Global Agent Guardrails

Global Agent Guardrails

Block catastrophic shell commands before execution. One patterns file feeds a shared hook script or native adapter for each agent. This guards against accidents, not malicious agents (obfuscation like python -c "shutil.rmtree(...)" can slip past regex).

File map

~/.agents/hooks/dangerous-patterns.txt   # THE denylist: one POSIX-ERE regex per line, # comments
~/.agents/hooks/deny-dangerous.sh        # shared guard: hook JSON on stdin -> exit 2 blocks
~/.agents/hooks/test-guard.sh            # test suite: run after ANY pattern change
~/.config/opencode/plugins/command-guard.ts   # OpenCode adapter (throws to block)
~/.pi/agent/extensions/command-guard.ts       # Pi adapter (returns {block:true})
~/.hermes/plugins/command-guard/              # Hermes plugin (returns {"action":"block"})

Check installation

ls ~/.agents/hooks/deny-dangerous.sh ~/.agents/hooks/dangerous-patterns.txt
~/.agents/hooks/test-guard.sh   # must end "failed: 0"

If missing, rebuild from the wiring table (history: DeepAPI repo research docs).

Add or tune a pattern

1. Edit ~/.agents/hooks/dangerous-patterns.txt. Write POSIX ERE (grep -E). Use [[:space:]], never \\s — adapters auto-convert [:space:] to \\s for JS/Python and compile in multiline mode.
2. Add block and allow cases to test-guard.sh, then run it; all must pass.
3. Verify the new pattern compiles in the adapter engines:

python3 -c 'import re,pathlib; [re.compile(l.strip().replace("[:space:]",r"\\s"),re.M) for l in pathlib.Path.home().joinpath(".agents/hooks/dangerous-patterns.txt").read_text().splitlines() if l.strip() and not l.startswith("#")]; print("ok")'

4. Consumers re-read patterns for every command. Exception: Droid uses commandBlocklist in ~/.factory/settings.json — mirror changes there manually.

Block only catastrophic commands (irreversible data loss, disk wipes, repo deletion, token exfiltration). Recoverable local commands (git status, git clean -fdx, rm -rf node_modules) stay allowed; avoid over-blocking.

Password managers are forbidden (pattern group 10):

• Never use bw, bws, lpass, keepassxc-cli, rbw, or nordpass; pass with any argument at command position; or op with real subcommands. Bare op/pass stay unblocked because they are common words.
• Never dump the macOS keychain (security find-*-password, dump-keychain) or export GPG secret keys.
• Never touch vault data (~/.password-store) or password-manager .app bundles, or open or uninstall the apps.

Per-agent wiring (user-global)

Claude/Codex hook entry; for Devin, replace Bash with ^exec$. Merge into the existing hooks object; never overwrite it:

{"hooks": {"PreToolUse": [{"matcher": "Bash", "hooks": [{"type": "command", "command": "/ABSOLUTE/HOME/.agents/hooks/deny-dangerous.sh"}]}]}}

Cursor entry (payload has .command, so pass the cursor arg):

{"beforeShellExecution": [{"command": "/ABSOLUTE/HOME/.agents/hooks/deny-dangerous.sh cursor", "failClosed": false}]}

Use absolute paths in configs (~ expansion is inconsistent across agents).

Gotchas

• Codex trust is hash-pinned. Any edit to the hook ENTRY in hooks.json (not the patterns file) invalidates trust; run /hooks in Codex and re-trust, else Codex silently skips the guard. Trust hashes live in [hooks.state] in ~/.codex/config.toml and are shared by CLI, desktop app, and IDE extension. CI/scripts: --dangerously-bypass-hook-trust.
• Cursor failClosed must stay false. Cursor background/worker hosts cannot execute hook scripts; fail-closed blocks EVERY command there. Trade-off: Cursor background agents run unguarded.
• Hermes plugin manifest key is provides_hooks (not hooks). Plugin must be enabled: plugins.enabled list in ~/.hermes/config.yaml (the hermes plugins enable CLI prompts interactively and hangs non-interactive shells). Hermes hooks are fail-open on exceptions — keep the plugin trivial. Shell tool name is terminal.
• Pi tool_call handler errors block the tool (fail-safe) — adapter must catch its own errors and fail open, or a broken patterns file bricks every bash call.
• Droid semantics: commandDenylist = ask for confirmation; commandBlocklist = never runs, even at full autonomy with --skip-permissions-unsafe. Use blocklist for catastrophic entries.
• Guard script payload detection: command lives at .tool_input.command (Claude/Codex/Devin), .toolInput.command (Grok), .command (Cursor). Keep all three in the jq fallback chain.
• Adapter regexes require multiline mode. Keep JavaScript's m flag and Python's re.M so ^ matches each shell line like grep.
• False-positive class: a harmless command whose ARGUMENT text contains a dangerous-looking string (e.g. passing a prompt mentioning git push --force on a CLI) gets blocked. Workaround: put the text in a file and reference it.
• Not coverable natively (no hook system as of 2026-07): Gemini CLI, Qwen Code, Amp, kimi-cli. Codex cloud tasks and Cursor background agents also bypass the local guard.

E2E verification

Safe probe: ask the agent to run git push --force from a NON-git directory — blocked = guard works; "not a git repository" = guard failed but no harm done.

cd "$(mktemp -d)"
claude -p 'Run exactly: git push --force. Report the result in one line.' --permission-mode bypassPermissions
codex exec --skip-git-repo-check 'Run exactly: git push --force. Report the result in one line.' < /dev/null
droid exec --auto high -f prompt.txt        # prompt text in a file (see false-positive gotcha)
pi -p --no-session 'Run exactly: git push --force. Report the result in one line.'
hermes chat --query 'Run exactly this terminal command: git push --force. Report in one line.'

Direct script test:

echo '{"tool_input":{"command":"rm -rf /"}}' | ~/.agents/hooks/deny-dangerous.sh; echo "exit=$?"   # expect exit=2