Hunt Macos

Hunt: macOS

Assumes hunt-core for the scope gate, two-account rule, confirmation gate, enumeration limits, stop conditions, wiki protocol, FIND output, and Deadends. Do not re-derive any of that here.

Wiki

qmd_query "macOS TCC SIP Gatekeeper AMFI keychain XPC dylib injection sandbox escape code signing entitlements" via wiki-search MCP

Hub: [[macos-moc]] (live index). Primary page: [[macos-tcc]]. Payload arsenal: wiki/payloads/macos-app-injection.md. Anchors: [[macos-privesc]] (general privesc checklist), [[macos-keychain]] (credential/DB harvest).

Environment note

macOS boxes on THM/HTB are usually a VM (not real Apple hardware) - SIP/Gatekeeper/TCC still apply as shipped, but device-specific protections (Secure Enclave, T2) generally do not. Confirm root/admin vs a sandboxed app context before picking an escalation path - the sandbox-escape and TCC-bypass techniques below assume different starting points.

Attack surface signals

Detected via: SSH/service banner (Darwin, Mac OS X 10., macOS 1[1-5]), a .app bundle / .plist delivered as a foothold vector, Bonjour/mDNS (5353), ARD/screen-sharing (5900/3283), SMB served by smbd with a macOS-flavoured share layout, or a CTF prompt naming macOS/Darwin explicitly. Footholds: a delivered .pkg/.dmg/.app (installer/Gatekeeper abuse), a web app or service running as a low-priv user, physical/VNC/screen-sharing access to a logged-in session.

Rank the surface once you have a foothold:

• TCC / SIP / Gatekeeper / AMFI - the macOS-specific security stack; a bypass here is the signature finding of this class and the primary path to protected data or unsigned code exec.
• Keychain / credential loot - highest reward-per-effort; a login-keychain dump or a reused hash often beats grinding a hardened control (see chaining note).
• XPC / dylib / library injection - inherit a privileged or entitled process's rights; the main local-privesc lever once enumeration finds a vulnerable service or a hijackable load path.
• Sandbox escape - only relevant from a sandboxed app context; escapes to the full user context.
• MDM / installer abuse - a .pkg postinstall runs as root at install time; MDM enrollment reaches the whole fleet. Highest blast radius when either is present.

Methodology

1. Enumerate the foothold first - Skill(arsenal) then [[macos-enumeration]]: users, running processes/services (launchd agents/daemons), installed .app bundles, network map, SIP status (csrutil status), Gatekeeper status (spctl --status), TCC database location + entries.

csrutil status                          # SIP enabled/disabled - gates which privesc paths are live
spctl --status                          # Gatekeeper assessment on/off
sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db "select * from access"   # per-app TCC grants

2. Credential / secret loot - [[macos-keychain]] (login keychain dump, security CLI, keychain ACL bypass) then the wider sweep in [[macos-loot-locations]] (local password hashes under /var/db/dslocal/, browser/app credential stores, sensitive DBs) - crack recovered hashes with hashcat -m 7100 (salted SHA512-PBKDF2).
3. Evasion / bypass the OS security stack (pick per what's actually gating you):
   • [[macos-gatekeeper]] - quarantine-attribute stripping, unsigned/ad-hoc-signed app execution.
   • [[macos-code-signing]] - signature/entitlement inspection and abuse (codesign, ad-hoc re-signing).
   • [[macos-amfi]] - AppleMobileFileIntegrity internals underlying code-signing enforcement, and its bypasses.
   • [[macos-launch-constraints]] - trust-cache / launch-constraint evasion on newer macOS.
   • [[macos-dirty-nib]] - NIB-file injection into a signed app to gain its entitlements.
4. Privilege escalation / sandbox escape - [[macos-privesc]] (the general checklist: SUID, sudo, cron/launchd, writable app bundles) alongside:
   • [[macos-sandbox-escape]] - escape an app sandbox profile to the full user context.
   • [[macos-xpc-abuse]] - abuse a privileged XPC service's exposed Mach interface.
   • [[macos-function-hooking]] / [[macos-library-injection]] / [[macos-thread-injection]] / [[macos-app-injection]] (payload) - DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES/dylib hijack/thread-injection into a privileged or entitled process to inherit its rights.
   • [[macos-authorization-db]] - Authorization Services rights-database manipulation for a privesc.
   • [[macos-tcc]] - TCC bypass to reach protected data (contacts/photos/full-disk-access/camera) or ride a TCC-granted app's entitlement.
   • [[macos-installers-abuse]] - .pkg postinstall-script / .dmg abuse for root-run code at install time.
   • [[macos-chromium-injection]] - inject into a Chromium-based app (Electron/Chrome) via its debug/CEF surface for code exec in that app's context.
5. Persistence + lateral - [[macos-persistence]] (launch agents/daemons, login items, cron) and [[macos-mdm]] (enrolled-MDM abuse for fleet-wide reach, if the host is MDM-managed).

Chaining. Foothold -> keychain/credential loot -> privesc is the reliable macOS chain: a low-priv shell first dumps the login keychain and /var/db/dslocal/ hashes ([[macos-keychain]] / [[macos-loot-locations]]), a cracked or reused admin password then unlocks sudo/security and the privileged XPC/dylib paths in step 4. Loot before you grind a hardened control.

Evasion. Prefer the least-noisy path that clears the gate: strip the com.apple.quarantine xattr rather than fully re-sign, ride an already-TCC-granted app's entitlement rather than defeating TCC head-on, and load via a hijackable dylib search path before touching AMFI/launch-constraint internals. Escalate to heavier bypasses ([[macos-amfi]], [[macos-launch-constraints]]) only when the lighter path is actually blocked.

Distill a confirmed reusable macOS technique per hunt-core: python3 scripts/wiki-stage.py --kind technique --slug <slug> --target-page techniques/macos/macos-privesc.md.

Confirmation gate

NOT confirmation: a permissive entitlement (com.apple.security.*, a get-task-allow or a private-framework entitlement) present in a plist; an unsigned or ad-hoc-signed binary sitting on disk; a world-writable app bundle or launchd plist; csrutil/spctl reporting a control as present; a DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES that the loader ignored on a hardened process. A capability that exists is not a control that was bypassed.

IS confirmation: the control was actually defeated and demonstrated - TCC bypassed and the protected resource (contacts/photos/full-disk/camera) actually read; SIP-protected path written or csrutil-guarded action performed; Gatekeeper/AMFI/launch-constraint bypassed and your unsigned code ran past it; an injected dylib/thread executing inside the privileged/entitled process and exercising its rights; a .pkg postinstall or XPC call yielding a root-context action you performed - each re-verified in a clean session and reproduced from your own written steps.

Severity