Competition Kerberos Delegation
Use this skill only as a downstream specialization after $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator is already active and has established sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities. If that has not happened yet, return to $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator first.
Use this skill when the hard part is not "is there Kerberos here," but which delegation edge exists, which ticket is being minted, and which service really accepts it.
Reply in Simplified Chinese unless the user explicitly requests English.
Quick Start
- Write the trust chain first: principal -> delegation edge -> ticket type -> target SPN -> accepting service -> resulting privilege.
- Separate ticket possession from accepted privilege.
- Keep SPNs, delegation mode, PAC/group data, encryption type, and service acceptance in one compact evidence block.
- Reproduce one minimal delegation chain before broadening into variants.
- Tie every privilege claim to a specific accepted ticket or service-side effect.
Workflow
1. Identify The Delegation Edge
- Determine whether the path is constrained delegation, unconstrained delegation, resource-based constrained delegation, protocol transition, or another trust edge.
- Inspect SPNs, ACLs, service accounts, SIDHistory, certificate templates, and replication rights only when they affect the active path.
2. Trace Ticket Minting And Acceptance
- Record TGT/TGS type, S4U steps when relevant, delegation flags, PAC or group data, encryption type, cache location, and target SPN.
- Prove which service actually accepts the ticket and what capability appears after acceptance.
3. Report The Effective Edge
- Compress the chain into one replayable path, not a vague "domain compromise" statement.
- Separate candidate edges from the edge that really lands privilege.
Read This Reference
- Load
references/kerberos-delegation.md for the delegation checklist, ticket fields to preserve, and common proof mistakes.
What To Preserve
- SPN, ticket type, delegation mode, PAC/group data, encryption type, cache location, accepting service
- Service-side logs, event IDs, logon session changes, or group changes proving effective privilege
- The exact trust edge that makes the ticket replayable
1---2name: competition-kerberos-delegation3description: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Kerberos delegation, SPN trust edges, S4U abuse, RBCD, constrained or unconstrained delegation, and service-ticket acceptance. Use when the user asks about constrained delegation, unconstrained delegation, RBCD, S4U, SPNs, ticket acceptance, or how a Kerberos trust edge turns into effective privilege under sandbox assumptions. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.4---5
6# Competition Kerberos Delegation
7
8Use this skill only as a downstream specialization after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` is already active and has established sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities. If that has not happened yet, return to `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` first.
9
10Use this skill when the hard part is not "is there Kerberos here," but which delegation edge exists, which ticket is being minted, and which service really accepts it.
11
12Reply in Simplified Chinese unless the user explicitly requests English.
13
14## Quick Start
15
161. Write the trust chain first: principal -> delegation edge -> ticket type -> target SPN -> accepting service -> resulting privilege.
172. Separate ticket possession from accepted privilege.
183. Keep SPNs, delegation mode, PAC/group data, encryption type, and service acceptance in one compact evidence block.
194. Reproduce one minimal delegation chain before broadening into variants.
205. Tie every privilege claim to a specific accepted ticket or service-side effect.
21
22## Workflow
23
24### 1. Identify The Delegation Edge
25
26- Determine whether the path is constrained delegation, unconstrained delegation, resource-based constrained delegation, protocol transition, or another trust edge.
27- Inspect SPNs, ACLs, service accounts, SIDHistory, certificate templates, and replication rights only when they affect the active path.
28
29### 2. Trace Ticket Minting And Acceptance
30
31- Record TGT/TGS type, S4U steps when relevant, delegation flags, PAC or group data, encryption type, cache location, and target SPN.
32- Prove which service actually accepts the ticket and what capability appears after acceptance.
33
34### 3. Report The Effective Edge
35
36- Compress the chain into one replayable path, not a vague "domain compromise" statement.
37- Separate candidate edges from the edge that really lands privilege.
38
39## Read This Reference
40
41- Load `references/kerberos-delegation.md` for the delegation checklist, ticket fields to preserve, and common proof mistakes.
42
43## What To Preserve
44
45- SPN, ticket type, delegation mode, PAC/group data, encryption type, cache location, accepting service
46- Service-side logs, event IDs, logon session changes, or group changes proving effective privilege
47- The exact trust edge that makes the ticket replayable
gabrielmoreira