Bb Methodology

Reverse-engineer developer psychology:

• Feature A has auth checks -> Similar feature B (newly added) probably doesn't
• Complex flows (coupon + points + refund) -> Edge cases have bugs
• /api/v2/user exists -> Does /api/v1/user still work with weaker auth?

What-If experiments:

• Skip checkout -> hit /checkout/success directly
• Skip 2FA -> navigate to /dashboard
• Send coupon request 10x simultaneously -> Race condition?
• Replace guid=f8a2... with id=100 on sibling endpoint -> IDOR?

2. Multi-Perspective (multiple angles)

3. Tactical Thinking (pattern detection)

• Naming anomaly: userId everywhere but suddenly user_id -> different dev, weaker security
• Error diff: Same 403 but different JSON structure -> different backend systems
• Environment diff: Prod vs Dev/Staging -> debug headers, CSP disabled
• Version diff: JS file before/after update -> new endpoints, removed params
• Supply chain: Check framework/library versions for known CVEs
• Third-party integration: Stripe/Auth0/Intercom -> webhook signature missing?

4. Strategic Thinking (big picture)

• Asymmetry: Defender must patch ALL holes. You only need ONE.
• Intuition engineering: Log why something "feels wrong." Verify later. Update mental DB.
• Unknown management: Can't understand something? Add to "investigate later" list. Just-in-Time Learning.

Amateur vs Pro: 7-Phase Comparison

Two Approach Routes

• Route A (Feature-based): "This feature is complex" -> deep-dive its input handling -> find vuln
• Route B (Vuln-based): "I want IDOR" -> find endpoints with sequential IDs -> test access control

Anti-Patterns (Stop Doing These)

• Program hopping: Stick with one target minimum 2 weeks / 30 hours
• Tool-only hunting: Automation finds duplicates. Manual testing finds unique bugs.
• Rabbit hole: Max 45 min per parameter. Set a timer. If stuck, sleep on it.
• No goal: "Just looking around" = wasted time. Always Define first.

PART 2: WORKFLOW (What to Do)

The 5-Phase Non-Linear Flow

+-------------------------------------------------+
|                                                 |
|  +----------+    +----------+    +----------+   |
|  | 1. RECON |---+| 2. MAP   |---+| 3. FIND  |  |
|  +----------+    +-----+----+    +-----+-----+  |
|       ^                |               |         |
|       |                v               v         |
|       |          +----------+    +----------+    |
|       +----------| 4. PROVE |---+| 5. REPORT|   |
|                  +----------+    +----------+    |
|                                                  |
|  Non-linear: stuck at any phase -> go back       |
|  New API found at phase 3 -> return to phase 2   |
|  WAF blocks at phase 4 -> origin IP from phase 1 |
+-------------------------------------------------+

THIS IS NOT LINEAR. Move freely between phases. When stuck, return to a previous phase.

Phase 0: SESSION START (Every Time)

Before touching any tool, answer these:

1. Define: "Today I target [feature/domain] to achieve [C/I/A/ATO/RCE]"
2. Select: Choose 1-2 vuln classes (IDOR, XSS, SSRF, etc.)
3. Execute: Focus ONLY on selected techniques

Route selection -- Wide or Deep?

Phase 1: RECON

Goal: Maximize attack surface. Find what others missed.

Wide approach (initial sweep):

Subdomain enum -> DNS resolution -> HTTP probing -> Port scan -> Tech detect

Deep approach (targeted):

Google Dorks -> JS file download -> Hidden param discovery -> API mapping

Command: /recon target.com

Phase 2: MAPPING & ANALYSIS

Goal: Understand the app like its developer does.

Checklist:

• Map all endpoints (Burp/Caido sitemap + JS analysis)
• Identify auth model (cookie, JWT, OAuth, SAML?)
• Find business-critical flows (payment, registration, password reset, data export)
• Download and analyze JS files for hidden routes, secrets, logic
• Identify roles and permissions (user, admin, API keys)
• Note "weird" behaviors (anomalies in naming, errors, timing)

Phase 3: VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY

Goal: Find the bug. Use Error-based first, then Blind-based.

Decision flow based on what you're testing:

What input are you testing?
+-- ID parameter (user_id, order_id)
|   -> IDOR checklist
+-- Search/filter/sort field
|   -> SQLi, NoSQLi probing
+-- URL input / webhook / PDF gen
|   -> SSRF checklist
+-- Text field reflected in page
|   -> XSS (DOM or reflected)
+-- File upload
|   -> SVG XSS, web shell, path traversal
+-- Price/quantity/coupon
|   -> Business logic, race conditions
+-- Login / 2FA / password reset
|   -> Auth bypass
+-- Profile update API
|   -> Mass Assignment
+-- Template / wiki editor
|   -> SSTI
+-- Nothing obvious
    -> Fuzz with ffuf, try Error-based probing

Error vs Blind decision:

1. Try Error-based first (send ', ", {{7*7}}, ${7*7}) -- watch for 500 errors, stack traces
2. No error? Time-based (SLEEP(10), ; sleep 10;) -- watch response time
3. No time diff? OOB (curl attacker.com, interactsh) -- watch for DNS callback
4. Still nothing? Boolean (AND 1=1 vs AND 1=0) -- watch content-length diff

Phase 4: PROVE & ESCALATE

Goal: Prove maximum business impact. Turn Low into Critical.

Escalation decision:

What did you find?
+-- XSS
|   +-- Can steal cookie/token? -> Session hijack -> ATO
|   +-- Cookie is HttpOnly? -> Force email change via XHR -> ATO
|   +-- Self-XSS only? -> Find CSRF to trigger it
+-- IDOR
|   +-- Can read PII? -> Automate scraping, show scale
|   +-- Can change password/email? -> Direct ATO
|   +-- UUID only? -> Find UUID leak source, then retry
+-- SSRF
|   +-- DNS only? -> DON'T REPORT. Try cloud metadata
|   +-- Can reach 169.254.169.254? -> Extract keys -> RCE
|   +-- Internal port scan? -> Find Redis/K8s -> RCE
+-- SQLi
|   +-- Error-based? -> Extract data (passwords, tokens)
|   +-- Can INTO OUTFILE? -> Web shell -> RCE
|   +-- Blind? -> Boolean/Time extraction
+-- Open Redirect
|   +-- OAuth flow? -> Token theft -> ATO
|   +-- javascript: scheme? -> XSS
+-- Blocked by defense
|   -> Bypass (WAF/CSP/proxy/sanitizer/2FA)
+-- Low-impact, can't escalate alone
    -> Find connector gadget for chain

After proving impact, check:

• Can attack work with 0-1 clicks? (minimize prerequisites)
• Does it affect all users or specific role?
• What's the business $ impact?

Phase 5: VALIDATE & REPORT

Goal: Get paid. Make triager's job easy.

Pre-report gate:

Run /validate (7-Question Gate)
+-- All 7 pass? -> Write report
+-- Any fail? -> KILL the finding. Don't waste time.
+-- Borderline? -> Run /triage for quick go/no-go

Multi-Tool Reproduction Bar (Critical / High only):

Before labeling a finding Critical or High, reproduce it via at least two independent tools (different stacks, different HTTP libraries). Cross-tool consistency rules out tool-artefact findings (e.g., a curl-only timing differential that disappears under Python requests was an artefact, not a bug).

Examples of independent reproductions:

• curl + Burp send_http1_request (different TLS stacks, different header normalisation)
• Python requests + raw socket via ssl.wrap_socket (one library normalises, one doesn't)
• Burp Repeater + Python urllib (same wire result expected from both)

The reproduction commands MUST be paste-into-shell ready in the report — a triager copies them verbatim. If the curl version requires special flags or breaks on certain systems, include a Python alternative.

Lesson from an authorized engagement: All three Critical findings (Authentication.asmx brute-force, TE.CL smuggling, NTLM Type-2 disclosure) were each independently reproduced via curl + Python raw sockets + Burp tooling. The cross-tool consistency was what convinced the triage write-up that the findings were not artefacts.

Report:

Run /report
+-- Platform-specific format (H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi)
+-- Title: [Bug Class] in [Endpoint] allows [role] to [impact]
+-- Impact-first summary (sentence 1 = what attacker CAN do)
+-- Exact HTTP requests in Steps to Reproduce
+-- Under 600 words
+-- CVSS 3.1 score that MATCHES actual impact

After submission:

• While waiting for triage: try to escalate further (A->B signal method)
• If fix deployed: re-test for bypass (incomplete patch = new bug)
• Record finding with /remember for hunt memory

PART 3: NAVIGATION & TIMING

Non-Linear Navigation Quick Reference

20-Minute Rotation Clock

Every 20 minutes ask yourself: "Am I making progress?"

• Yes -> Continue
• No -> Rotate to next: endpoint -> subdomain -> vuln class -> target
• Been on same target 2+ weeks with no findings? -> Consider switching program

Pushback Protocol (When the User Says "Find More")

When the user disagrees with your stopping point — e.g., "I've found 10+ bugs, you should find the same," or "look harder," or "you're missing things":

Default assumption: they are correct. You stopped early.

Before pushing back with "I think we're done because X," do this:

1. Re-read 3 more hunt-* skills beyond what you have loaded. Pick ones that match observed surface (e.g., custom login → hunt-auth-bypass; SOAP endpoints → look for protocol-specific skills; URL parameters → hunt-ssrf).
2. Re-attack the same surface with the new skill checklists. Walk every step in the new skills, even if it feels redundant.
3. Document negatives as you go — a confirmed "no bug here" is itself a finding for the user to see (it proves coverage).
4. Only after exhausting 3 new skills' checklists do you push back, and only with a concrete list of what was tested.

Lesson from an authorized engagement: After a first-pass of 5 weak findings the user said "I have 10+, find them." Loading hunt-auth-bypass (which had been loaded but not walked through end-to-end) immediately surfaced the /_vti_bin/Authentication.asmx legacy SOAP login — the highest-impact bug in the engagement. The user was right; pushback would have been wrong.

Tool Routing by Phase

Session End Checklist

• Save all Burp/Caido project files
• Record any "weird but not yet exploitable" behaviors (future gadgets)
• Update notes with failed attempts (don't re-test with same techniques)
• Log findings with /remember

PART 4: METHODOLOGY DISCIPLINE (False-Positive Prevention)

Most retracted findings come from four recurring process bugs. Each has a hard rule.

Important framing: These discipline rules are about correctness of findings — not throttling of effort. They tell you which signals are real findings and which aren't. They do not tell you to send fewer probes. If you find yourself using these rules to justify stopping early, you're misreading them — load redteam-mindset (DO NOT STOP primary directive) and continue. Coverage discipline and finding-correctness discipline are orthogonal axes; you need both on full.

Marker Discipline

When testing for reflection, cache poisoning, parameter pollution, or OOB SSRF, the marker string you inject MUST be unique and unmistakable.

Rules:

• Markers are random alphanumeric strings, 8+ characters, no English words, no protocol keywords.
• NEVER use test, marker, evil, attacker, payload, javascript, script, AAAA, BBBB, your domain name, or any string that could plausibly appear naturally in the target's HTML/JS/error messages.
• Good markers: cpmark987abc, x4hd2k9pq, a Collaborator subdomain prefix like dlsrcurl.<collab>.oastify.com, or __ZZ_MARKER_<random>_ZZ__.
• Before claiming reflection: search the baseline (no-marker) response for the marker string. If it appears naturally, change your marker. This single check catches 80% of false-positive reflection reports.
• For OOB testing, sub-tag each Collaborator payload (e.g., dlsrcurl.<collab>, authsrc.<collab>) so callbacks identify the specific sink that fired.

Lesson from an authorized engagement: Initial scan flagged X-Forwarded-Proto: javascript as reflecting into multiple SharePoint pages. The "reflection" was the literal word javascript appearing naturally in SP help-link hrefs (href="javascript:HelpWindowKey(...)"). False positive caused by a non-unique marker.

Body-Diff Rule

A bypass claim requires response body differential, not just status code.

Rules:

• 200 OK with byte-identical body to the baseline is NOT a bypass.
• 200 OK with a 5-byte difference might be — verify what changed (correlation ID? timestamp? real content?).
• Always diff the body side-by-side before claiming bypass: diff <(curl ... baseline) <(curl ... bypass).
• Status-code-only claims (e.g. "Host header X gave 200 instead of 403") are the most common rejected-as-N/A category on bug bounty platforms.

Lesson from an authorized engagement: Host: target.example:80@evil.example.com returned HTTP 200 instead of the baseline 403. Looked like a Host-header bypass. But the body was byte-identical (8341 bytes both) — the AWS ELB normalised the Host to target.example:80, dropping the @evil portion. Not a bypass.

Statistical-Sample Rule (for timing-based claims)

Single outliers are NOT signal. Network jitter routinely produces 2× outliers.

Rules for any user-enum / blind-SQLi / blind-NoSQLi / timing-side-channel claim:

• Minimum sample size: n ≥ 10 INTERLEAVED trials per group (control + test, randomised order, not back-to-back).
• Compute mean, median, σ for each group.
• A signal requires the suspect group's mean to be ≥ 2σ above the control group's mean.
• A single 2× outlier in n=1 testing is jitter, not signal.

Lesson from an authorized engagement: Single-shot probe showed Administrator taking 1527 ms vs ~700 ms control on Authentication.asmx Login — looked like clear user-enum signal. Reproduction with n=80 interleaved trials across 8 groups collapsed every group to mean=685-716 ms, σ=25-74 ms. The 1527 ms was network jitter. Finding retracted.

Shell-Loop Ban (>5 iterations)

For any iteration that runs more than 5 times, use Python (with try/except per iteration), not shell for-loops.

Why: zsh array expansion fails silently on edge cases. A loop like for x in "${arr[@]}" can produce zero iterations with no error if the array wasn't populated by the previous command. The user sees output that looks complete but actually skipped the test entirely.

Rules:

• Loops of ≤5 hardcoded items in shell: OK.
• Anything that iterates a list, file, or computed range: Python.
• Always count results. If you expected 100 probes and got <50 lines of output, your loop ate something.

Lesson from an authorized engagement: A zsh array-iteration verb-tampering test silently produced no curl invocations across 20+ iterations (zsh ate the array). Output looked like "HIT [GET] /_api/web → " repeated for every probe but the actual response was missing. ~50 probes worth of testing lost. Switching the test to Python with explicit per-iteration logging surfaced the real results.

Related Skills & Chains

• hunt-dispatch — When PART 0 mode is confirmed (redteam / wapt + blackbox|greybox). Workflow primitive: after the engagement-type answer is locked, hand off to hunt-dispatch to fingerprint the target and load the matching platform + hunt-* skill set; this skill stops being the active context once dispatch prints its taxonomy.
• bug-bounty — When the user asks a generic "what should I do" or starts a new target. Workflow primitive: bug-bounty is the orchestrator that names which hunt-* skills to load by topic; this skill (bb-methodology) provides the 5-phase workflow that orchestrator runs against.
• triage-validation — When a finding completes Phase 4 and is about to be written up. Workflow primitive: Phase 5 explicitly calls /validate (the 7-Question Gate); only findings that pass all 7 questions get handed off to report-writing.
• offensive-osint + web2-recon — When Phase 1 (Recon) is active. Workflow primitive: Phase 1's "Wide approach" delegates to offensive-osint for asset arsenal and web2-recon for the live-host + URL pipeline.

Operator Notes (Claude-BugHunter)

Engagement-derived additions to the vendored foundation. Wisdom from real authorized engagements + Phase 2 verification across this repo's 31+ skill-area live tests. The upstream methodology covers the WHAT; this layer covers the WHEN-IT-ACTUALLY-WORKS and the FAILURE-MODES.

What the methodology doesn't tell you

The vendored 5-phase workflow is a checklist; real engagements are improvisation. Sometimes you skip phases entirely — a client hands you a single URL and a JWT, recon was already done by their internal team, and Phase 1 collapses to a 10-minute fingerprint. Sometimes you spend 80% of the engagement in Phase 1 because the scope is a 200-asset financial-services parent org and asset discovery IS the work. The methodology is a map of terrain that exists in every engagement, not a sequence you traverse uniformly.

Mode-confirmation, in practice

PART 0 (the bug-bounty vs WAPT vs red-team gate at the top of this file) is a hard rule, but the answer isn't always handed to you. Read the scope language:

• "in-scope assets" + "out-of-scope assets" + "safe harbor" → bug-bounty discipline. Validation-heavy, OOB-required, no exfil.
• "kill chain" + "objectives" + "flag capture" + "adversary emulation" → red-team. Stealth, persistence, lateral movement valid.
• "compliance" + "PCI" + "HIPAA" + "executive report" + "remediation timeline" → WAPT. Coverage-driven, deliverable-focused, all findings count regardless of exploitability.

When the language is mixed (common — clients often write WAPT-shaped SOWs and call them red-team engagements), default to bug-bounty discipline until proven otherwise. It's the most validation-strict mode; you can always relax later if the client confirms red-team. The reverse — assuming red-team latitude on what turns out to be a WAPT — gets findings retracted at delivery.

Phase priority shifts by target type

The 5 phases are not equal-weight. Engagement type dictates the time allocation:

If you find yourself spending 50% of a SaaS bug-bounty engagement in recon, you're procrastinating on the hunt. If you're spending 10% of an external red-team engagement on recon, you've already lost — the attack surface map IS the deliverable on those.

When to break the methodology

If you find a Critical in the first 30 minutes of recon, stop reconning, validate the Critical fully, report it, then return to recon. The methodology says "complete the phase before moving on" — the value-per-hour curve disagrees. A confirmed Critical paying out within 24h of engagement start is worth more than a comprehensive asset list you'll never get to chain.

The same applies in reverse: if you've been hunting a candidate for 4+ hours and it won't reproduce on a second account, the candidate is dead. Don't sink another 4 hours into making a dead candidate reproduce. Drop it, document the retraction in your notes, move on.

The discipline rules are non-negotiable

The discipline rules in this file — OOB Gate, Marker Discipline, Body-Diff Rule, Statistical-Sample Rule, Server-Policy-vs-State, Pre-Severity Gate, Shell-Loop Ban — are not methodology. They are quality gates. Methodology is the order of operations; these are the validation guarantees at each step.

Verified across Phase 2D's hardened-lab campaign: 8/8 discipline rules fired correctly against fake-bug-shaped behavior (URL echo dressed as XSS, word collision dressed as reflection, status-code-only "bypasses" with byte-identical bodies, 200-OK leak-claims with no actual leak data). Validation rates fall sharply when these rules get skipped. The friction is the feature — if a rule feels obstructive, that's it doing its job. The findings it kills are the half that would have come back N/A anyway.

• evidence-hygiene — When Phase 5 is collecting PoC screenshots / HARs. Workflow primitive: before any cookie / PII appears in a screenshot, hand off to evidence-hygiene for the redaction protocol.