Clawd Zero Trust

clawd-zero-trust (v1.3.1)

Zero Trust hardening framework for OpenClaw. Built by Blocksoft.

⚠️ BREAKING (v1.3.0→v1.3.1): First apply after upgrade requires --force or run bash scripts/release-gate.sh --reset-hash to reset trusted baseline. Unattended/cron apply workflows must be updated.

Dependencies

The following binaries are required. Install with apt on Debian/Ubuntu:

Read-only modes (--verify, --audit-log, --status) do not require root. Mutating modes (--apply, --canary, --reset, --refresh) require root privileges.

Core Principles

1. NHI (Non-Human Identity): Sub-agents run as isolated sessions with scoped credentials. Never share 'main' identity for high-risk ops.
2. PLP (Principle of Least Privilege): Restrict default model toolset. Use tools.byProvider to limit small/untrusted models to coding profile.
3. Plan-First: Declare intent (what + why + expected outcome) before any write, exec, or network call.
4. Egress Control: Whitelist outbound traffic to authorized AI providers only. Preserve Tailscale + Telegram API.
5. Assumption of Breach: Design as if the attacker is already in. Verify every plugin, model, and extension.

Canonical Egress Script Path

Single source of truth:

/home/claw/.openclaw/workspace/skills/clawd-zero-trust/scripts/egress-filter.sh

Compatibility symlink:

/home/claw/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/egress_filter.sh -> .../skills/clawd-zero-trust/scripts/egress-filter.sh

Workflow: Audit → Harden → Egress → Verify

1) Audit

bash scripts/audit.sh

2) Harden

# Preview (default)
bash scripts/harden.sh

# Apply
bash scripts/harden.sh --apply

3) Egress Policy (dry-run default)

# Dry-run preview (default)
bash scripts/egress-filter.sh --dry-run

# Transactional apply: auto-rollback if Telegram/GitHub/Anthropic/OpenAI checks fail
bash scripts/egress-filter.sh --apply

# Canary mode: temporary apply + 120s periodic verification, then commit/rollback
bash scripts/egress-filter.sh --canary

# Verify critical endpoints only (Telegram, GitHub, Anthropic, OpenAI)
bash scripts/egress-filter.sh --verify

# Emergency rollback
bash scripts/egress-filter.sh --reset

4) Egress Profile Status (v1.3.0)

# Print current egress profile status (read-only, no root required)
bash scripts/egress-filter.sh --status

Displays: profile version, last applied timestamp, last result, provider count from providers.txt, and current UFW state. Read-only. No root required for core status output. UFW active state is best-effort — may show 'unknown' if sudo is unavailable on your system.

5) Egress Violation Audit Log (v1.3.0)

# View blocked outbound traffic from the last 24 hours
bash scripts/egress-filter.sh --audit-log

Parses /var/log/ufw.log and journalctl -k for [UFW BLOCK] entries with outbound markers (OUT=, DPT=). Aggregates by destination IP + port and prints a summary table with counts, first-seen, and last-seen timestamps. During --apply, a UFW LOG rule (ZT:egress-violation) is automatically inserted to capture future violations.

6) IP Snapshot Auto-Refresh (v1.3.0)

# Re-resolve DNS and apply only changed IPs (delta) to UFW
bash scripts/egress-filter.sh --refresh

Re-resolves all domains in config/providers.txt, diffs against the last-applied IP snapshot (.state/applied-ips.json), and applies only the delta rules. Transactional: backs up UFW rules before applying, verifies critical endpoints after, and rolls back on failure. The IP snapshot is saved automatically after every --apply and --canary.

7) Per-Provider Verification (v1.3.0)

# Protocol-aware verification of ALL providers in providers.txt
bash scripts/egress-filter.sh --verify-all

Detects the appropriate protocol from port number and runs the matching check:

• 443 → HTTPS curl (status code check)
• 587/465/25 → SMTP openssl s_client (STARTTLS/TLS)
• 993/143 → IMAP openssl s_client (TLS/STARTTLS)
• 41641 → UDP nc -zu (Tailscale WireGuard)
• 22 → TCP nc -z (SSH)
• other → TCP nc -z (generic fallback)

Each check runs with a hard timeout 5s wrapper (enforced at OS level, not just socket timeout). Automatically called after --apply and --canary. Available standalone for on-demand verification. Requires: curl, openssl, nc (netcat-openbsd).

8) Plugin Integrity Hashing (v1.3.0)

# Snapshot current plugin hashes
bash scripts/plugin-integrity.sh --snapshot

# Verify plugin integrity against stored hashes
bash scripts/plugin-integrity.sh --verify

# Check plugins against hardening.json allowlist
bash scripts/plugin-integrity.sh --drift

# Combine checks
bash scripts/plugin-integrity.sh --verify --drift

Monitors plugin file integrity via SHA-256 hashing of each plugin's JS entry point (dist/index.js → index.js → *.js fallback). Detects unauthorized modifications, new/removed plugins, and drift from the hardening.json allowlist.

9) Dynamic Whitelisting (MAX USER-FRIENDLY API)

To open a new port or add a service securely (e.g. for custom email, video extraction, new AI agents), DO NOT edit the bash script or hardcoded arrays. Always use the dynamic configuration helper command:

bash scripts/whitelist.sh <domain> <port>

(Example: bash whitelist.sh youtu.be 443). This automatically injects the domain cleanly into the config/providers.txt engine, triggers a transactional configuration flush, and instantly applies the changes to UFW.

10) Release Gate (v1.3.0)

bash scripts/release-gate.sh

Gate checks (must all pass):

• quick_validate.py on skill structure
• shellcheck on all shell scripts (fails with install hint if missing)
• package_skill.py packaging to skills/dist/clawd-zero-trust.skill
• --verify endpoint checks

Versioned Firewall Profile State

State files (in .state/):

On apply/canary, hash mismatch is refused unless --force is provided. The whitelist.sh helper intrinsically handles hash mismatches seamlessly.

References

• references/zero-trust-principles.md — Detailed ZT framework for AI agents
• references/false-positives.md — Verified safe patterns that trigger audit warnings

HARD REQUIREMENT: Self-Update Prevention

NEVER run openclaw update, openclaw upgrade, npm install -g openclaw, or npm update -g openclaw without explicit Founder approval.

These commands are blocked in denyCommands. On 2026-02-24, a self-update during an audit caused a 10,450+ crash-loop by deprecating a plugin. System stability > latest version. Always:

1. Present update details + changelog to Founder first
2. Backup config: cp openclaw.json openclaw.json.pre-update
3. Only update after explicit approval
4. Run openclaw doctor --fix + openclaw status after

MANDATORY: Update Proposal Format

When you detect that an OpenClaw update is available (via update-scout-daily or any other means), you MUST ALWAYS propose it in exactly this format — no exceptions:

📦 OpenClaw update available: vOLD → vNEW

To apply safely, SSH in and run:

openclaw update
/home/claw/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/post-update-repair.sh

The repair script restores all symlinks, cleans config, restarts the gateway, and runs a 6-point smoke test automatically. No other steps needed.

NEVER say "I will run the update for you" or attempt to run it yourself. The update MUST be executed by the Founder via SSH.