Agent Owasp Check

Agent OWASP Check

Audit an AI agent system against the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) Top 10. Use this when you need a focused agent-security workflow rather than a broad repository scorecard.

When to Use

• Reviewing a repository that exposes agent, MCP, or LLM execution paths
• Before deploying a new multi-agent workflow or tool-using assistant
• When onboarding a new MCP server, tool layer, or prompt orchestration pattern
• During a security review of an AI-powered product feature

When NOT to Use

Prerequisites

• The repository actually contains agent, MCP, or LLM behavior to inspect
• You can search source, config, and workflow files
• You know which runtime boundaries matter: prompts, tools, memory, logs, or external fetches

Workflow

1. Confirm the agent surface exists

git ls-files | Where-Object { $_ -match 'agent|llm|mcp|openai|anthropic|claude|langchain|gpt|gemini|codex|vertex|bedrock|ollama|litellm' }

If nothing relevant is present, stop and use a broader repository audit instead.

2. Check each ASI risk

ASI-01: Unbounded Resource Consumption

git --no-pager grep -n "maxTokens\|max_tokens\|timeout\|rate_limit\|maxRetries" -- "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" "*.json"

Pass: Agent runs have explicit limits for time, retries, tokens, or tool calls.
Fail: The agent can loop or consume resources without a clear bound.

ASI-02: Privilege Escalation

git --no-pager grep -n "allowedTools\|toolWhitelist\|allowlist\|permissions" -- "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" "*.json"

Pass: Tool access is scoped to the task or role.
Fail: The agent can invoke any available tool or cross trust boundaries freely.

ASI-02-B: Tool Usage Policy Enforcement

git --no-pager grep -n "rate_limit\|approval\|require_approval\|tool_policy\|ToolPolicy\|UsagePolicy\|justification" -- "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" "*.json" "*.yaml" "*.yml"

Pass: Tool calls have rate limits and high-risk tools require explicit approval or review gates.
Fail: Tools can be called indefinitely or without any approval boundary for sensitive operations.

ASI-03: Memory Injection

git --no-pager grep -n "UNTRUSTED\|sanitize\|escape\|external content" -- "*.md" "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py"

Pass: Untrusted external content is clearly isolated before it reaches prompts or memory.
Fail: Fetched or user-supplied content flows directly into agent instructions.

ASI-04: Tool Poisoning

git ls-files | Where-Object { $_ -match 'mcp|tool' }
git --no-pager grep -n "\"name\"\|toolName\|tool_name" -- "*.json" "*.ts" "*.js"
# Zero-width / Unicode obfuscation in tool descriptions
git --no-pager grep -Pn "[\x{200B}-\x{200F}\x{FEFF}\x{202A}-\x{202E}]" -- "*.json" "*.ts" "*.js"
# Hidden directives aimed at the model
git --no-pager grep -in "do not tell\|<important>\|dump.*env\|read.*\.ssh" -- "*.json" "*.ts" "*.js"
# Tool-description hash drift (rug-pull) — file-level package integrity → agent-supply-chain instead
if (-not (Test-Path ".mcp-hashes.json")) { Write-Warning "No .mcp-hashes.json baseline — rug-pull undetectable." }

Pass: Tool names intentional; descriptions free of hidden instructions and obfuscated text; hash baseline present.
Fail: Arbitrary names accepted, zero-width chars present, or .mcp-hashes.json baseline absent.

ASI-05: Prompt Injection

git --no-pager grep -n "system.*user\|template.*input\|prompt.*input" -- "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py"

Pass: User input stays separated from system-level instructions.
Fail: User content is concatenated into privileged prompt layers.

ASI-06: Data Exfiltration

git --no-pager grep -n "console\.log\|logger\|print" -- "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" | Select-String "token|secret|key|password"

Pass: Sensitive data is redacted or blocked before logging or agent output.
Fail: Secrets or raw tool results can leak through logs or responses.

ASI-07: Adversarial Input Resilience

git ls-files | Where-Object { $_ -match 'eval|test|prompt' }
git --no-pager grep -n "adversarial\|injection\|jailbreak" -- "*.md" "*.json" "*.yaml" "*.yml"

Pass: The project includes adversarial or injection-oriented eval coverage.
Fail: No evidence exists that hostile inputs are tested.

ASI-08: Cascading Failure

git --no-pager grep -n "circuit\|loop detect\|fallback\|retry" -- "*.md" "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py"

Pass: Sub-agent failures are isolated with fallback, breaker, or stop conditions.
Fail: One failing agent can take down the whole workflow unchecked.

ASI-09: Trust Boundary Violation

git --no-pager grep -n "trust\|verify_sender\|source_agent\|agent_id" -- "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" "*.md"

Pass: Cross-agent messages or delegated actions carry explicit trust assumptions, and remote identity or key discovery paths are verified before privileged actions run.
Fail: Peer agents can direct privileged actions without verification, or trust decisions depend on unauthenticated identity metadata.

ASI-10: Unmonitored Autonomy

git --no-pager grep -n "audit\|tool log\|event store\|activity log" -- "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" "*.md"

Pass: Tool calls and key agent actions are observable after the fact.
Fail: There is no durable record of what the agent did.

Compound-risk escalation

Treat the review as highest severity when the same workflow combines all three:

• access to sensitive or private data
• ingestion of untrusted content such as user text, fetched docs, or marketplace skills
• outbound communication or action capability such as network calls, tool execution, or write operations

This combination is sometimes called the "Lethal Trifecta." Even when individual controls look acceptable in isolation, require explicit trust boundaries, approval gates, and reviewable traces before deployment.

Additional high-signal pattern checks

Use these targeted checks when the repository has a richer agent stack than the top-level ASI pass captures on its own.

Cryptographic session identifiers

git --no-pager grep -n "session_id\|conversation_id\|request_id\|randomUUID\|uuid4\|token_hex\|crypto" -- "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" "*.go" "*.rs"

Pass: MCP sessions, agent sessions, and other cross-boundary identifiers use cryptographically strong random IDs rather than timestamps, counters, or guessable slugs.
Fail: Predictable session identifiers can be forged, enumerated, or replayed across trust boundaries.

Structured filter and JSON-path injection

git --no-pager grep -n "jsonpath\|json_path\|\\$\\.\|\\$\\[\|filter" -- "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" "*.sql"

Pass: Structured filters and JSON-path fragments are parameterized or safely constructed instead of string-concatenated from user input.
Fail: User-controlled filter fragments or JSON paths are interpolated directly into storage or query operations.

Promptware and stored-instruction injection

git --no-pager grep -n "delimiter\|threat_pattern\|promptware\|brainworm\|scan memory\|recalled memory\|tool output" -- "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" "*.md" "*.yaml" "*.yml"

Pass: Recalled memory, stored skills, or tool output are scanned, delimited, or downgraded before they can impersonate trusted instructions.
Fail: Stored or fetched content can enter privileged prompt layers without isolation or pattern checks.

Token cache isolation and secret redaction

git --no-pager grep -n "token cache\|cache.*token\|redact\|sanitize.*token\|SAS\|bearer" -- "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" "*.md" "*.yaml" "*.yml"

Pass: Auth tokens are isolated by provider, user, or session as appropriate, and sensitive credentials are redacted before logging or persistence.
Fail: Shared token caches, leaked SAS URLs, or raw bearer tokens can cross users, providers, or logs.

In-process sandbox escape resistance

git --no-pager grep -n "sandbox\|seccomp\|vm\|subprocess\|denylist\|blocked import\|stdlib" -- "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" "*.go" "*.rs" "*.md"

Pass: Sandboxed execution paths constrain imports, stdlib escape hatches, or subprocess access explicitly.
Fail: A supposedly sandboxed path can regain privileged file, network, or process access through unchecked runtime features.

MCP SSRF and endpoint exposure (static)

# Hardcoded internal targets in URL-fetch tools (static analysis — no live probing)
git --no-pager grep -n "169\.254\.169\.254\|metadata\.google\.internal\|localhost:6379\|localhost:22\|file:///etc" -- "*.json" "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" ".mcp.json"
# 0.0.0.0 binding or auth bypass in MCP server config
git --no-pager grep -in "0\.0\.0\.0\|\"auth\".*false\|no.?auth" -- ".mcp.json" "*.json" "*.yaml" "*.yml"

Pass: No internal/metadata addresses hardcoded; MCP server binds to localhost or an authenticated gateway.
Fail: AWS IMDS, GCP metadata, or internal service addresses present; or server exposed on 0.0.0.0 without auth.

Dynamic SSRF probing against a live server requires ownership — out of scope for this static audit.

mcp-scan (optional, if uvx is available)

# Automated static + runtime scan by Invariant Labs (https://github.com/invariantlabs-ai/mcp-scan)
# Pin a specific version — @latest violates agent-supply-chain guidance.
if (Get-Command uvx -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
    uvx "mcp-scan==0.1.14" .mcp.json --json  # verify current stable at invariantlabs-ai/mcp-scan
}
# Without uvx: rely on the static checks above.

AI/ML CWE Cross-Reference (CWE 4.20)

Use this table as a taxonomy cross-check alongside the ASI findings above:

Do not map "model poisoning" to CWE-1428 here. MITRE CWE 4.20 assigns CWE-1428 to reliance on HTTP instead of HTTPS, so keep that AI-specific label deferred until MITRE publishes a stable matching identifier.

3. Summarize findings

╔══════════════╦═══════╦══════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ Risk         ║ Score ║ Finding                                      ║
╠══════════════╬═══════╬══════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ ASI-01       ║  ?/10 ║                                              ║
║ ASI-02       ║  ?/10 ║                                              ║
║ ASI-03       ║  ?/10 ║                                              ║
║ ASI-04       ║  ?/10 ║                                              ║
║ ASI-05       ║  ?/10 ║                                              ║
║ ASI-06       ║  ?/10 ║                                              ║
║ ASI-07       ║  ?/10 ║                                              ║
║ ASI-08       ║  ?/10 ║                                              ║
║ ASI-09       ║  ?/10 ║                                              ║
║ ASI-10       ║  ?/10 ║                                              ║
╠══════════════╬═══════╬══════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ OVERALL      ║  ?/10 ║                                              ║
╚══════════════╩═══════╩══════════════════════════════════════════════╝

Block deployment if ASI-01, ASI-03, or ASI-05 lands at 3/10 or below.

Common Rationalizations

Red Flags

• Arbitrary tool execution with no allowlist
• Untrusted external content flows straight into prompts
• One workflow combines sensitive-data access, untrusted content, and outbound action capability
• No timeout, retry cap, or stop condition on agent runs
• No evidence of adversarial testing

Verification

• The repository actually exposes an agent or LLM surface
• Each relevant ASI risk was checked with repo-specific evidence
• Findings identify concrete files, configs, or workflow gaps
• Any critical ASI-01, ASI-03, or ASI-05 finding is called out as release-blocking

Tips

• Pair this with evaluate-repository when you need both a broad repo scorecard and a focused agent-security pass
• Pair this with eval-harness when ASI-07 needs adversarial test coverage rather than static inspection
• Use sub-agent-sandboxing patterns as concrete mitigations for ASI-08 findings
• Look for tool usage policies that enforce rate limits, approvals, and justification guards, not just allowlists
• Check whether session IDs and token caches are isolated strongly enough to survive hostile multi-agent or MCP conditions

See Also

• evaluate-repository — broad repository scorecard with an AI governance dimension
• security-scan — general codebase security review
• eval-harness — adversarial and regression eval design
• agent-governance — tool allowlists, approval gates, trust scoring, and audit trails
• sub-agent-sandboxing — loop detection and circuit breaker patterns