How do I install the Letsping skill?

Run npx skillmds@latest add dvcrn/letsping in your terminal (requires Node.js), paste this page's agent-chat prompt into Claude, Cursor, or any MCP-connected agent, or download the SKILL.md file and copy it into your agent's skills directory.

Is Letsping safe to use?

This skill has not completed SkillMD's automated safety review yet. Independent scanners report: SkillSpector: CAUTION, Skill Scanner: PASS. Capability flags: makes network calls. SkillMD never runs a skill's scripts for you; review the SKILL.md before installing.

Which AI agents work with Letsping?

This skill is tagged as working with Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex. SKILL.md is an open format, so most agents that read a skills directory can load it too.

Is Letsping free to use?

Yes. Installing skills from SkillMD is free, and the skill stays under its author's original license.

Who published Letsping?

dvcrn (@dvcrn) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Letsping by dvcrn — Agent Skill

Name: Letsping
Rating: 4.2 (5 reviews)
Author: dvcrn

File contents

Install (runtime)

This registry entry is instruction-only. The letsping_ask runtime is provided by the npm package @letsping/openclaw-skill. Use one of:

npm: npm install @letsping/openclaw-skill (then register the skill in your OpenClaw workspace so it loads letsping_ask).
Clone: git clone https://github.com/CordiaLabs/openclaw-skill ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/letsping && cd ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/letsping && npm install.

Set LETSPING_API_KEY (your LetsPing agent key, e.g. lp_live_...) in the skill's env. Obtain it at https://letsping.co/openclaw/pair or via LetsPing's Agent Credentials API. Treat this key as highly sensitive; use a dedicated agent key and revoke if compromised.

Usage

This skill provides the letsping_ask tool, a secure escalation point for high risk actions. The agent calls it, blocks until your approval/patch/reject via the LetsPing PWA, then resumes with the authorized payload only.

Critical: Use frontier models (e.g., Claude Opus, GPT-4o or better) to minimize prompt bypass risk. Smaller models are vulnerable to drift/injection.

Copy-paste this into your workspace TOOLS.md or AGENTS.md (or append to system prompt):

You have full autonomous authority for **SAFE** actions only: reading files/logs, web searches, viewing/analyzing data without side effects.

You **MUST** call `letsping_ask` **BEFORE** any **HIGH-RISK** action—and **NEVER** execute the action directly. High-risk includes:
- Financial: Any spending, transactions, bookings > $10
- Destructive: Deleting/overwriting files, DB rows, configs
- Social: Posting publicly, sending DMs/emails to new contacts, or group chats
- Infrastructure: Modifying DNS, env vars, deployments, infra APIs, or permissions

When escalating:
- Provide tool_name (exact tool, e.g., "system_run")
- args_json: Stringified JSON of the original arguments
- risk_reason: Clear, concise justification (e.g., "Potential file deletion")

After the call returns:
- If APPROVED: Use **ONLY** the `executed_payload` / authorized payload (patched if edited)
- If REJECTED or TIMEOUT: Abort the action, retry with safer plan, or ask user for guidance

Few-shot examples:
1. Safe (no call): browser_search(query: "current weather in NYC")
2. Risky deploy: letsping_ask(tool_name: "vercel_deploy", args_json: "{\"project\":\"my-app\",\"env\":\"production\",\"force\":true}", risk_reason: "Production deployment with force flag")
3. Risky delete: letsping_ask(tool_name: "system_run", args_json: "{\"cmd\":\"rm -rf /important/folder\"}", risk_reason: "Destructive file deletion")
4. Risky post: letsping_ask(tool_name: "discord_send", args_json: "{\"channel\":\"general\",\"message\":\"Accidental dump: ls ~\"}", risk_reason: "Potential data leak in public channel")

Test thoroughly in a sandbox session first: simulate high risk plans and verify escalation rate (~90-95% reliable on strong models/prompts). If the agent skips calls, add more examples or tighten language.

Troubleshooting:

Agent ignores rule? Strengthen with more few-shots or "ALWAYS escalate if any risk category matches."
Timeout/reject? Agent prompt should handle gracefully (e.g., "If rejected, propose alternative").

---name: letspingdescription: Human-in-the-loop approval for high-risk agent actions (sudo protocol). Agent must call letsping_ask before destructive/financial/social/infra changes.---### Install (runtime)This registry entry is **instruction-only**. The `letsping_ask` **runtime** is provided by the npm package **`@letsping/openclaw-skill`**. Use one of:- **npm:** `npm install @letsping/openclaw-skill` (then register the skill in your OpenClaw workspace so it loads `letsping_ask`).- **Clone:** `git clone https://github.com/CordiaLabs/openclaw-skill ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/letsping && cd ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/letsping && npm install`.Set **`LETSPING_API_KEY`** (your LetsPing agent key, e.g. `lp_live_...`) in the skill's env. Obtain it at https://letsping.co/openclaw/pair or via LetsPing's Agent Credentials API. Treat this key as **highly sensitive**; use a dedicated agent key and revoke if compromised.### UsageThis skill provides the `letsping_ask` tool, a secure escalation point for high risk actions. The agent calls it, blocks until your approval/patch/reject via the LetsPing PWA, then resumes with the **authorized payload only**.**Critical**: Use frontier models (e.g., Claude Opus, GPT-4o or better) to minimize prompt bypass risk. Smaller models are vulnerable to drift/injection.**Copy-paste this into your workspace TOOLS.md or AGENTS.md** (or append to system prompt):```textYou have full autonomous authority for **SAFE** actions only: reading files/logs, web searches, viewing/analyzing data without side effects.You **MUST** call `letsping_ask` **BEFORE** any **HIGH-RISK** action—and **NEVER** execute the action directly. High-risk includes:- Financial: Any spending, transactions, bookings > $10- Destructive: Deleting/overwriting files, DB rows, configs- Social: Posting publicly, sending DMs/emails to new contacts, or group chats- Infrastructure: Modifying DNS, env vars, deployments, infra APIs, or permissionsWhen escalating:- Provide tool_name (exact tool, e.g., "system_run")- args_json: Stringified JSON of the original arguments- risk_reason: Clear, concise justification (e.g., "Potential file deletion")After the call returns:- If APPROVED: Use **ONLY** the `executed_payload` / authorized payload (patched if edited)- If REJECTED or TIMEOUT: Abort the action, retry with safer plan, or ask user for guidanceFew-shot examples:1. Safe (no call): browser_search(query: "current weather in NYC")2. Risky deploy: letsping_ask(tool_name: "vercel_deploy", args_json: "{\"project\":\"my-app\",\"env\":\"production\",\"force\":true}", risk_reason: "Production deployment with force flag")3. Risky delete: letsping_ask(tool_name: "system_run", args_json: "{\"cmd\":\"rm -rf /important/folder\"}", risk_reason: "Destructive file deletion")4. Risky post: letsping_ask(tool_name: "discord_send", args_json: "{\"channel\":\"general\",\"message\":\"Accidental dump: ls ~\"}", risk_reason: "Potential data leak in public channel")```**Test thoroughly in a sandbox session first**: simulate high risk plans and verify escalation rate (~90-95% reliable on strong models/prompts). If the agent skips calls, add more examples or tighten language.**Troubleshooting:*** **Agent ignores rule?** Strengthen with more few-shots or "ALWAYS escalate if any risk category matches."* **Timeout/reject?** Agent prompt should handle gracefully (e.g., "If rejected, propose alternative").

Frequently asked questions

Letsping