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Is Detecting Eval Exec Usage free to use?

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Who published Detecting Eval Exec Usage?

gabrielmoreira (@gabrielmoreira) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Detecting Eval Exec Usage by gabrielmoreira

Name: Detecting Eval Exec Usage
Rating: 4.2 (5 reviews)
Author: gabrielmoreira

Detecting Eval Exec Usage

Scan a source tree for dynamic-code-execution APIs that an attacker can hijack: Python eval / exec / compile, JavaScript eval / Function() / setTimeout(string), Ruby eval / instance_eval / class_eval, Java ScriptEngine, PHP eval / assert($str), .NET Activator.CreateInstance / Reflection.Emit with dynamic input. Use when: pre-commit gate on any application that parses user-uploaded code (rule engines, formula evaluators, plugin systems), or post-bug-report when "we run user-supplied expressions." Threshold: any call to eval / exec / Function / similar where the argument is not a string literal. Trigger with: "scan eval", "find dynamic exec", "audit eval calls", "code injection patterns".

gabrielmoreira Updated Sep 9, 2026 17 repo stars

File contents

Detecting eval / exec Usage

Overview

Dynamic-code-execution APIs (CWE-95 Eval Injection) let an application interpret a string as code at runtime. If the string contains anything user-controllable, the application has handed the attacker arbitrary code execution.

The defensive posture: don't use these APIs. The exceptions are narrow: rule engines, formula evaluators (spreadsheet = formulas), plugin systems with explicit sandboxing. For everything else, there's almost always a safer alternative.

When the skill produces findings

Finding	Severity	Threshold	Affected control
Python `eval(...)` with non-literal	CRITICAL	argument contains var ref	CWE-95
Python `exec(...)` with non-literal	CRITICAL	argument contains var ref	CWE-95
Python `compile(...)` with non-literal	HIGH	source string contains var	CWE-95
Python `__import__(var)`	HIGH	dynamic module loading	CWE-95
JS `eval(...)`	CRITICAL	any	CWE-95
JS `new Function(str)`	CRITICAL	any non-literal	CWE-95
JS `setTimeout/setInterval(string)`	HIGH	string instead of function	CWE-95
Ruby `eval(...)`/`instance_eval(...)`/`class_eval(...)`	CRITICAL	non-literal	CWE-95
PHP `eval(...)`	CRITICAL	always	CWE-95
PHP `assert($str)`	CRITICAL	(legacy code-eval form)	CWE-95
PHP `create_function`	CRITICAL	deprecated, eval-equivalent	CWE-95
Java `ScriptEngineManager` + eval	HIGH	dynamic script execution	CWE-95
C# `Activator.CreateInstance(Type.GetType(str))`	HIGH	type loading from string	CWE-95

Prerequisites

Python 3.9+
Source tree on local filesystem

Instructions

Run

python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-eval-exec-usage/scripts/scan_eval.py /path/to/repo

Options: --output FILE, --format json|jsonl|markdown, --min-severity, --include-tests, --languages LIST.

Interpret

CRITICAL = direct RCE vector. Replace the dynamic execution with explicit logic (lookup table, switch statement) or a sandboxed expression library (Python simpleeval, JavaScript expr-eval, Ruby Dentaku).

Remediation

See references/PLAYBOOK.md.

Examples

Pre-commit

python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-eval-exec-usage/scripts/scan_eval.py \
    --min-severity high $(git diff --name-only main...HEAD | tr '\n' ' ')

CI

- run: |
    python3 plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/detecting-eval-exec-usage/scripts/scan_eval.py \
        . --min-severity high

Output

JSON / JSONL / Markdown. Exit codes: 0 / 1 / 2.

Error Handling

False positive on eval("'literal'") — the value is a constant string. Verify the regex match by reading the source line.

Resources

references/THEORY.md — Why dynamic-code execution is the highest-impact injection class, sandbox limits, the formula-evaluator design pattern
references/PLAYBOOK.md — Per-language safe alternatives (Python simpleeval / ast.literal_eval, JS expression-eval libraries, Ruby Dentaku, Java scripting sandboxes)

---name: detecting-eval-exec-usagedescription: Scan a source tree for dynamic-code-execution APIs that an attacker can hijack: Python eval / exec / compile, JavaScript eval / Function() / setTimeout(string), Ruby eval / instance_eval / class_eval, Java ScriptEngine, PHP eval / assert($str), .NET Activator.CreateInstance / Reflection.Emit with dynamic input. Use when: pre-commit gate on any application that parses user-uploaded code (rule engines, formula evaluators, plugin systems), or post-bug-report when "we run user-supplied expressions." Threshold: any call to eval / exec / Function / similar where the argument is not a string literal. Trigger with: "scan eval", "find dynamic exec", "audit eval calls", "code injection patterns".license: MIT--- # Detecting eval / exec Usage ## Overview Dynamic-code-execution APIs (CWE-95 Eval Injection) let an application interpret a string as code at runtime. If the string contains anything user-controllable, the application has handed the attacker arbitrary code execution. The defensive posture: don't use these APIs. The exceptions are narrow: rule engines, formula evaluators (spreadsheet `=` formulas), plugin systems with explicit sandboxing. For everything else, there's almost always a safer alternative. ## When the skill produces findings | Finding | Severity | Threshold | Affected control | |---|---|---|---| | Python `eval(...)` with non-literal | **CRITICAL** | argument contains var ref | CWE-95 | | Python `exec(...)` with non-literal | **CRITICAL** | argument contains var ref | CWE-95 | | Python `compile(...)` with non-literal | **HIGH** | source string contains var | CWE-95 | | Python `__import__(var)` | **HIGH** | dynamic module loading | CWE-95 | | JS `eval(...)` | **CRITICAL** | any | CWE-95 | | JS `new Function(str)` | **CRITICAL** | any non-literal | CWE-95 | | JS `setTimeout/setInterval(string)` | **HIGH** | string instead of function | CWE-95 | | Ruby `eval(...)`/`instance_eval(...)`/`class_eval(...)` | **CRITICAL** | non-literal | CWE-95 | | PHP `eval(...)` | **CRITICAL** | always | CWE-95 | | PHP `assert($str)` | **CRITICAL** | (legacy code-eval form) | CWE-95 | | PHP `create_function` | **CRITICAL** | deprecated, eval-equivalent | CWE-95 | | Java `ScriptEngineManager` + eval | **HIGH** | dynamic script execution | CWE-95 | | C# `Activator.CreateInstance(Type.GetType(str))` | **HIGH** | type loading from string | CWE-95 | ## Prerequisites - Python 3.9+ - Source tree on local filesystem ## Instructions ### Run ```bash python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-eval-exec-usage/scripts/scan_eval.py /path/to/repo ``` Options: `--output FILE`, `--format json|jsonl|markdown`, `--min-severity`, `--include-tests`, `--languages LIST`. ### Interpret CRITICAL = direct RCE vector. Replace the dynamic execution with explicit logic (lookup table, switch statement) or a sandboxed expression library (Python `simpleeval`, JavaScript `expr-eval`, Ruby `Dentaku`). ### Remediation See `references/PLAYBOOK.md`. ## Examples ### Pre-commit ```bash python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-eval-exec-usage/scripts/scan_eval.py \ --min-severity high $(git diff --name-only main...HEAD | tr '\n' ' ') ``` ### CI ```yaml - run: | python3 plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/detecting-eval-exec-usage/scripts/scan_eval.py \ . --min-severity high ``` ## Output JSON / JSONL / Markdown. Exit codes: 0 / 1 / 2. ## Error Handling False positive on `eval("'literal'")` — the value is a constant string. Verify the regex match by reading the source line. ## Resources - `references/THEORY.md` — Why dynamic-code execution is the highest-impact injection class, sandbox limits, the formula-evaluator design pattern - `references/PLAYBOOK.md` — Per-language safe alternatives (Python simpleeval / ast.literal_eval, JS expression-eval libraries, Ruby Dentaku, Java scripting sandboxes)

Frequently asked questions