Gcloud

gcloud — Google Cloud CLI in agentbox

The google-cloud-sdk (gcloud, gsutil, bq) is provisioned in the nix image (flake.nix → basePackages), so gcloud is on $PATH in every shell. This skill covers using it correctly in this container's constraints and the canonical GCP deployment (the the target repository VPS behind IAP).

Environment constraints (read first)

• /home/devuser is READ-ONLY. Only ~/workspace and ~/.config are writable. gcloud's config/credential dir defaults to ~/.config/gcloud — writable, so gcloud auth login and gcloud config work with no override.
• Auth is INTERACTIVE and operator-run. An agent cannot complete gcloud auth login (it opens a browser/entered code). Ask the operator to run it in the session with the ! prefix:

  ! gcloud auth login
  ! gcloud config set project <PROJECT_ID>
  

  After that, the agent's own gcloud calls reuse the stored credentials.
• Prefer impersonation over downloaded keys. Do not create/handle JSON service-account key files. Use a deploy service account the operator can impersonate:

  gcloud <cmd> --impersonate-service-account="<sa>@<project>.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
  

  Verify access with:

  gcloud auth print-access-token --impersonate-service-account="<sa>@<project>…"
  

• Never commit credentials. ~/.config/gcloud, access tokens, and any key material stay out of git. Application-default creds and tokens are runtime-only.

The canonical deployment — the target repository

• Project: the target repository-503809 · Deploy SA (impersonate): the target repository-deployer@the target repository-503809.iam.gserviceaccount.com
• Identity connector: the app validates Google IAP (gcp-iap auth mode) — a signed X-Goog-IAP-JWT-Assertion verified against Google's fixed JWKS. The deployment puts the pod behind an IAP-gated external HTTPS load balancer.
• Full runbook: the the target repository repo's docs/runbooks/gcp-vps-deploy.md — 10 idempotent phases (VPC + Cloud NAT egress, IAP-range firewall 130.211.0.0/22 + 35.191.0.0/16, GCE e2-standard-2/4 with no external IP, Secret Manager for DB/cookie/model secrets, HTTPS LB + managed cert, IAP enable → derive the audience → feed CAMPAIGNBUILDER_AUTH_AUD, e2e verify, snapshot backups).
• Least-privilege grant to ask the project owner for (impersonation, not a key): roles/compute.admin, roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin + roles/iam.serviceAccountUser, roles/secretmanager.admin, roles/serviceusage.serviceUsageAdmin, and roles/iap.admin for the full IAP path — all at project scope, no projectIamAdmin.

Common operations

# Identity / project
gcloud auth list                                   # who am I
gcloud config get-value project
gcloud projects describe <PROJECT_ID> --format='value(projectNumber)'

# Enable APIs (idempotent)
gcloud services enable compute.googleapis.com iap.googleapis.com secretmanager.googleapis.com

# Compute Engine (check-before-create pattern — describe, then create)
gcloud compute instances describe <VM> --zone=<ZONE> --format='value(status)' \
  || gcloud compute instances create <VM> --zone=<ZONE> --machine-type=e2-standard-2 --no-address …

# Secret Manager (values via stdin — never a file on disk)
printf '%s' "$(openssl rand -base64 32)" | gcloud secrets create <name> --data-file=-
gcloud secrets versions access latest --secret=<name>

# IAP-brokered SSH (Google IAM, not host SSH) — this is authorised from agentbox
gcloud compute ssh <VM> --zone=<ZONE> --tunnel-through-iap --command '…'

# Derive the IAP audience for the app's gcp-iap auth mode
PN=$(gcloud projects describe <PROJECT_ID> --format='value(projectNumber)')
BID=$(gcloud compute backend-services describe <BACKEND> --global --format='value(id)')
echo "/projects/${PN}/global/backendServices/${BID}"   # → CAMPAIGNBUILDER_AUTH_AUD

Execution contract for agents

1. Check before create — every step is idempotent (describe then create).
2. Stop on failure — a half-built LB/firewall is worse than none; surface it.
3. Resolve values, don't guess — the IAP audience is derived from the backend service, never hard-coded.
4. Secrets never to disk or git — stdin into Secret Manager; tokens are runtime-only.
5. Surface interactive steps to the operator — gcloud auth login, OAuth consent, and the IAP brand are operator actions; provide the exact ! gcloud … line.

Notes

• Installed via flake.nix basePackages (pkgs.google-cloud-sdk) — persistent across rebuilds. (A prior userland bundle in ~/workspace/.tools predates this; the nix package supersedes it once rebuilt.)
• Not an MCP server — this is a CLI skill (progressive disclosure): the front-matter description is the discovery surface; this body is the on-demand detail.
• Related: the the target repository repo (the app + the runbook), and the pod's gcp-iap connector in control-plane/src/auth/verify.ts.