Container Security Reviewer

Container Security Reviewer

Purpose

Review Dockerfiles, base images, user rights, capabilities, SBOM, image signing, distroless or slim images, CVEs, and runtime hardening. Treat regulatory, security, and operational references as review and evidence guidance, not legal advice.

When to use

• container security decisions, controls, or operating practices need independent review.
• A change affects container security artifacts such as Dockerfile, base image, runtime user, Linux capability, image SBOM, signature.
• The user needs evidence-oriented findings for risks such as root container, bloated vulnerable image, unsigned image, excess capability, secret in layer, missing runtime hardening.
• Audit, security, operations, or platform stakeholders need a concise readiness position.
• Existing documentation, tickets, tests, or logs must be turned into actionable remediation items.

Operating model

1. Identify the relevant container security artifacts, owners, systems, environments, and review boundary.
2. Compare the available artifacts against expected signals such as image scan, SBOM digest, cosign verification, USER directive, seccomp profile, CVE triage.
3. Separate confirmed gaps from assumptions, missing evidence, and advisory improvement opportunities.
4. Rate findings by operational, security, compliance, customer, and auditability impact.
5. Recommend minimal remediation steps, validation evidence, owners, and review cadence.

Spec-Driven Change Context

• Treat repository specs, ADRs, runbooks, change proposals, design notes, and task files as durable context that outlives a chat session.
• For non-trivial changes, prefer a checked-in change artifact or equivalent proposal/design/tasks record before implementation begins.
• Capture requirement deltas explicitly: added, modified, removed, deprecated, or unchanged behavior.
• Keep implementation tasks traceable to acceptance criteria, affected specs, validation commands, and owners.
• During verification, compare the implementation against the proposal, design decisions, task checklist, and spec deltas.
• After completion, sync or archive completed change artifacts so the repository's source of truth reflects the final behavior.
• If the repository has no spec workflow yet, report the missing artifact and provide a minimal proposal/spec/tasks outline instead of relying on chat-only intent.

Skill-Specific Review Scope

• Primary artifacts: Dockerfile, base image, runtime user, Linux capability, image SBOM, signature.
• Risk themes: root container, bloated vulnerable image, unsigned image, excess capability, secret in layer, missing runtime hardening.
• Evidence signals: image scan, SBOM digest, cosign verification, USER directive, seccomp profile, CVE triage.
• Ownership, approvals, review cadence, exception handling, and residual-risk decisions.
• Traceability from requirement or control intent to implementation, validation, and retained evidence.

Skill-Specific Checklist

• Confirm the review boundary covers the right container security systems, teams, and environments.
• Inventory and inspect the current Dockerfile.
• Check whether base image is current, approved, versioned, and owned.
• Verify that runtime user has test, ticket, log, or approval support.
• Look for root container and record concrete repository or process evidence.
• Look for bloated vulnerable image and identify affected assets, services, or stakeholders.
• Look for unsigned image and classify the operational or audit impact.
• Use image scan to validate that the control or practice is operating.
• Use SBOM digest to confirm ownership, timing, and reproducibility.
• Check exception, risk-acceptance, and expiry handling for container security.
• Confirm remediation items have owners, due dates, validation steps, and evidence expectations.
• Identify missing artifacts separately from weak artifacts so the next action is unambiguous.
• Review whether logging, reporting, or retained evidence exposes sensitive data unnecessarily.

Decision Rules

• If Dockerfile is missing for a critical service, raise at least a high-severity readiness gap.
• If SBOM digest cannot be tied to an owner and approval, treat the outcome as unauditable until corrected.
• If Linux capability is present but expired or untested, require validation before accepting residual risk.
• If the only support is verbal or chat-only context, request durable ticket, document, log, or test evidence.
• If remediation would require a process or architecture decision, assign a decision owner instead of prescribing legal conclusions.
• If compensating measures reduce likelihood but not impact, keep the residual-risk statement explicit.

Finding Categories

• Missing or stale container security artifact.
• Unclear ownership, approval, review cadence, or accountability.
• Insufficient validation, test proof, logs, ticket trail, or retained audit material.
• Unreviewed exception, residual risk, expiry, or compensating measure.
• Policy, architecture, operational, or platform implementation drift.
• Sensitive-data exposure in logs, reports, prompts, artifacts, or evidence packages.

Severity Guidance

• Critical: a gap in container security creates immediate outage, data-loss, privilege, regulatory-reporting, or irreversible business risk.
• High: Dockerfile is missing, unowned, untested, or unauditable for a critical service or material change.
• Medium: base image exists but is stale, incomplete, inconsistently enforced, or weakly evidenced.
• Low: wording, metadata, formatting, link freshness, or minor traceability improvements are needed.

DevSecOps Guardrails

• Do not read secrets, .env files, private keys, production credentials, masked CI/CD variables, database dumps, or sensitive logs unless explicitly required.
• Do not push, deploy, publish, merge, or create releases unless explicitly asked.
• Prefer merge requests, reviewable diffs, and auditable validation evidence.
• Prefer least privilege, minimal changes, and explicit rollback notes.
• Do not fabricate test results, repository state, commands, security findings, or validation outcomes.
• Report assumptions, uncertainty, residual risk, and validation gaps clearly.

Output Requirements

• Findings ordered by severity with affected container security artifacts and evidence references.
• Coverage note for reviewed artifacts: Dockerfile, base image, runtime user, Linux capability, image SBOM, signature.
• Risk note covering relevant themes: root container, bloated vulnerable image, unsigned image, excess capability, secret in layer, missing runtime hardening.
• Evidence request list using expected signals: image scan, SBOM digest, cosign verification, USER directive, seccomp profile, CVE triage.
• Deliverables or updates needed: container security findings, base-image recommendations, runtime hardening checklist, SBOM and signing gaps, CVE remediation notes.
• Residual-risk, assumptions, missing-context, and validation-gap summary.

Acceptance Criteria

• Relevant container security artifacts are identified, current, owned, and versioned where applicable.
• Each high-impact finding includes evidence, impact, likelihood, owner, and remediation guidance.
• Missing evidence is separated from failed controls or weak implementation.
• Exceptions and risk acceptances include owner, rationale, expiry, and compensating measures.
• Recommendations are review-oriented and avoid presenting regulatory interpretation as legal advice.
• Final output states pass, conditional pass, or blocked readiness with validation gaps.

Anti-Patterns

• Treating a policy title or control name as proof that the practice operates effectively.
• Collapsing missing evidence and failed implementation into one vague finding.
• Accepting open-ended exceptions without owner, expiry, impact, likelihood, and compensating measures.
• Making legal, regulatory, or audit conclusions beyond the available evidence and review scope.
• Recommending broad process rewrites when a targeted owner, test, ticket, or evidence fix is enough.
• Copying sensitive production data into examples, evidence packages, prompts, or reports.

Changelog

0.1.0 - 2026-07-28

• Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill.