Nightmare Arsenal (Windows LPE, CTF)
Reworked (hash-changed, cross-compiled) Windows LPE PoCs from Nightmare_Eclipse
(git.churchofmalware.org; upstream clones read-only at raw/git/). Binaries +
verdicts live in the PRIVATE repo github.com/Encod3d-Sec/Nightmare; build
recipes in its BUILD.md. Authorized CTF/lab targets ONLY.
Hub: [[privesc-exploit-arsenal]] (Windows table, nightmare row) ? routed from Skill(hunt-windows).
Wiki
Hub: [[exploit-dev-moc]] - Primary page: [[windows-privesc]] REFS: [[windows-privesc]]
Gate
- Confirm target authorization (scope.md for engagements; CTF box rules otherwise).
- These are LOCAL privilege escalations: you need an interactive session of a standard user. Admin one-shots (wmiexec/schtasks) can test Defender verdicts but CANNOT validate the LPE itself. RDP 3389 or console access required.
Triage: pick the PoC by target build
| PoC | Bug | Fire when | Caution |
|---|---|---|---|
| mini-plasma | CVE-2020-17103 cldflt placeholder hydration race | Any build per author; TURNKEY SYSTEM shell | Race: variable, record run counts. Needs .NET 4.8 + the 2 loose DLLs pushed together |
| red-sun | Defender cloud-tag rewrite-to-origin overwrite | Defender + cloud protection ON; overwrites System32\TieringEngineService.exe | Turnkey but disruptive (kills/replace a Defender-managed binary) |
| green-plasma | ctfmon BaseNamedObjects session-cache section | Win11/2022/2026 (author unsure re Win10) | Creates privileged section only; chain to SYSTEM is Phase 2 dev work |
| legacy-hive | User Profile Service arbitrary hive load | All builds supported at Jul 2026 patches | Needs creds of a 2nd standard user + a 3rd (admin) username |
| blue-hammer | Defender RPC MpUpdateEngineSignature path abuse | Defender-managed hosts | Author admits bugs; verify-first, treat as reference build |
Pick ONE, highest-fits-first: mini-plasma > red-sun > legacy-hive > green-plasma > blue-hammer.
Workflow
- Pull the arsenal (Kali): clone
git@github.com:Encod3d-Sec/Nightmare.gitinto the engagement working dir. Read the PoC's VERDICT.md: verdicts are PER-BUILD, a different target build means the binary is unproven, not bad. - Record the build:
cmd /c ver+ DisplayVersion (repo tools/nm.sh build). - Defender status: tools/nm.sh mpstatus. If cloud protection is OFF, red-sun is out.
- Throwaway standard user (admin): tools/nm.sh user HOST ADMIN PASS nmtest .
- Push binaries via tools/nm.sh push (lands C:\ProgramData).
- Run in the nmtest interactive session (RDP in as nmtest via xfreerdp if 3389 open). One named tmux window per action.
- Verdicts x2: 0 min and +10 min (tools/nm.sh threats) - cloud verdicts flip late. Full protocol: repo tools/TEST-PROTOCOL.md.
- Record: write VERDICT.md per the template, commit + push to the private repo. Binaries land in the repo WITH their verdicts; an untested build ships as verdict PENDING, never silently.
Failure handling
- PoC runs, no SYSTEM: race PoC -> retry up to 3, count runs, then move on (stop condition). Stripped PoC (green-plasma/legacy-hive) -> expected, they are Phase 2; fall back to the standard winpeas misconfig sweep (Skill(hunt-windows)).
- Defender flags it: note the threat name in VERDICT.md. Do NOT iterate obfuscation on the target; rebuild variants are Phase 2 work in the repo.
Boundaries
- NEVER run against out-of-scope or production hosts. PreToolUse scope guard applies.
- Repo is PRIVATE by design; never push it public, never embed binaries in the wiki.
- Wiki keeps technique notes only (no binaries); client specifics stay under targets//.
False Positives
- PoC runs clean but the box kernel is outside the PoC's tested range (verdict PROBABLY-NOT, not a failed run - record the kernel delta).
- PoC "succeeds" in a container sharing the host kernel (kernel patch level is the HOST's - verify against the target's own uname).
- Compile succeeds, exploit hangs on patchguard/EDR - that is a BLOCKED verdict with the observed tell, never a silent drop.