Sc Open Redirect

SC: Open Redirect

Purpose

Detects open redirect vulnerabilities where user-controlled input determines the destination of HTTP redirects, enabling phishing attacks, OAuth token theft, and SSRF chaining. Covers URL parameter redirects, protocol-relative URL bypasses, backslash tricks, and JavaScript/data URI schemes.

Activation

Called by sc-orchestrator during Phase 2 when redirect functionality is detected.

Phase 1: Discovery

Keyword Patterns to Search

"redirect(", "res.redirect(", "response.sendRedirect(",
"http.Redirect(", "redirect_to(", "RedirectToAction(",
"Location:", "window.location", "document.location",
"return_url", "redirect_url", "next=", "callback=", "url=", "goto="

Vulnerability Pattern

// VULNERABLE: Unvalidated redirect
app.get('/redirect', (req, res) => {
  res.redirect(req.query.url);  // url=https://evil.com
});

// SAFE: Allowlist validation
const ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['example.com', 'app.example.com'];
app.get('/redirect', (req, res) => {
  const url = new URL(req.query.url, 'https://example.com');
  if (!ALLOWED_HOSTS.includes(url.hostname)) {
    return res.status(400).send('Invalid redirect');
  }
  res.redirect(url.toString());
});

Bypass Techniques to Check

• Protocol-relative: //evil.com
• Backslash: \/evil.com or \evil.com
• URL encoding: %2f%2fevil.com
• Data URI: data:text/html,<script>...
• JavaScript URI: javascript:alert(1)
• @ in URL: https://example.com@evil.com

Severity Classification

• Critical: Open redirect in OAuth callback enabling token theft
• High: Open redirect on login/auth pages enabling credential phishing
• Medium: Open redirect on general pages, or redirect with URL visible to user
• Low: Open redirect requiring authentication, or in non-sensitive flows

Output Format

Finding: REDIR-{NNN}

• Title: Open Redirect in {endpoint}
• Severity: Critical | High | Medium | Low
• Confidence: 0-100
• File: file/path:line
• Vulnerability Type: CWE-601 (Open Redirect)
• Description: Redirect destination from {parameter} is not validated against an allowlist.
• Impact: Phishing, OAuth token theft, reputation damage, SSRF chaining.
• Remediation: Validate redirect URL against domain allowlist. Use relative paths only.
• References: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/601.html

Common False Positives

1. Relative redirects — /dashboard or ./profile cannot redirect to external domains
2. Hardcoded redirect URLs — redirect to constant URLs
3. Framework-safe redirects — some frameworks validate redirect URLs by default