Sc Xss

SC: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Purpose

Detects Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities across three categories: Reflected XSS (input reflected in response), Stored XSS (input persisted and rendered to other users), and DOM-based XSS (client-side JavaScript manipulation). Covers all major frontend frameworks and template engines, identifying cases where auto-escaping is bypassed.

Activation

Called by sc-orchestrator during Phase 2. Runs against all web applications and APIs returning HTML.

Phase 1: Discovery

File Patterns to Search

**/*.html, **/*.htm, **/*.ejs, **/*.hbs, **/*.pug, **/*.jade,
**/*.tsx, **/*.jsx, **/*.vue, **/*.svelte, **/*.php, **/*.blade.php,
**/*.erb, **/*.haml, **/*.jinja2, **/*.twig, **/*.cshtml, **/*.razor,
**/*.thymeleaf, **/*.ftl, **/templates/*, **/views/*,
**/*.ts, **/*.js (for DOM-based XSS)

Keyword Patterns to Search

# DOM-based XSS sinks
"innerHTML", "outerHTML", "document.write(", "document.writeln(",
"insertAdjacentHTML", ".html(", "$.html(",
"eval(", "setTimeout(.*,.*string", "setInterval(.*,.*string",
"location.href =", "location.assign(", "location.replace(",
"window.open(", "document.cookie"

# Framework-specific unsafe rendering
"dangerouslySetInnerHTML"                    # React
"v-html"                                     # Vue
"[innerHTML]", "bypassSecurityTrust"         # Angular
"{@html"                                     # Svelte
"{!! !!}"                                    # Laravel Blade (unescaped)
"| safe", "{% autoescape off %}", "mark_safe"  # Django/Jinja2
"<%= %>"                                     # ERB (unescaped)
"Html.Raw("                                  # ASP.NET Razor
"th:utext"                                   # Thymeleaf (unescaped)

# Server-side reflected output
"res.send(", "res.write(", "response.write("
"echo ", "print ", "Response.Write("

Data Flow Tracing

Sources (user input reaching client):

• URL parameters → reflected in HTML response
• Form data → stored in database → rendered in views
• document.location, document.URL, document.referrer (DOM sources)
• window.name, postMessage data
• URL hash (location.hash)

Sinks (unsafe rendering):

• innerHTML, outerHTML, document.write()
• dangerouslySetInnerHTML (React)
• v-html (Vue), [innerHTML] (Angular)
• Template engine unescaped output
• eval(), setTimeout(string), Function()

Phase 2: Verification

Sanitization Check

1. Is output HTML-encoded before rendering? (<, >, &, ")
2. Is a sanitization library used? (DOMPurify, bleach, HtmlSanitizer)
3. Is Content-Security-Policy header set to block inline scripts?
4. Is the framework's auto-escaping mechanism active?

Framework Auto-Escaping

• React JSX: Auto-escapes by default. Only dangerouslySetInnerHTML is unsafe.
• Vue: {{ }} auto-escapes. v-html is unsafe.
• Angular: Auto-sanitizes by default. bypassSecurityTrustHtml() is unsafe.
• Django: {{ }} auto-escapes. {{ var|safe }}, {% autoescape off %}, mark_safe() are unsafe.
• Laravel Blade: {{ }} auto-escapes. {!! !!} is unsafe.
• Jinja2: Auto-escapes when configured. {{ var|safe }} is unsafe.
• Go html/template: Auto-escapes. text/template does NOT auto-escape.
• Thymeleaf: th:text escapes. th:utext is unsafe.
• Razor: @Html.Encode() escapes. @Html.Raw() is unsafe.

Reflected XSS Example

// VULNERABLE: Express reflecting input without encoding
app.get('/search', (req, res) => {
  res.send(`<h1>Results for: ${req.query.q}</h1>`);
});

// SAFE: Using a template engine with auto-escaping
app.get('/search', (req, res) => {
  res.render('search', { query: req.query.q }); // Template auto-escapes
});

DOM-based XSS Example

// VULNERABLE: Using innerHTML with URL parameter
const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
document.getElementById('output').innerHTML = params.get('name');

// SAFE: Using textContent instead
document.getElementById('output').textContent = params.get('name');

Stored XSS Example

# VULNERABLE: Rendering user-supplied HTML from database
@app.route('/profile/<user_id>')
def profile(user_id):
    user = User.query.get(user_id)
    return render_template('profile.html', bio=Markup(user.bio))  # mark_safe!

# SAFE: Let template auto-escape
@app.route('/profile/<user_id>')
def profile(user_id):
    user = User.query.get(user_id)
    return render_template('profile.html', bio=user.bio)  # Auto-escaped

Severity Classification

• Critical: Stored XSS that executes for all users visiting a page, or XSS in authentication flows
• High: Reflected XSS with no CSP, or DOM-based XSS via commonly-used URL parameters
• Medium: Reflected XSS mitigated by CSP but still exploitable, or XSS in less-visited areas
• Low: Self-XSS (user can only attack themselves), or XSS with strong CSP blocking execution

Output Format

Finding: XSS-{NNN}

• Title: {Reflected|Stored|DOM-based} XSS in {location}
• Severity: Critical | High | Medium | Low
• Confidence: 0-100
• File: file/path:line
• Vulnerability Type: CWE-79 (Cross-site Scripting)
• Description: User input from {source} is rendered without encoding via {sink}.
• Proof of Concept: Injecting <img src=x> as the {parameter} would execute JavaScript in the victim's browser.
• Impact: Session hijacking, cookie theft, keylogging, phishing, defacement, malware distribution.
• Remediation: {Use framework auto-escaping / Apply DOMPurify / Set CSP header}
• References: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html, https://owasp.org/Top10/A03_2021-Injection/