Google Workspace — auth + calling Gmail/Drive/Calendar/Sheets
This skill owns one layer: authenticating to and calling the four Google Workspace REST APIs from server-side code. Everything here is service-account / machine auth — if a real user must click "Allow", that is interactive OAuth and out of scope.
Where the neighbouring layers live:
| Not this skill | Goes to | This skill's slice |
|---|---|---|
| SMTP/provider choice, transactional/marketing sends | email-connector |
Gmail-the-API inside a Workspace mailbox |
| SPF/DKIM, inbox placement | email-deliverability |
— |
| Availability search, booking-link UX, timezone-as-a-feature | calendar-scheduling |
Raw Calendar event CRUD underneath |
| Sheet data modeling, formulas, pivots | spreadsheet-ops |
Sheets API read/write transport |
| Doc/PDF parsing, extraction, OCR | document-processing |
Drive as storage transport (upload/download/move/permissions) |
| Chaining several connectors into one flow | automation-flows |
The individual Google calls |
| Notion as the backend / generic REST wrapping | notion-connector, api-connector-builder |
— |
| Receiving Gmail/Drive push notifications | webhooks |
— |
Pick your auth mode
Choose first — it dictates scopes, the Admin-console step, and the client build.
| Situation | Mode | Why |
|---|---|---|
| App owns the data (its own Drive folder, its own calendar, a shared drive it was added to) | Service account, no delegation | The SA is its own identity; no need to act as a human. Simplest, no Admin step. |
Must act AS each Workspace user (send from ops@acme.com, read their inbox/calendar) |
Service account + domain-wide delegation + subject |
Gmail has no "shared mailbox via SA" — to touch a user's mail/calendar you impersonate them. Requires a Workspace admin to authorize the SA. |
| Code runs on GCP (Cloud Run, GKE, Functions) or CI with WIF | Keyless: Application Default Credentials / Workload Identity Federation | No long-lived key file to leak or rotate. The runtime mints short-lived tokens. Always prefer this when the platform supports it. |
Rule: never reach for domain-wide delegation if app-owned resources suffice. DWD lets the SA impersonate anyone in the org for the granted scopes — it is a large blast radius. Use it only when you genuinely must act as the user.
Setup checklist
Do these in order. references/auth-setup.md has the full Cloud + Admin
click-path, the scope catalog, DWD authorization, keyless WIF/ADC, and a longer
troubleshooting matrix.
- Enable the APIs you will call in the Cloud console (Gmail, Drive,
Calendar, Sheets) for the project. A disabled API returns
403regardless of scopes. - Create the service account in IAM & Admin → Service Accounts. For keyless you stop here and attach the SA to the runtime; for a key you create a JSON key (and treat it like a password — see Security).
- Decide scopes (next section) — the exact scope strings you will request.
- Authorize DWD only if impersonating. In the Admin console →
Security → Access and data control → API controls → Manage Domain Wide
Delegation, add the SA's client ID (the numeric
client_id, not the email) plus the exact comma-separated scope list. A scope requested in code but not authorized here is the #1 cause ofunauthorized_client.
Scopes: least privilege
Request the narrowest scope that does the job. Broad scopes also force a stricter Google verification review and widen what a leaked key can touch.
# Bad — full read/write to ALL of the user's Drive
https://www.googleapis.com/auth/drive
# Good — only files this app created or was explicitly shared
https://www.googleapis.com/auth/drive.file
| Task | Scope | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Send mail only | gmail.send |
Cannot read the inbox — ideal for notifications. |
| Read mail | gmail.readonly |
Read, no modify/delete. |
| Modify labels/state | gmail.modify |
Avoid full mail.google.com unless you truly need delete + settings. |
| App-created Drive files | drive.file |
Cannot see the user's other files — smallest footprint. |
| Read all Drive | drive.readonly |
Prefer over full drive. |
| Calendar events | calendar.events |
Narrower than full calendar. |
| Read/write Sheets | spreadsheets |
Use spreadsheets.readonly if you only read. |
Build the authed client
Node uses googleapis (latest 173.x, maintenance mode — bugs/security only) with
google-auth-library (10.6.2). Python uses google-auth +
google-api-python-client. The impersonation line is the subject / with_subject.
// Node — service account, optionally impersonating a Workspace user.
import { google } from 'googleapis';
const auth = new google.auth.JWT({
email: process.env.SA_CLIENT_EMAIL,
key: process.env.SA_PRIVATE_KEY.replace(/\\n/g, '\n'), // from secret mgr, never a file in the repo
scopes: ['https://www.googleapis.com/auth/gmail.send'],
subject: 'ops@acme.com', // omit this line for app-owned (no-delegation) mode
});
const gmail = google.gmail({ version: 'v1', auth });
// Node — keyless on GCP (Cloud Run / GKE / CI with WIF). No key in code at all.
import { google } from 'googleapis';
const auth = new google.auth.GoogleAuth({
scopes: ['https://www.googleapis.com/auth/spreadsheets.readonly'],
});
const sheets = google.sheets({ version: 'v4', auth });
# Python — service account from credentials, impersonating a user.
from google.oauth2 import service_account
from googleapiclient.discovery import build
SCOPES = ["https://www.googleapis.com/auth/gmail.send"]
creds = service_account.Credentials.from_service_account_info(
sa_info, scopes=SCOPES # sa_info loaded from secret mgr, not a tracked file
).with_subject("ops@acme.com") # drop .with_subject(...) for app-owned mode
gmail = build("gmail", "v1", credentials=creds, cache_discovery=False)
Per-API recipes (short)
Copy-paste-ready minimums. Longer recipes (raw MIME with attachments, resumable
uploads, batchUpdate, recurring/timezone-correct events) are in
references/api-recipes.md.
// Gmail: send. Body must be base64url-encoded RFC 822 (note -_ , no padding).
const raw = Buffer.from(
'To: a@acme.com\r\nSubject: Report\r\n\r\nHello.'
).toString('base64url');
await gmail.users.messages.send({ userId: 'me', requestBody: { raw } });
// Drive: create a file, then grant read to one person (least-privilege share).
const file = await drive.files.create({
requestBody: { name: 'report.pdf' },
media: { mimeType: 'application/pdf', body: stream },
fields: 'id', // partial response — ask only for what you use
});
await drive.permissions.create({
fileId: file.data.id,
requestBody: { role: 'reader', type: 'user', emailAddress: 'a@acme.com' },
});
# Calendar: insert an event (always send explicit IANA timeZone).
event = {
"summary": "Sync",
"start": {"dateTime": "2026-06-10T10:00:00", "timeZone": "Europe/Andorra"},
"end": {"dateTime": "2026-06-10T10:30:00", "timeZone": "Europe/Andorra"},
}
cal.events().insert(calendarId="primary", body=event).execute()
# Sheets: write a range. Use values.batchUpdate to write many ranges in one call.
sheets.spreadsheets().values().update(
spreadsheetId=SID, range="Sheet1!A2",
valueInputOption="USER_ENTERED",
body={"values": [["2026-06-02", 1290]]},
).execute()
Stay under quota
The per-user ceiling is the one that bites a cron looping over a mailbox.
- Gmail: 1.2M units/min per project, 6,000 units/min per user, 80M
units/day. Costs:
messages.send100,messages.get20,messages.list5,messages.modify5,drafts.create10. Hard cap 500 recipients/message. - Drive: 1M units/min per project, 325,000 units/min per user, 1 TB/day egress.
- Sheets: read and write each 300/min per project, 60/min per user; 429 on overage; 180s request timeout; keep payloads under ~2 MB.
- Policy shift: as of 2026-05-01 Google updated Workspace quota policy — projects active Nov 2025–Apr 2026 keep legacy quotas, new projects get the new model, and overage will start incurring Cloud billing charges later in 2026. Treat quota as a cost line, not a free ceiling.
Three habits keep you under it:
fieldspartial responses — ask only for the fields you read; smaller responses, lower cost, faster.- Batch — Sheets
values.batchUpdate, Gmail batch requests, Drive batch — one call instead of N cuts per-user request count directly. - Exponential backoff with jitter on
403 rateLimitExceededand429— retrying immediately just burns more quota.
# Backoff: min((2^n) + random_ms, max_backoff). Cap 32–64s. Jitter avoids
# thundering-herd retries syncing up.
import random, time
from googleapiclient.errors import HttpError
def with_backoff(call, max_retries=6, max_backoff=64):
for n in range(max_retries):
try:
return call()
except HttpError as e:
if e.resp.status not in (403, 429) or n == max_retries - 1:
raise
time.sleep(min((2 ** n) + random.random(), max_backoff))
Security rules
- Never commit the SA key JSON. It is a long-lived bearer credential — a
committed
service_account.jsonis game over. Add*.jsonSA patterns to.gitignore; theverify.shhere flags tracked keys. - Prefer keyless. A leaked key is the single most common Workspace credential compromise. On GCP/CI use ADC or Workload Identity Federation so there is no file to leak. If you must use a key, store it in a secret manager (env-injected, not a file beside the code) and rotate it.
- Least scope. A leaked
drive.filekey sees app files; a leaked fulldrivekey sees everything. The scope IS the blast radius. - Map the error before you change anything:
| Error | Likely cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
unauthorized_client |
SA client ID / scope not authorized for DWD | Add the client ID + exact scopes in Admin console Manage DWD |
403 insufficient permissions |
Scope too narrow, or API not enabled | Widen to the right scope (still least), enable the API |
403 rateLimitExceeded / 429 |
Per-user or per-project quota hit | Exponential backoff + jitter; batch; spread load |
400 failedPrecondition on impersonation |
subject set but DWD not configured |
Either remove subject (app-owned) or finish DWD setup |
invalid_grant |
Clock skew or stale/rotated key | Sync clock; re-issue the key |
Anti-patterns
| Anti-pattern | Why it breaks | Do instead |
|---|---|---|
Committing service_account.json to the repo |
Long-lived key in git history = full compromise; can't un-leak | Keyless ADC/WIF, or key in a secret manager + .gitignore |
Requesting auth/drive / mail.google.com "to be safe" |
Max blast radius, stricter Google review, more to leak | Narrowest scope: drive.file, gmail.send, spreadsheets.readonly |
Using DWD subject for app-owned data |
Impersonating users when the SA could own the resource — needless blast radius + an Admin dependency | Drop subject; let the SA own the folder/calendar/shared drive |
Looping messages.send/values.update per row with no backoff |
Trips the 6k/min (Gmail) or 60/min (Sheets) per-user cap → 429 storm | Batch (values.batchUpdate) + exponential backoff with jitter |
Reading whole resources without fields |
Bigger payloads, higher quota cost, slower | Request only the fields you use (fields: 'id') |
| Hardcoding the private key inline in source | Can't rotate, leaks via logs/screenshots/history | Inject from env/secret manager; \n-unescape at load |
Pasting raw text into Gmail raw |
API needs base64url RFC 822, not plain text → 400 | Build a MIME message, base64url-encode it |
Before this connector ships, run the secret-handling and key-rotation pass in
../secure-coding/SKILL.md.