring in place
- Related controls (IA-2, IA-8, PE-16, PL-2) reviewed