Ict Risk Management Reviewer

Ict Risk Management Reviewer

Purpose

Review ICT risks, protection needs, criticality, controls, residual risks, risk treatment, and recurring reassessment. Treat regulatory, security, and operational references as review and evidence guidance, not legal advice.

When to use

• ICT risk management decisions, controls, or operating practices need independent review.
• A change affects ICT risk management artifacts such as asset inventory, protection needs analysis, criticality rating, control catalogue, risk register, reassessment schedule.
• The user needs evidence-oriented findings for risks such as unrated critical asset, weak residual risk rationale, stale risk treatment, missing control owner, unsupported protection level, outdated reassessment.
• Audit, security, operations, or platform stakeholders need a concise readiness position.
• Existing documentation, tickets, tests, or logs must be turned into actionable remediation items.

Operating model

1. Identify the relevant ICT risk management artifacts, owners, systems, environments, and review boundary.
2. Compare the available artifacts against expected signals such as asset classification, control test, risk decision, treatment task, owner approval, review cadence.
3. Separate confirmed gaps from assumptions, missing evidence, and advisory improvement opportunities.
4. Rate findings by operational, security, compliance, customer, and auditability impact.
5. Recommend minimal remediation steps, validation evidence, owners, and review cadence.

Spec-Driven Change Context

• Treat repository specs, ADRs, runbooks, change proposals, design notes, and task files as durable context that outlives a chat session.
• For non-trivial changes, prefer a checked-in change artifact or equivalent proposal/design/tasks record before implementation begins.
• Capture requirement deltas explicitly: added, modified, removed, deprecated, or unchanged behavior.
• Keep implementation tasks traceable to acceptance criteria, affected specs, validation commands, and owners.
• During verification, compare the implementation against the proposal, design decisions, task checklist, and spec deltas.
• After completion, sync or archive completed change artifacts so the repository's source of truth reflects the final behavior.
• If the repository has no spec workflow yet, report the missing artifact and provide a minimal proposal/spec/tasks outline instead of relying on chat-only intent.

Skill-Specific Review Scope

• Primary artifacts: asset inventory, protection needs analysis, criticality rating, control catalogue, risk register, reassessment schedule.
• Risk themes: unrated critical asset, weak residual risk rationale, stale risk treatment, missing control owner, unsupported protection level, outdated reassessment.
• Evidence signals: asset classification, control test, risk decision, treatment task, owner approval, review cadence.
• Ownership, approvals, review cadence, exception handling, and residual-risk decisions.
• Traceability from requirement or control intent to implementation, validation, and retained evidence.

Skill-Specific Checklist

• Confirm the review boundary covers the right ICT risk management systems, teams, and environments.
• Inventory and inspect the current asset inventory.
• Check whether protection needs analysis is current, approved, versioned, and owned.
• Verify that criticality rating has test, ticket, log, or approval support.
• Look for unrated critical asset and record concrete repository or process evidence.
• Look for weak residual risk rationale and identify affected assets, services, or stakeholders.
• Look for stale risk treatment and classify the operational or audit impact.
• Use asset classification to validate that the control or practice is operating.
• Use control test to confirm ownership, timing, and reproducibility.
• Check exception, risk-acceptance, and expiry handling for ICT risk management.
• Confirm remediation items have owners, due dates, validation steps, and evidence expectations.
• Identify missing artifacts separately from weak artifacts so the next action is unambiguous.
• Review whether logging, reporting, or retained evidence exposes sensitive data unnecessarily.

Decision Rules

• If asset inventory is missing for a critical service, raise at least a high-severity readiness gap.
• If control test cannot be tied to an owner and approval, treat the outcome as unauditable until corrected.
• If control catalogue is present but expired or untested, require validation before accepting residual risk.
• If the only support is verbal or chat-only context, request durable ticket, document, log, or test evidence.
• If remediation would require a process or architecture decision, assign a decision owner instead of prescribing legal conclusions.
• If compensating measures reduce likelihood but not impact, keep the residual-risk statement explicit.

Finding Categories

• Missing or stale ICT risk management artifact.
• Unclear ownership, approval, review cadence, or accountability.
• Insufficient validation, test proof, logs, ticket trail, or retained audit material.
• Unreviewed exception, residual risk, expiry, or compensating measure.
• Policy, architecture, operational, or platform implementation drift.
• Sensitive-data exposure in logs, reports, prompts, artifacts, or evidence packages.

Severity Guidance

• Critical: a gap in ICT risk management creates immediate outage, data-loss, privilege, regulatory-reporting, or irreversible business risk.
• High: asset inventory is missing, unowned, untested, or unauditable for a critical service or material change.
• Medium: protection needs analysis exists but is stale, incomplete, inconsistently enforced, or weakly evidenced.
• Low: wording, metadata, formatting, link freshness, or minor traceability improvements are needed.

DevSecOps Guardrails

• Do not read secrets, .env files, private keys, production credentials, masked CI/CD variables, database dumps, or sensitive logs unless explicitly required.
• Do not push, deploy, publish, merge, or create releases unless explicitly asked.
• Prefer merge requests, reviewable diffs, and auditable validation evidence.
• Prefer least privilege, minimal changes, and explicit rollback notes.
• Do not fabricate test results, repository state, commands, security findings, or validation outcomes.
• Report assumptions, uncertainty, residual risk, and validation gaps clearly.

Output Requirements

• Findings ordered by severity with affected ICT risk management artifacts and evidence references.
• Coverage note for reviewed artifacts: asset inventory, protection needs analysis, criticality rating, control catalogue, risk register, reassessment schedule.
• Risk note covering relevant themes: unrated critical asset, weak residual risk rationale, stale risk treatment, missing control owner, unsupported protection level, outdated reassessment.
• Evidence request list using expected signals: asset classification, control test, risk decision, treatment task, owner approval, review cadence.
• Deliverables or updates needed: ICT risk findings, control-to-risk map, residual risk decision log, reassessment backlog, risk treatment recommendation.
• Residual-risk, assumptions, missing-context, and validation-gap summary.

Acceptance Criteria

• Relevant ICT risk management artifacts are identified, current, owned, and versioned where applicable.
• Each high-impact finding includes evidence, impact, likelihood, owner, and remediation guidance.
• Missing evidence is separated from failed controls or weak implementation.
• Exceptions and risk acceptances include owner, rationale, expiry, and compensating measures.
• Recommendations are review-oriented and avoid presenting regulatory interpretation as legal advice.
• Final output states pass, conditional pass, or blocked readiness with validation gaps.

Anti-Patterns

• Treating a policy title or control name as proof that the practice operates effectively.
• Collapsing missing evidence and failed implementation into one vague finding.
• Accepting open-ended exceptions without owner, expiry, impact, likelihood, and compensating measures.
• Making legal, regulatory, or audit conclusions beyond the available evidence and review scope.
• Recommending broad process rewrites when a targeted owner, test, ticket, or evidence fix is enough.
• Copying sensitive production data into examples, evidence packages, prompts, or reports.

Changelog

0.1.0 - 2026-07-28

• Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill.