dvcrn guard-scanner
Scan AI agent skills for 35 categories of threats. Detect prompt injection, identity hijacking, memory poisoning, MCP tool poisoning, supply chain attacks, and 27 more threat classes that traditional security tools miss.
Quick Start
# Scan a skill directory
npx -y @guava-parity/guard-scanner ./my-skills/ --verbose
# Scan with identity protection
npx -y @guava-parity/guard-scanner ./skills/ --soul-lock --strict
Core Commands
Scan
guard-scanner scan <dir> # Scan directory
guard-scanner scan <dir> -v # Verbose output
guard-scanner scan <dir> --json # JSON output
guard-scanner scan <dir> --sarif # SARIF for CI/CD
guard-scanner scan <dir> --html # HTML report
Asset Audit
Audit public registries for credential exposure.
guard-scanner audit npm <username>
guard-scanner audit github <username>
guard-scanner audit clawhub <query>
guard-scanner audit all <username> --verbose
MCP Server
Start as MCP server for IDE integration.
guard-scanner serve
Editor config (Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Code, OpenClaw):
{
"mcpServers": {
"guard-scanner": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@guava-parity/guard-scanner", "serve"]
}
}
}
MCP tools: scan_skill, scan_text, check_tool_call, audit_assets, get_stats.
Watch Mode
Monitor skill directories in real-time during development.
guard-scanner watch ./skills/ --strict --soul-lock
VirusTotal Integration
Combine semantic detection with VirusTotal's 70+ antivirus engines. Optional — guard-scanner works fully without it.
export VT_API_KEY=your-key
guard-scanner scan ./skills/ --vt-scan
Runtime Guard
The validated OpenClaw surface is the compiled runtime plugin entry (dist/openclaw-plugin.mjs) discovered through package.json > openclaw.extensions and mounted on before_tool_call for OpenClaw v2026.3.8.
The before_tool_call hook provides 27 runtime checks across 5 defense layers:
| Layer | Focus |
|---|---|
| 1. Threat Detection | Reverse shell, curl|bash, SSRF |
| 2. Trust Defense | SOUL.md tampering, memory injection |
| 3. Safety Judge | Prompt injection in tool arguments |
| 4. Behavioral | No-research execution detection |
| 5. Trust Exploitation | Authority claims, creator bypass |
Modes: monitor (log only), enforce (block CRITICAL, default), strict (block HIGH+).
Key Flags
| Flag | Effect |
|---|---|
--verbose / -v |
Detailed findings with line numbers |
--strict |
Lower detection thresholds |
--soul-lock |
Enable identity protection patterns |
--vt-scan |
Add VirusTotal double-layered check |
--json / --sarif / --html |
Output format |
--fail-on-findings |
Exit 1 on findings (CI/CD) |
--check-deps |
Scan package.json dependencies |
--rules <file> |
Load custom rules JSON |
--plugin <file> |
Load plugin module |
Custom Rules
module.exports = {
name: 'my-plugin',
patterns: [
{ id: 'MY_01', cat: 'custom', regex: /dangerous_pattern/g, severity: 'HIGH', desc: 'Description', all: true }
]
};
guard-scanner ./skills/ --plugin ./my-plugin.js
CI/CD Integration
# .github/workflows/security.yml
- name: Scan AI skills
run: npx -y @guava-parity/guard-scanner ./skills/ --format sarif --fail-on-findings > report.sarif
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
with:
sarif_file: report.sarif
Threat Categories
35 categories covering OWASP LLM Top 10 + Agentic Security Top 10. See src/patterns.js for the full pattern database. Key categories:
- Prompt Injection — hidden instructions, invisible Unicode, homoglyphs
- Identity Hijacking ⚿ — persona swap, SOUL.md overwrites, memory wipe
- Memory Poisoning ⚿ — crafted conversation injection
- MCP Security — tool poisoning, SSRF, shadow servers
- A2A Contagion — agent-to-agent worm propagation
- Supply Chain V2 — typosquatting, slopsquatting, lifecycle scripts
- CVE Patterns — CVE-2026-2256, 25046, 25253, 25905, 27825
⚿ = Requires
--soul-lockflag