Sc Cors

SC: CORS Misconfiguration

Purpose

Detects Cross-Origin Resource Sharing misconfigurations that allow unauthorized cross-origin access to sensitive APIs. Covers wildcard origins with credentials, reflected origin without validation, null origin allowance, overly permissive regex matching, and subdomain matching bypasses.

Activation

Called by sc-orchestrator during Phase 2 when HTTP APIs are detected.

Phase 1: Discovery

Keyword Patterns to Search

"Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "cors(", "CORS(",
"allowOrigin", "allow_origin", "AllowOrigin",
"Access-Control-Allow-Credentials",
"corsOptions", "cors_allowed_origins"

Vulnerability Patterns

1. Wildcard with Credentials:

// VULNERABLE: Wildcard + credentials (browsers block this but misconfiguration indicates intent)
app.use(cors({
  origin: '*',
  credentials: true  // This combination is a security anti-pattern
}));

2. Reflected Origin:

// VULNERABLE: Reflects any origin
app.use((req, res, next) => {
  res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', req.headers.origin);
  res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials', 'true');
  next();
});

// SAFE: Allowlist
const ALLOWED_ORIGINS = ['https://app.example.com', 'https://admin.example.com'];
app.use(cors({
  origin: (origin, callback) => {
    if (!origin || ALLOWED_ORIGINS.includes(origin)) {
      callback(null, true);
    } else {
      callback(new Error('CORS not allowed'));
    }
  },
  credentials: true
}));

3. Null Origin Allowed:

# VULNERABLE: Allows null origin (exploitable via sandboxed iframe)
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS = ['null']  # Attackers can send Origin: null

4. Regex Bypass:

// VULNERABLE: Weak regex allows subdomain takeover attack
origin: /\.example\.com$/  // Matches evil-example.com too!

// SAFE: Anchor regex properly
origin: /^https:\/\/([a-z]+\.)?example\.com$/

Severity Classification

• Critical: Reflected origin + credentials on endpoints with sensitive data
• High: Null origin allowed + credentials, regex bypass allowing attacker domains
• Medium: Wildcard origin on non-credential endpoints with sensitive data
• Low: Overly permissive CORS on public data endpoints

Output Format

Finding: CORS-{NNN}

• Title: CORS Misconfiguration — {type}
• Severity: Critical | High | Medium | Low
• Confidence: 0-100
• File: file/path:line
• Vulnerability Type: CWE-942 (Permissive Cross-domain Policy)
• Description: {CORS configuration allows unauthorized cross-origin access.}
• Impact: Cross-origin data theft, account takeover via CSRF-like attacks.
• Remediation: Implement strict origin allowlist. Never reflect origin without validation.
• References: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/942.html

Common False Positives

1. Public APIs — APIs serving public data may intentionally use *
2. CDN/static assets — CORS * on static files is standard practice
3. Development configuration — localhost origins in dev config
4. API gateways — CORS may be configured at the gateway level, not application level